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ABSTRACT
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, PARENTAL EFFORT AND SCHOOLING
by
Andrew J. Houtenville
University of New Hampshire, May, 1997
When evaluating public education programs that are aimed at improving student
achievement, it is often assumed that a child's family background is an exogenous
factor, albeit an important factor. However, parental decisions may be influenced by
such programs. It is the assertion of Becker and Tomes (1976) that distortions in
parental behavior (time allocation) may be one of the reasons that compensatory
education fails to improve student achievement. In short, parents reduce their own
effort when school services (schooling) is increased. However, theoretically parental
responses are ambiguous; parental effort can increase or decrease in response to
increased schooling. This dissertation investigates the response of parents to changes
in schooling and the opportunity cost of schooling.
Empirically investigating parental behavior, the National Education
Longitudinal Study (NELS) is utilized. NELS contains parent, student and school
administrator surveys along with standardized student examinations. It is the
comprehensive nature of NELS that allows for the estimation of the model implied by
Becker and Tomes (1976) for the first time. When schooling is assumed to be
exogenous, parental effort equations are estimated the results of which are used in the

xiii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

estimation of the household's achievement production function. When schooling is
assumed to be endogenous, parental effort and schooling equations are estimated, and
again the results are used to estimate the production function. In addition, tests are
performed to determining the exogeneity of schooling.
The empirical results suggest that parental effort is influenced by changes in
schooling and the opportunity cost of schooling. Unfortunately, the results are
conflicting. Depending on the measure of effort and schooling, some estimated
coefficients reveal a complementary relationship between schooling and effort, while
others suggest that schooling and effort are substitutes. With regard to the role of
schooling, exogeneity tests lend support for the non-exogeneity of schooling. In the
end, it is concluded that parental effort is influenced by school variables, and the key
to policy is ensuring that parental responses help rather than hinder policy.

xiv
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Few issues receive more attention from the public, politicians, government and
scholars than child development. First of all, every member of the public was, is or
acts like a child and therefore has something to say about child development.
Presidential politicians even debate the locus of child development: the "village"
versus the "family". In the United States, government programs from Head Start to
public primary and secondary education to student loans are in part aimed at boosting
the attainment of the nation's youth. Government spending on primary and secondary
education alone is roughly 6.6 percent of the United States' gross national product in
1991, as reported by Haverman and Wolfe (1995). Scholars are not short on words.
Numerous studies have evaluated the determinants of child attainment as measured by
cognitive ability, high school graduating rates and labor market wages, to name a few.
One of the most pivotal moments in the child development research was the
issuing of the 1966 Coleman Report. It offered evidence of the importance of the
household environment in determining a child's attainment (as measured by cognitive
ability). In other words, the achievement of primary and secondary students depends
not only on the school and teachers but on the child and parents. The Coleman Report
focused the attention of some economists and others away from schools and toward the
home.
1
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Rather than viewing the household environment as a static or exogenous factor
in the determination of a child's academic achievement, this dissertation looks at how
the constrained choices made by parents influence their child's academic achievement.
Of particular interest is what happens to the efforts of parents when attempts are made
by federal, state and local governments to boost student achievement. In theoretical
models below, it is shown that parental effort may increase or decrease in response to
such government programs.1 Becker and Tomes (1976) assert that such distortions in
household behavior may explain the failure of government programs. However, the
response is ambiguous which means that it is an empirical issue. As a consequence,
this dissertation provides an empirical analysis of parental effort and achievement and
shows that parental effort does respond to changes in the school environment but in
conflicting ways.
General Framework and Central Issues
The general framework employed in this dissertation to explore parental effort
and achievement begins with the assumption that all cultures teach their children the
skills necessary for survival as adults and for the maintenance of the culture. As
institutions, the family and community ("village") are responsible for the development
of these skills. However, due to complexity, the family and community depend on
another institution, the school, to provide services that are too difficult and costly to

1Briefly, the source of this ambiguity is revealed in the following story. Professor
Chamberlin is disappointed with the grades of her students, so she improves her lectures.
This action provides her students with two conflicting incentives. On one hand, her students
can study less while keeping their grade the same. On the other hand, each hour of studying
(effort) is now more effective and thus reduces the opportunity cost of an additional letter
grade. In response, her students may study more to obtain higher grades.
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3
provide in the home and community. In order to produce these skills, the services of
0

the school are combined with other inputs. The observed level of skills and the
corresponding level of school services are chosen within complex interactions between
the family, community and the school. In the following discussion, the level of skill is
called achievement, and the services obtained from the school are called schooling. In
short, achievement is the performance o f a child, while schooling is the exposure a
child gets to educational material.
The family determines the level of achievement, while the community and
school influence the decisions of the family via taxes, subsidies and regulations. First
of all, within the family, parents' preferences for achievement often supersede a
child's ill-informed preferences. Parents' preferences are realized by providing the
inputs used to produce achievement, such as schooling, parental effort (assistance with
homework), books, home computers, etc. and by overseeing the production process.
The community's preference for achievement is realized by subsidizing the family's
purchase of inputs (such as schooling, nutrition, and a safe environment) and the
creation and enforcement of regulations regarding schooling. The school's preferences
for achievement are realized via their productive efficiency in producing schooling,
i.e., their efficiency influences the cost of achievement borne by the family. It is
important to note that the community and schools can influence achievement by
influencing schooling; but in order to do so, they must go through the family.
This generai framework facilitates the investigation of the family's response to
the actions of the community which is the central issue of the analysis presented
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below; however, the behaviors of the community and school are not explicitly
modeled. Of particular interest are (1) how parental effort and student achievement
may change in response to the actions of the community and (2) whether schooling is
chosen by families or exogenously determined.
Advancements
In the process of investigating parental effort, schooling and achievement, three
theoretical models are developed within the context of household production and time
allocation. In general, these models formalize a household's demand for and supply
of inputs that go into the production of achievement and then describe that household's
production function for achievement. In essence, the household satisfies its demand
for achievement via the supply of parental effort and purchasing of schooling. The
three theoretical models differ in the ability of families to choose schooling; however,
the aforementioned ambiguity in parental behavior shows up in all three models.
Empirically, following the implications of these theoretical models, reduced
form effort supply and schooling factor demand equations are estimated, and then
these results are used to estimate the household production function for achievement.
(Of course, the schooling equation is dropped if schooling is exogenous. This
assumption is empirically tested.) The effort supply and schooling demand equations
address the ambiguities in parental behavior. In particular, the Becker and Tomes'
(1976) assertion is empirically modeled for the first time with regard to primary and
secondary education.
The estimates of effort supply and schooling demand are used to consistently
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estimate the production function, something that has been neglected in the past due to
data limitations. They lacked either adequate effort data or adequate achievement
data. In addition, linking effort supply and schooling demand with the production of
achievement merges the time allocation and household production function literatures
for the first time with regard to achievement. This is in accordance with a
recommendation made by Mincer (1977).
None of these advancements would be possible if not for the Restricted-Use
National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS). This rich data set has been largely
ignored by the economics literature. It provides individual level data for children,
their parents and their schools, in addition to other family and household
characteristics. In particular, along with a child's standardized test score, NELS
provides measures of his or her parents' effort and characteristics of his or her school.
With these variables, effort, schooling and achievement equations are estimated.
Jointly investigating time allocation and household production behavior could not be
performed without such a broad yet detailed data set.
Structure of Following Chapters
In order to explore parental effort and achievement, this dissertation utilizes the
family economics, education economics, and public finance literatures. These
literatures are reviewed in Chapter II. As mentioned above, theoretical and empirical
models of parental behavior are developed to investigate the determinants of parental
effort and to explore how these determinants influence the academic achievement of
children. Schooling as an input into the production of achievement is assumed to be
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outside the influence of the family in Chapter m , while schooling is assumed to be
chosen by the family in Chapter IV. In the last section of Chapter IV, whether
families choose schooling is tested. A synthesis of results and concluding remarks are
provided in Chapter V. A list of references plus appendices that include tables,
mathematical derivations and a description of the data follow Chapter V.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to explain the observed level of achievement and schooling,
economists focus on the constrained choices of families, communities, and schools and
the ability of these institutions to influence achievement and schooling. Various fields
of economics analyze observed achievement and schooling in different ways. First,
the fam ily economics literature frames the determination of achievement and schooling
in terms of a family's demand for and production of child quality, where achievement
is a characteristic of child quality and schooling is an input into the production of child
quality. Second, the education economics literature evaluates the ability of schools to
produce achievement and schooling. Third, the public finance literature focuses on the
community's demand for and supply of achievement and subsequent subsidization of
schooling. Overall, family economics looks at the constraints and choices of the
family, while education economics and public finance evaluate the constraints and
choices of the school and community, respectively.
Family Economics
How families choose achievement and schooling and how families respond to
the actions of the community and school are investigated in the family economics
literature. The study of family economics begins with Harvey Leibenstein (1957) and
Becker (1960) who use consumer theory to model the determinants of fertility
7
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behavior. Becker (1960) suggests that if parents receive direct utility from children,
then children are analogous to consumer durables. He also suggests that there is a
tradeoff between child quantity and child quality, since parents may choose to
consume many low quality children or a couple of high quality children. One o f the
characteristics o f child quality that may satisfy a fam ily's demand is a certain level o f
achievement. In the 1960's, a theory of fertility was developed that posits that the
demand for children (quantity and quality) depends on family characteristics such as
income and the value of the parents' time.
Parallel to the fertility theory, Becker (1965) introduces a new element into
consumer theory - a theory of household production and time allocation. According to
Becker (1965), the family produces utility generating commodities (like achievement)
by employing inputs purchased from the market (like schooling) and household inputs
(like parental effort) in the household's production process. Ignoring intra-family
interactions, the family's problem is to maximize utility,
(1)

defined over commodities subject to production functions,
ci = fi(xP t,)

(i « 1,...,»),

(2)

a budget constraint,
(3)
and a time constraint,
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T = H + Ef(,

(4)

where U(») is the utility function;
Cj is the i* commodity produced by the family;
fi(«) is the household production function for the i* commodity;
Xj is a vector of Iq market goods used to produce the i* commodity;
Pi is a price vector for the k; market goods used to produce the i* commodity;
t; is the family time used to produce the i* commodity;
w is the market wage;
H is the number of hours worked in the labor force;
N is non-labor income;
T is the total time available to the family.2
Substituting the time constraint into the budget constraint creates the "full income"
budget constraint
(5)
There are two approaches to solve the family’s problem: the commodity price
approach and the input approach. In the commodity price approach, the "full income"
budget constraint is transformed into the commodity price budget constraint,

wT + N = E*t(pv p * ..., pH, w)c,,

(6)

by using the production functions to substitute for It, and x;, where Jtj(*) is the
shadow price of the i* commodity. The parameters of the shadow price reflect
household technology and preferences. The family's problem is to maximize utility
subject to the commodity price budget constraint. The solution is a set of commodity

2 Assuming there is only one wage earner or that the parents receive the same wage
simplifies matters greatly.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
demand functions,
c, - CjOtiCpj,..., p„, w),..., n^Cpp..., p„ w), IV, T, w)

(i = 1,..., n).

(7)

The properties of these commodity demand functions are consistent with the properties
of traditional demand functions.3 The input demands and time supply equations fo*
and O are found residually by entering the optimal commodity into conditional input
demands and time supply equations.
In the input approach, the production functions are substituted into the utility
function; therefore, the family's problem is to maximize utility,

WiC*i, *i).... /,(■*„. 0).

<8>

subject to the household "full income" budget constraint. The solution is thus the
family's input demand functions,

V* = ^ (P p - .. P„, w, N, 7)

(i = 1,..., n),

(9>

(/ = 1,..., n).

(10>

and time supply functions,

= tjCPp—.P ,. w», Nt T)

The family’s production functions for the desired commodity,

<T

O

= 1

«).

(11)

are found residually by entering the input demand and time supply functions into the
3 Strong assumptions must be made about the household production function in order to
derive the commodity demand as a function of the shadow prices. Poliak and Wachter (1975)
show that constant returns to scale and no joint production of commodities must be assumed,
otherwise the shadow prices change with the amount of commodities demanded.
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production functions. Note that these production functions for the desired commodity
are not commodity demand functions, since there is no explicit representation of
commodity price.4
As a result, the influence of the commodity's shadow price on its demand (dc’’/dT^)
cannot be constructed. However, all of the other comparative statics of c ” and Cj* are
identical, since they are derived from the same first-order conditions.
National Bureau of Economic Research's (NBER) work on fertility decisions
(notably, Willis 1973, Becker and Lewis 1973, and De Tray 1973) incorporated the
new fertility theory and the new theory of household production and time allocation.
Not surprisingly, family economics views children, in terms of quantity and quality, as
one of the commodities produced and demanded by the family. These studies
theoretically and empirically evaluate various aspects of the trade-off between child
quality and quantity. Another important advancement made in the NBER series is the
use of educational achievement as an element of child quality. De Tray (1973) uses
expected county public school per pupil expenditures as a measure of child quality.
Household Production Function Studies
With achievement as a form of household output, studies estimating
household production functions of achievement proliferated: Leibowitz (1974a, 1977),
Fleisher (1977), Mumane, Maynard and Ohls (1981), Behrman and Taubman (1986),
Stafford (1987), Krein and Beller (1988), and Hanushek (1992). In these studies, the

4 Constant returns to scale and no joint production of commodities do not have to be
assumed, because the input approach is not trying to derive the commodity demand as a
function of the shadow price.
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household produces a certain characteristic of child quality, for example, earnings,
market wage rate, or academic achievement as measured by test scores or grade level
completed. In general, these characteristics are regressed on household inputs and
characteristics, such as schooling, proxies for parental effort, the availability of
reading material, encyclopedias, a television, mother's education, father's education,
mother's work habits, father's work habits, birth order, number of siblings, gender of
child, family income, food expenditures, house size, whether the family lives in public
housing, and whether the parents are divorced.
For example, Leibowitz (1974a) and Fleisher (1977) use a recursive system of
production functions for I.Q., achievement, and wage/eamings to model the influence
of household inputs on these three measures of child quality. The I.Q. production
function,
I.Q. = / ( household inputs),
is imbedded in the achievement (measured by years of education completed)
production function,
achievement = g(household inputs, I.Q),

(13)

which is imbedded in the wage/eamings production function,
wagefeamings =f{household inputs, achievement).

(H)

The direction of this recursive system is based on the age when these measures are
most important and most influenced by household inputs. The endogeneity of
achievement in the production of earnings/wages follows the human capital production
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function literature that started with Ben-Porath (1967).5
Coming from a different direction and a static approach, Mumane et al. (1981)
and Hanushek (1992) include school quality in the achievement production function,
where achievement is measured by standardized test scores. The family produces
achievement by mixing exogenously determined schooling with other household inputs
which are also exogenously determined. In their empirical models, the schooling is
not chosen by the family, although the authors provide no justification for this
assumption. However, in a separate section of his paper, Hanushek (1992) estimates
an equation that suggests a strong relationship between teacher quality and household
characteristics, but he does not include the insights from this equation in his household
production model where teacher quality is exogenous. Mumane et al. (1981) discuss
the ability of families to choose inputs, but do not follow through with this discussion
in their empirical specifications.
These studies estimate the household production function in order to examine
the influence of household technology on the determination of achievement. However,
these household production studies fall short of the theoretical underpinnings of Becker
(1965) and the NBER work. Recall in the input approach, the solution of Becker's
(1965) model is a series of household input demand functions (x;**), time supply

1 The human capital approach is complementary to the approach taken in the family
economics literature, for it simply modifies the family's objective function. Achievement
becomes a form of human capital which is a means to consumption rather that a consumable
item. The demand for achievement is a factor demand in the production of wealth and
depends on the rate of return on achievement. The motivations of the family are placed in
terms of altruism and inter-generational wealth transfers.
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functions ( O , anti residually found production functions for desired achievement
(C ;* * ).

The aforementioned household production studies attempt to estimate the

household production function for achievement (Cj) but are actually inconsistently
estimating the production function for desired achievement (c " ).6 With few
exceptions, the inputs into the production function are considered exogenous to the
choices made by the household.7 For example, when included, parental effort (or a
proxy) is exogenous and not explored as a matter of choice.8 Without first estimating
the input demand and time supply functions, the estimation of a production function is
not only inconsistent but cannot disentangle household technology from household
preferences.
Time Supply Studies
In order to produce achievement, the family mixes schooling with other inputs
such as parental time. Becker's (1965) theory of household production and time
allocation set the groundwork for numerous time supply studies such as Leibowitz
(1974b), Gronau (1977), Stafford and Hill (1974, 1977, 1980), Kooreman and

6 Inconsistency exists because of the likely correlation between the error term in the
production function and error terms of the underlying household's factor demand and time
supply equations. In other words, inputs are choice variables (endogenous)
7 Leibowitz (1974a) and Fleisher (1977) consider I.Q. as endogenous in the production of
achievement and then achievement as endogenous in wages/earnings.
8 The shortcomings of all of these studies, except Stafford (1987), are due to a lack of the
data set that contains detailed information on both household output and inputs. Data sets with
student achievement are not often collected with specific household input data. For example,
marital status is sometimes used to proxy parental effort, because presumably married couples
spend more time with their children. In defense of these household production studies, very
few microeconomic data surveys contain information on achievement, household inputs, and
school inputs.
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Kapteyn (1987), and Solberg and Wong (1991). Recall one solution of Becker's
(1965) model is a system of input demand and time supply equations (X;** and tj” ).
These studies focus on the inputs into household production. They address such issues
as time allocation among household members, housework, and female labor supply.
In these studies, the household supplies a certain amount of time to a particular task,
for example, child care time by mother, washing dishes, doing laundry, aggregate
housework by homemaker, leisure, market work, personal care, and interacting with
their children (teaching, reading, playing). In general, the amount of time supplied is
regressed on family characteristics, such as wife's education, husband's education,
wife's age, husband's age, husband's occupation, wife's work experience, husband's
wage, wife's wage, predicted housewife's wage, number of children, children's
gender, children's age, number of children in school, family income, family non-labor
income, house size, race, and religion.
However, these time supply studies do not follow through with the estimation
of the production function for desired child quality

(Cj**),

nor do they look at schooling

as an input. For example, Gronau (1977) examines the allocation of married women's
time between work at home, work in the market, and leisure, but he lacks a measure
of household output which is needed to estimate the commodity demand function.
Leibowitz (1974b) examines the supply of child care by mothers and focuses on the
role of the mother's education on time allocation decisions, but she also lacks output
data. By failing to estimate the production function and other input demand functions
(such as a factor demand for schooling), the time supply studies can say little about
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the influence of household choices on the determination of the level of output, like
achievement and the mix of inputs, like schooling.
Merging the Two Lines of Research
From Becker's theory of time allocation and household production, family
economics splits into two lines of research that differ in their focus on inputs and
outputs. However, the Hill and Stafford team and Leibowitz participate in both lines
of research.9 Commenting on Hill and Stafford (1977 - time allocation), Mincer
(1977) suggests merging time supply and household production function studies. Hill
and Stafford (1977) do not estimate the household production function for desired
achievement using their own data. Instead, they cite Leibowitz's (1974a) household
production function results in order to show a positive correlation between
achievement and parental time inputs. Mincer (1977, p. 554) states, "[a]ctually, Hill
and Stafford show no direct relationship between parental time inputs and measures [of
a] child's development or achievement." In essence, Mincer (1977) wants Hill and
Stafford (1977) to address the commodity (achievement) that actually motivates the
supply of time. Stafford (1987) does not attempt such a merger, even though he uses
a data set with seemingly adequate household output data (standardized student test
scores). Stafford (1987) does not address Mincer's (1977) criticisms by
simultaneously estimating household production function and time supply equations.
Addressing Mincer's (1977) suggestion, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) merge

9 These studies are Leibowitz (1974a, 1977 - household production, 1974b - time
allocation) Stafford (1987 - household production), Hill and Stafford (1974, 1977, 1980 - time
allocation)).
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the two branches of the literature by simultaneously estimating household input
demand equations

(X ;**)

and the household production function.10 Specifically,

Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) estimate the demand for health related inputs and the
infant health production function. They use the predicted values of the household
inputs to consistently estimate the production function. In doing so, Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1983) translate the household production function from a constraint into a
behavioral relationship; in other words, they translate the production function into the
production function for desired infant health (c: into

Cj**).

Recall that this production

function is not like the standard formulation of a demand equation, because there is no
explicit commodity price or shadow price. The main emphasis of Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1983) is on obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters. They do not
attempt to isolate preferences. Returning to achievement, Rosenzweig and Schultz's
(1983) empirical model suggests that the input demands for schooling, parental effort,
and other household inputs must be estimated and the results used to estimate the
household's production function for desired achievement.
The Family's Response tQ ihg Community and the School
Given Becker's (1965) model of household consumption and production, the
response of the family to the actions of the community and school may be addressed.
As previously mentioned, the community influences the family's decisions through the
taxation, subsidization and regulation of schooling, while school employees influence
achievement via their efficiency in providing schooling. In family economics, Becker

10 Time use data was not available for the estimation of time supply equations.
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and Tomes (1976) discuss the influence of the community and the school by allowing
these institutions to influence a child's initial quality endowment. According to Becker
and Tomes (1976), parents respond to an exogenous increase in a child's quality
endowment in two ways. On one hand, the increased endowment increases the
production/consumption possibilities of the parents for all commodities. In response,
parents shift household resources devoted to child quality away from that child and
toward other household activities. As a result, the child's quality increases by less
than the exogenous increase in the child's quality endowment. On the other hand, the
increased endowment may increase the productivity of the other inputs in the
production of that child's quality, thereby reducing the shadow price for that child's
achievement. In response, parents shift household resources toward that child and
away from other household activities.11 As a result, the child's quality increases by
more than the exogenous increase in the child's quality endowment. Concerning
parental effort, schooling, and achievement, this suggests that when the community
subsidizes schooling, parents may actually reduce the amount of direct effort they
expend in the production and consumption of achievement, if the first effect dominates
the second. The amount of achievement may stay the same or increase depending on
the degree of to which parental effort is reduced.
Compensatory education programs (such as Head Start) are a way for the
community to subsidize the purchase of schooling by certain families. Becker and

11 Johnson (1978) and Ross (1991) add that all in-kind transfer programs may suffer from
this adverse redistribution of household resources.
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Tomes (1976) use this result in a discussion of the "failure" of the community to
influence achievement through compensatory education programs. Such programs
essentially give parents additional child quality, but parents may use this in-kind
transfer to redistribute household resources to other activities. Depending on the size
of the two effects above, compensatory education programs may be ineffective. In the
extreme, such programs would have no effect on child quality (educational
achievement). According to Becker (1993, p.274), "[rjedistributions of expenditures
within families induced by government subsidies can explain why many programs
appear to have weak effects on participants." Empirically, Peltzman (1973) found
some evidence that tuition subsidies to higher education reduce the family expenditures
on higher education. Whether parental effort decreases in response to community
actions has yet to be explored empirically.
If parents substitute away from the commodity that is targeted by community
programs (like compensatory education), then communities must take this into
consideration when designing such programs. Likewise, an economist evaluating the
effectiveness of such programs must also consider the distortionary effect the programs
have on household resource allocation and consumption.
Education Economics
To this point, family behavior and the influence of community actions on
family behavior are discussed. In this section, the discussion revolves around the
actions of the school and the impact of these actions on family decisions. The
education economics literature provides insight into the actions of the school.
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School Production Function Studies
The ability of schools to produce achievement is the focus of numerous school
production function studies. Similar to the household production function, the school
produces achievement by mixing certain school inputs such as per pupil expenditures,
student-teacher ratios, teacher qualifications, etc. These school inputs are chosen
according to some unspecified school objective function. However, similar to the
shortcoming of household production studies, family characteristics are assumed to be
exogenous. In other words, family characteristics are entered into the school
production function but are not considered to be influenced by the actions of the
school.
The school production function literature is rooted in the "Coleman Report"
(1966). This controversial and highly cited report finds that school inputs do not
influence student achievement, while family background is extremely influential. The
"Coleman Report" led to the proliferation of studies estimating public school
production functions. Lending support to the "Coleman Report" (1966), Hanushek
(1979, 1981, 1986) surveys these studies and concludes that school inputs do not
influence student achievement, while the family background is very influential. These
conclusions support the approach taken in family economics where the focus is on the
constraints and choices of the family and not the ability of the school to produce
achievement.
Impact of the School on Family Decisions
Hanushek's (1986) conclusions do not mean that actions of the school or school
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employees should be ignored. There is important insight to be gained from
Hanushek's conclusions. Hanushek (1986, pp. 1166) asserts, ”[i]f we think of schools
as maximizing student achievement, the [inability of school inputs to influence
achievement] indicates that [public] schools are economically inefficient, because they
pay for attributes that are not systematically related to achievement." This suggests
that schools are following an alternative objective function, and that the allocation of
school resources runs counter to the objectives of the family and community who
desire school inputs that maximize generation achievement for the minimum costs.
Although, without controlling for the endogeneity of household variables, such
a conclusion cannot be reached. It may be the case that the objective function of
schools is to maximize achievement, but the objectives of families dampen the ability
of schools to boost achievement. For example, suppose that a school increases its
productive efficiency (increase schooling) in the hopes of boosting student
achievement. According to Becker and Tomes (1976), families respond to this in-kind
transfer of schooling and achievement. Some families may respond by reducing their
efforts holding achievement constant, while other families increase their efforts and
increase achievement. A production function for student achievement that does not
consider the endogeneity of family inputs would show school inputs being ineffective
and family characteristics being influential.
The problem with the school production function approach is that schools
produce schooling not achievement. The interaction of school and families is best
understood in family economics where the actions of the school increases or decreases
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the cost of achievement faced by the family. If the school is maximizing achievement,
then it must go through the family to satisfy its objective function.12
Public Finance and Schooling Regulations
To this point, three broad assumptions are made. First, the family maximizes
utility subject to household constraints. In order to do so, the family mixes inputs
such as schooling and time to produce utility generating child achievement.
Importantly, schooling is assumed to be a matter o f choice. Second, subsidies from
the community alleviate the influence of household constraints by giving the family
additional resources to be used in the production of achievement. Third, the behavior
of schools also influences the household constraints via the cost of schooling.13
However, the community also imposes regulations on schooling that introduce an
additional constraint on the ability of the family to choose schooling and achievement.
The degree to which schooling should be treated as endogenous to the family depends
on the degree to which these schooling regulations are binding.
In the United States, there are two important ways in which the community
regulates the family with regard to schooling. First, families are required to provide
children a minimum level of schooling. Although varying across states, this minimum
level of schooling often takes the form of minimum years, days and hours of
schooling. If parents choose to provide schooling in the home and forgo public and

12 Mumane et al. (1981) and Hanushek (1992) looked at the influence of schooling on the
household production of achievement, but they lack an adequate measure o f household inputs
to explore the influence of schooling or its cost on the household's choice of inputs.
13 If schooling is exogenous to the family's decisions, the school and community can
influence the level of schooling directly. This option is explored below.
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private institutions, these parents must meet certain minimum standards. The second
and more important schooling regulation is the mandatory public provision of
schooling and accompanying taxation which forces the family to pay for public
schooling regardless of whether they utilize it.
How these regulations are chosen and the degree to which they constrain a
family's decisions is addressed in the public finance literature. Numerous approaches
are taken to explain the provision of public schooling, such as the Tiebout model, the
median voter model, and the competing Leviathans model. In some of these models,
schooling is exogenous to the choices of the family, while in other models schooling is
endogenous. A major issue addressed in the sections to follow is whether schooling is
an input demand for households or an exogenous factor.
Tiebout Model and Endogenous Schooling
The Tiebout model of publicly provided goods allows the family to choose the
level of public schooling. Tiebout (1965) advances a Pure Theory o f Local
Expenditures in response to work by Richard A. Musgrave and Paul A. Samuelson in
public finance theory that modeled federally provided public goods. Given federal
provision, the only recourse of the "consumer-voter" was to satisfy their preference
through political mechanisms. Tiebout (1956) points out that many governmental
services are locally provided, such as public schooling. Given local provision,
Tiebout (1965, p. 418) asserts that "consumer-voters" may satisfy their preferences by
"picking the community that best satisfies his preferences for public goods."
Metaphorically, the "consumer-voters" shop or vote with their feet. Musgrave and
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Samuelson's implicit assumption of federal provision did not give "consumer-voters" a
choice. Assuming perfect mobility of households and the absence of institutional
inefficiencies, the family moves to the jurisdiction that provided its utility maximizing
bundle of publicly provided goods.
In essence, the Tiebout model equates the family and the community by placing
the family as the central decision-maker. The objective function and constraints of the
family explain the observed level of publicly provided schooling.14 A family moves to
the school district with their optimal level of schooling. Given perfect mobility and
the absence of institutional inefficiencies, the observed public schooling in a school
district is consistent with the preferences of every family within this school district.
Given the homogeneity of the community, the family mirrors the community. This
result also allows conclusions to be drawn about family preferences by using school
district level data.
Returning to family economics, if the family behaves according to the Tiebout
hypothesis, the observed level of schooling should be treated as endogenous.15
Achievement will differ within a school district depending on the other inputs provided
by the family.
Median Voter Model and Exogenous Schooling
To the contrary, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) place the community (the
electorate) in the role of the decision maker. By assuming a majority rules voting

14 This holds regardless of whether schooling is a "public" good or a "private" good.
15 The cost of mobility would be a part of the cost a family incurs to obtain and adjust
schooling (transactions costs).
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scheme, the preferences and constraints of the median voter determine the level of
public schooling. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) derive and then estimate the
median voter's and thus the community's demand function for local public schooling
(as measure by per pupil expenditures). This means that public schooling is
exogenous to non-median families. In order to obtain optimal achievement, such
families must compensate for the inappropriate level of public schooling by adjusting
other inputs or by opting for private schooling.
Competing Leviathans Model
Placing the preferences of the public producer in the forefront, the Leviathan
model approaches the determination of public schooling from the supply side.16
Leviathan (the public provider) maximizes its own utility or wealth by providing the
cost minimizing level of public schooling with a revenue maximizing tax structure.
The level of public schooling is provided with the minimum of its resources. In this
fashion Leviathan maximizes the transformation of tax dollars into its own private
consumption.
In a simple Leviathan model, the choice of schooling is exogenous to the
family. However, if the family behaves according to the Tiebout hypothesis, the
Leviathan Model provides a supply side to the Tiebout hypothesis. Like the
monopolist, the ability of Leviathan to extract surplus from consumer-citizens is
constrained by the degree of competition from Leviathans in other locations, which

16 Recall that schooling is defined as the level of services received at the school, therefore
the Leviathan Model only describes who determines schooling not achievement.
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depends on the degree to which the consumer-citizens are mobile. The ability of
Leviathan to impose its objectives on consumer-citizens decreases with the mobility
(elasticity of demand) of the consumer-citizen and the responsiveness of other
Leviathans. Schmidt and Schmidt (1995) explore the degree to which public providers
compete. In contrast, an immobile median voter is subjected to both the tax structure
and level of public schooling mandated by Leviathan. Also, Leviathan does not
compete with private schools, because the consumer-citizen must still pay taxes.
Leviathan would rather see children go to private schools which removes the expense
of schooling such children.
Incorporation of Private Schooling Alternatives
The existence of private schools cannot be ignored in a discussion of the ability
of the family to choose schooling. The public finance literature takes various
approaches to including the existence of private schooling alternatives. In these
approaches, the family is constrained by schooling regulations and the choices of the
median voter, but the existence of private schools partially lifts the constraint of these
regulations.
Sonstelie (1982) adapts the median voter model. Private schools exist because
some families demand a level of schooling that is higher than that demanded by the
median voter. Sonstelie (1982) derives and estimates the median voter's schooling
demand function and the reservation level of schooling of a representative family.17 If

17 An often overlooked difficulty with such studies is that the median voter theorem may
fail because the existence of private schools may lead to multi-peaked preferences.
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the median voter prefers a level of public schooling below the reservation level of
schooling, then the representative family with children sends its children to private
schools.
In contrast, Schmidt (1992) derives the demand for private schooling by
combining the median voter model and Tiebout model with imperfectly mobile
households. Imperfect mobility necessitates an alternative method of determining the
level of public schooling. Hence, Schmidt (1992) assumes the level of public
schooling in a district is determined by the median voter. However, she allows non
median voter families to maximize their utility by choosing among a discrete
distribution of public and private schooling alternatives. This model is much different
from the Tiebout model, for in the Tiebout model there is no need for private schools,
because individual families maximize utility by moving. Tiebout (19S6) uses the
family's decision making process to explain public provision. In this model, the
voting mechanism determines the level of public schooling produced, but the
individual families determine the level of schooling they ultimately consume. In
essence, Schmidt (1992) places the family in control of schooling, but the family can
only choose between a public school and private alternative.
Conclusions of Ihg Literature Review
The general framework presented in the Introduction assumes that the family
chooses the level c f achievement and the corresponding level of parental effort and
perhaps schooling subject to household constraints and the behavior of the community.
This general framework facilitates the investigation of the family's response to the
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actions of the community, which is the central issue of the analysis presented below.
Of particular interest are whether families can choose the level of schooling and how
parental effort changes in response to the actions of the community.
The literature presented above supports this general framework. Family
economics, which is best represented by Becker (1965) and Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1983), provides a model of household choice. Education economics lends insights
into school behavior. And public finance provides different ways to view the
household's ability to choose schooling in the context of mandatory public provision of
schooling and the existence of private school alternatives.
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ENDOGENOUS EFFORT AND EXOGENOUS SCHOOLING MODEL

Altogether, three theoretical models are presented in this chapter and chapter 4.
They are designed to embody the general framework and facilitate the investigation of
the central issues described in the Introduction (page 2). These models follow
Becker's (1965) theory of household production and time allocation and draw upon the
insights of Becker and Tomes (1976). The basic assumption of these three models is
that parents desire child academic achievement and oversee the production of this
achievement. Parents produce academic achievement by mixing the effort they expend
(parental effort) with schooling. This implies that the parents have a parental effort
supply equation, a schooling factor demand equation and an achievement demand
equation.
These models vary according to the ability of the family to choose schooling.
In the first model, schooling is exogenous to the choices of the family. The family
cannot move to another school district and does not have private school alternatives.
In this case, the family may be subject to the preferences of the median voter or a
Leviathan-like public provider. The second model is similar but allows the family to
choose the amount of schooling used in the production of achievement. Schooling is
measured in uniform units and is available at a constant price. There is no distinction
between public and private providers of schooling.
29
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A very simplified version of the parents' problem shows the differences among
these two models. Suppose that the family consumes two things, schooling (S) and all
other goods (C). In Figure 1, the family's indifference curve and budget constraint
depict how the family maximizes utility. If schooling is exogenously determined (as in
the model presented in this chapter) then the family may be stuck with a sub-optimal
bundle, point W in Figure 1. If the family can choose the level of schooling at some
constant price (as in the simple model of Chapter IV), then the family will adjust
schooling and the composite commodity accordingly, point X in Figure 1.
In a third, more realistic model, schooling is endogenous and the family
chooses the level of schooling from a choice set o f private and public schools. When
choosing a school from their choice set, the family faces a fee schedule associated
with their choice set. This fee may vary in a non-constant way with the level of
schooling provided by school. In short, the price is the change in the fee due to a
change in the level of schooling.
This more realistic model does not easily fit into Figure 1. Instead, Figure 2
depicts the fee/schooling (total outlay) schedule for two families, k,F(S) and k2F(S).
(The public and private decision is ignored for simplicity.) Each point on a
fee/schooling schedule represents the fee and schooling of a particular school in a
family’s choice set.18 When a family chooses a school, it is choosing the fee it pays
and the level of schooling the school provides. In Figure 2, the two families face
different schedules because they face different choice sets. Choice sets may vary

18 The marginal price of schooling is the slope of the fee/schooling schedule.
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according to the easy of switching schools and the degree of competition. There may
be transactions costs present in one choice set that are not present in another. And/or
competition may drive down the cost o f schooling and drive up the quality of the
schools in the choice set. In Figure 2, all levels of schooling are available for both
families to purchase, but the fee paid varies because of costs associated with their
different choice sets. This difference is captured in the proportional shifters (k, and
<2), which plays an important role in the empirical section of Chapter IV.
In short, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the differences among the theoretical models
presented below. The constraints on the family become much more complex with the
inclusion o f the production function for achievement and the ability of the family to
adjust household inputs.
Theoretical Model of Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling
To begin with the case of exogenous schooling, simplifying Becker's (1965)
model outlined in equations (1) through (4), parents are assumed to derive utility from
their child's achievement (A), a composite good (C) and leisure (L). Like the
commodities (Cj) in equation (2), achievement is produced by mixing certain inputs. It
is assumed that parents mix their effort (E) and schooling (S) to produce achievement
according to some production function.
In the model explored in this chapter, schooling is assumed to be exogenous;
the family has no influence over the level of schooling received by its children.
Perhaps there are no private schools, and the level of schooling may be determined by
the median voter, a pure Leviathan with no competition, or some other mechanism
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over which the family has no influence. In Becker's (1965) model this assumption is
analogous to holding an input purchased in the market (xj constant. The exogeneity
of schooling forces the family to adjust other household and market inputs in order to
produce the utility maximizing level of achievement. Analogous to Becker's (1965)
time inputs (tj), parents may adjust the amount of effort they expend on the child. If
the exogenous level o f schooling (S°) changes, perhaps due to changes in public
policy, then the amount of parental effort may change.
To formalize this simplification of Becker's (1965) model, the parents' problem
is to maximize utility,

W.

£).

<15>

which is a function of a composite good (C), leisure (L), and the academic
achievement of their children (A). This maximization process is subject to a budget
constraint,

p sS° + p cC = wH + N

(budget

constraint),

^

a time constraint and the household production function for achievement,
T =H +L + E

A = /(£ , S°)

(itime constraint),

(household production Junction),

where U(«) is the utility function;
A is the academic Achievement of their children;
f(«) is the household production function;
E is time (Effort) devoted to their children's education;
S° is the exogenous level of Schooling;
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C is a Composite of all other goods;
L is Leisure time;
ps is the price of S°;
p c is the price of C;
w is the market wage;
H is labor market time;
N is non-labor income;
T is the maximum Time available to the parents.19
It is assumed that U(«) is separable, differentiable, and strictly quasi-concave, and
f(«) is differentiable and strictly concave.20 The sign of fSE is ambiguous but assumed
non-negative.21 By normalizing p c to one and substituting the constraints and the
production function into the utility function, the parents' problem is
m ax^ u <f(E>s °)> wT + N - wE - wL - p JS°, L),

(19)

The first-order conditions are
U JE - wUc = 0,

(20)

UL - w U c = 0.

(21)

The second-order conditions are

19 The amount the family pays for schooling may be a nonlinear function of the level of
schooling. However, it is assumed in this model that the price of schooling is a constant.

20 Removing the separability assumption does not substantively change the result
presented below, but is assumed in order to simplify the discussion. In addition,
assuming a single wage rate for the family greatly simplifies matters.
21 This means that additional parental effort doesn't decrease the productivity of
schooling and vice versa.
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The parents maximize their utility by choosing effort and leisure,
E = E ( w , T , N , p s,S ° ) ,

L = L{w, Tt N, p \ S°).

(2S)

The production function for desired achievement is residually found as
A =f(E(wt T , N , p s,S °),S°).

<26>

In the time allocation framework, the wage is the opportunity cost of time as
can be seen in the budget constraint. The response of the parental effort to a change
in wage is a function of negative substitution effect and a positive income effect,
£w * GUcUll * [T-L-E\E n >«< 0.

(27)

The negative substitution effect follows from the fact that an increase in wage
increases the opportunity cost of effort (and therefore the opportunity cost of
achievement), which in turn, causes parents to reduce effort and switch to leisure
and/or the composite commodity. However, the positive income effect arises because
an increase in wage increases income and therefore causes parents to provide more
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effort; i.e., obtain more achievement.22 Note, there is no substitution among the
inputs in the household production process because of the exogeneity o f schooling; i.e.
one of two inputs is fixed. In the next chapter, this form of substitution is important
when schooling is assumed to be endogenous. (The comparative statics of the parental
effort equation are derived in the Mathematical Appendix.)
More interesting is the change in effort with in response to a change in
exogenous schooling. The community and school influence the family's decisions by
changing the level of schooling and/or the price of schooling. For example, the level
of schooling (S) increases in minimum standards, while an alternative is to reduce the
price of schooling (ps) with a matching grant. The relationship between parental effort
and schooling is shown by the response of parental effort (E) to changes in schooling
(S),
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where G is the reciprocal of | G21, and E n is the change in parental effort due to a
change in non-labor income.23 Similar to Becker and Tomes' (1976) discussion on
compensatory education, parents respond to a change in schooling in three ways. E$
is comprised of a negative income effect, a negative achievement effect, and a positive

22 Effort (and therefore achievement) is a normal good, En > 0 . This follows
from the assumption of a separable utility function; i.e., the utility derived from one
good does not effect the utility derived from another.
23 Separability makes achievement a normal good, En > 0. Assuming a nonseparable utility function makes the income effect En ambiguous and the three effects
more complex and ambiguous, as well. However, the general interpretation of the
three effects still holds.
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productivity effect. First, the negative income effect (-EnPs) stems from the fact that a
change in schooling changes the household's disposable full income (wT + N - psS),
assuming that parents must pay for the change in schooling.24 This reduction in
disposable full income reduces the level of achievement attainable by the parents and
therefore the level of parental effort diminishes. In other words, in order to pay for
the additional schooling, the parents must forgo other activities, one of which might be
achievement/parental effort.
The achievement and productivity effects follow from changes in the
production relationship between parental effort and schooling. The negative
achievement effect (-G [ U ^ ^ f J [w2Ucc + U jJ < 0) reflects the fact that an increase
in schooling allows parents to lower their efforts while maintaining the chosen level of
academic achievement.25 In contrast, the positive productivity effect (-GfUAfsaKVUcc
+ UlJ > 0, given fSE > 0) reflects the fact that an increase in schooling raises the
marginal productivity of parental effort (fg), thereby reducing the per unit opportunity
cost of achievement.26 In short, an increase in schooling reduces the shadow price of
achievement and therefore increases the quantity of achievement demanded. In order
to produce this higher level of achievement, the parents must increase their effort.

24 Different methods of funding the increase in schooling will have different
impacts on parental full disposable income.
25 The [w2Ucc + U gJ term appears in both production related effects. This term
basically scales the achievement and productivity effect by the parents' preferences for
alternative uses of their time.
26 This can be shown by manipulating the first-order conditions.
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The sign of Es is ambiguous and depends on the strengths of the income,
achievement, and productivity effects. Parents may respond to an increase in
schooling by increasing or decreasing the level of effort they expend on their child's
education. Recall that Becker and Tomes (1976) linked the failure of compensatory
education to a decrease in the household inputs. However, it may be the case that
household inputs (like parental effort) increase in response to community efforts,
especially if the family does not pay for the additional schooling (i.e., no negative
income effect on parental efforts).
Instead of increasing schooling, suppose in an attempt to increase achievement,
the community lowers the price of schooling.27 The response of parental effort (E) to
changes in the price of schooling (ps) is
Ef = -E nS° < 0.

(29)

When the price of schooling is lowered, parental effort increases and therefore
achievement increases. This result follows from an increase in the family's feasible
production/consumption set and lends support for the public subsidization of schooling.
Since schooling is exogenously determined, cross-price substitution effects do not
exist, because the family cannot substitute schooling for parental effort. Rather, Ep»
only contains an income effect, because a change in the price of schooling does not
influence household production relationships. By decreasing the price of schooling the

27 The price of schooling may be reduced improving the efficiency of the school
system or by shifting the property tax burden more toward non-residential property or
by increasing state aid that is funded through broad based taxes, etc.
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community can increase achievement, but if the community increases the level of
schooling, parental effort may decrease and achievement may remain the same.
Reducing parental effort is likely not what the community intended to accomplish.
Empirical Model of Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling
In the theoretical model presented above, the response of parents to changes in
schooling is ambiguous. How parents respond to the actions of the community and
school is therefore an empirical question. Based on their theoretical work, Becker and
Tomes (1976) assert that the reallocation of household resources may cause
compensatory education programs to be ineffective. This dissertation provides the
first empirical exploration of this assertion. The foundations of this advancement are
found in Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) and Hanushek (1986). Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1983) estimate the demand for health related inputs and the infant health
production function, while Hanushek (1986) provides insight into estimating an
achievement production function.
Following P.osenzweig and Schultz (1983), given the exogeneity of schooling,
the Erst step is to estimate a reduced form parental effort supply equation,
E, = y'X{ + e,,

(30)

where the vector X contains schooling and family characteristics like the parents'
wages and non-labor income. The coefficient on schooling represents the
substitutability or complementarity between parental effort and schooling. The next
step is to estimate the production function for desired achievement using the expected
value of parental effort derived from the first step,
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A, = * & % ] + a'x, + vr

(31)

The coefficient on expected parental effort is a E. Estimating equation (31) provides a
consistent estimate of the family's production function for achievement, i.e., the
measurement of parental effort is purged of the correlation between e; and v;. The x
vector is a subset of the X vector. It includes schooling and family characteristics but
excludes the wages of the parents. Wages represent the opportunity cost of parental
effort and only influence the achievement through parental effort. Before explicitly
describing the variables that represent effort, schooling and family characteristics, a
description of the data set that supplies these variables is provided.
Description of the Data Set
In order tc estimate the model above, a comprehensive data set that reports a
child's achievement, his or her parents' effort, his or her schooling and other
characteristics is needed. The United States Department of Education's Restricted Use
National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) is such a data set. In fact it is the
scale and scope of the NELS data set that eliminates that constraints faced by previous
studies.
NELS is a comprehensive three wave (1988, 1990, 1992), national survey of
24,599 students and their parents, teachers, and school administrators. The students
(from 815 public schools and 237 private schools) were in the eighth grade in 1988.
Along with the survey, each student took standardized tests in reading, mathematics,
science, and social studies. NELS follows and re-tests the same students from 8lh
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grade to 10* grade to 12th grade.28
Using the 8* grade surveys is preferred, because parental effort is more
relevant in 8* grade than in 10* grade. Unfortunately, in order to control for prior
achievement, which is stressed throughout the achievement production function
literature, the 10* grade surveys (1990) need to be used, because the 8* grade surveys
do not contain a measure of prior achievement.
In preparing the NELS data set for the estimation of the effort equation and
production function, five basic cuts were made. First, 10,361 observations (42
percent of the 24,599 observations in NELS) are dropped. These observations are
missing the student survey, parent survey or student examination for 1988 (8* grade)
or the student survey and student exam for 1990 (10* grade).29 Second, 17
observations (0.001 percent of the remaining 14,238) are dropped, because the parents
are the same gender which makes it difficult to code mother and father variables.30
Third, 8,307 observations (58 percent of the remaining 14,221) are dropped. These
observations lack one or more of the relevant variables. Fourth, 946 observations (16
percent of the remaining 5,914) are dropped because the family is headed by a single
parent. Including single parent families in the same equation as two parent families
28 The use is restricted due to confidentiality issues. The Public Release NELS
does not contain continuous measures of schooling, for fear that someone will be able
to identify a specific school and thus a specific school administrator.
29 One of the major shortcomings of NELS is that it does not contain parents
surveys for 1990, therefore some of the family information (wages and income) are
1988 figures. See the Data Appendix for more detail.
30 "Mother" and "father" represent a parent, step-parent or individuals similar to a
step-parent.
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creates problems with father and mother variables. Entering zero for the missing
parent's education makes it difficult to interpret the estimated coefficient on mother's
and father's education.31 The last cut is to drop 809 observations (16 percent of the
remaining 4968) because these families send their eighth grade child to private school.
These private school families are dropped, because schooling is clearly endogenous for
these families.32 However, these families are utilized below when schooling is
explored as a matter of choice. In the end, 4519 two parent families (18.4 percent of
the 24,599 families in NELS) remain. These two parent families send their eighth
graders to public school (public school families) and have complete information on the
relevant variables.
Econometrics Techniques and Issues
NELS provides the relevant variables needed to estimate the parental effort
supply and the achievement production function. These variables are described below
and briefly in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Means and
standard deviations are reported for continuous variables, while frequencies and
relative frequencies are reported for dummy variables (denotes by superscript cross).
However, the two step procedures and the nature of the data create problems in
the estimation of the coefficients and standard errors and in the interpretation of the

31 Separate equations for single parent equations are not estimated for simplicity
and left for future research.
32 Only using public school families could lead to sample selection bias. This
possibility is explored in the next chapter when parents are assumed to be able to
choose schooling.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
coefficients. Starting with the effort equation, actual parental effort (E) is not
observed. Instead, three variables are used to represent actual parental effort. They
are the responses of a child to three questions on the 10th grade survey. Check is how
frequently his or her parents "check on" his or her homework: never, rarely,
sometimes, often. Discuss is how frequently his or her parents "discuss things"
studied in school: never, sometimes, often.33 Event is whether the parent attends
"school events" in which the child participates. Separate equations are estimated for
these three representations of actual parental effort (E).
The categorical and qualitative nature of these measures of parental effort
necessitates the use of qualitative-variable econometric models to estimate the
relationship between parental effort and the independent variables like schooling. The
way children categorize their parents is assumed to reflect the underlying actual
parental effort (E).34 For example,
If Discuss = never = 0, then E < E,;
If Discuss = sometimes = 1, then E, < E <
If Discuss = often = 2, then E > Ej,
where E, and E2 are threshold values that separate the categories. The ordered probit
model is used for Check and Discuss, because they have more than two categories
and the ordering is meaningful; i.e., less to more parental effort. This econometric
model estimates the threshold values (MU's in the tables) that put

parentsinto a

33 The question that Discussis based upon does not have a "rarely"category.
34 Of course, a child’s perception may differ from his or her parents' and may
depend of the child's gender. Such issue are left for future research.
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particular category.35 Tne probit model is used for Events, because it has only two
categories and thus no threshold values need to be estimated.36 Ordered probit simply
uses the information revealed by the ordering. In short, these econometric models
estimate the relationship between actual parental effort and the independent variables
by looking at the probabilities of falling into a particular category.37 The LIMDEP
statistical package is used to estimate these models via maximum-likelihood estimation.
In the second step, following much of the education production function
literature, the dependent variable in the achievement equation (Achieve) is a student's
score on part of the 10th grade standardized test. This partial score is based on a
subset of reading and mathematics questions. Importantly, this subset of questions is
defined by the creators of NELS and described as being "consistent" across the 1988
(8* grade) examination and 1990 (10th grade) examination. The importance of the
1988 examination is discussed shortly.
This partial test score (Achieve) is a continuous variable so ordinary least
squares regression model (OLS) is used. However, while the coefficients of the
production functions are valid, the standard errors obtained from OLS are biased.
35 During the estimation of the ordered probit equation one of these E, is
normalized to zero.
36 An option for future research is to join these three measures into one variable
with 24 possible categories and then estimate a pan-parental effort using multi-nominal
logit or nested logit.
37 The probit models assume that the underlying actual level of effort is normally
distributed and the probability of being in a category is drawn from the standard
normal distribution. Gujarati (1988) provides a readable and basic explanation of
these models, while Maddala (1982) is a more comprehensive and sophisticated
exposition.
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Recall parental effort is a matter of choice; using the expected value of the parental
effort measures rather than the actual value purges 8; of its correlation with v;.

More

explicitly, the estimated parameters of the Check, Discuss and Event equations are
used to compute the expected values of parental effort, x(Check), x(Discuss) and
x(Event). The probability of the parent being in the highest category,
p(Check=often) and p(Discuss=often), could be entered into the achievement
equation. Their estimated coefficients would be easy to interpret. But information
about the probabilities of the other categories would not be not utilized. In order to
minimize the loss of information the expected values, x(Check) and x(Discuss), are
entered into achievement equations. The expected values of a multiple-response
categorical variable is a weighted sum o f the probabilities: x(Check) equals
0*p(Check=never) + l*p(Check=rarely) + 2 *p(Check= sometimes) +
3*p(Check=often). Similarly, x(Discuss) equals 0*p(Discuss=never) +
1*p(Discuss= sometimes) + 2*p(Discuss=often). From the Event equation xfEvent)
is calculated in the same fashion, l*p(Event=go).
Unfortunately, the statistical package used to run OLS does not distinguish
between expected values and actual values. As a result, the estimated standard errors,
which enter into the calculation of the t-ratios, are biased. Typically, the correct
standard errors are calculated in an additional step by using actual effort (E), but here,
this secondary calculation is not possible because actual effort (E) is not observed.
Only the categorical responses are available. There are methods of calculating the
correct covariance matrix when the first stage is a single probit equation and the
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second stage is ordinary least squares.38 However, when the first stage is more than
one endogenous categorical variable, the calculation of the correct covariance matrix
becomes more complex. Deriving the correct covariance matrix is beyond the scope
of this dissertation. Instead, to resolve this problem, a bootstrap procedure is used to
get estimates of the standard errors.
Following Efron and Gong (1983), this bootstrap procedure treats the data set
(4,159 observations) like the universal population. One thousand random samples of
4,159 observations are drawn with replacement from the data set. These 1,000
samples are used to estimate 1,000 achievement equations. For each variable, the
standard deviation of the 1,000 estimated coefficients is an estimate of the coefficient's
standard error.
Regarding the interpretation of the coefficients, the results of the effort and
achievement equations are presented in Tables 4 and 6, respectively. For the effort
equations, the reported estimated coefficients of the probit or ordered probit models
are not the marginal effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable as in
OLS. The reported coefficients represent f of equation (31), which is the influence
of independent variables on the actual effort (E).39 Of course, the actual effort is not
observed given the discrete nature of the data. Recall these econometric models
estimate the relationship between actual parental effort and the independent variables

38 See Maddala (1983), page 167.
39 More specifically, it represents the relationship between the actual effort and the
independent variables that are scaled by the actual error term.
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by looking at the probabilities of falling into a particular category.
In order to aid the discussion of the influences of the independent variables on
parental effort, Table 5 reports the change in the probability (at the sample means) of
the parents being in the highest category (p(Check=often), p(Discuss=often),
p(Event=go)) due to a standard deviation change in continuous variables. For
dummy variables, the difference between the probability of the parents being in the
highest category with and without the dummy variable (except the regional dummies)
are calculated. These calculations use the coefficients reported in Table 4.
For a different reason, the OLS estimated coefficients of the achievement
equations are also difficult to interpret. In order to obtain "consistent" test scores
across the 1988 (8th grade) examination and 1990 (10* grade) examination, the
creators of NELS transformed the test score into an almost uninterpretable index. As
a result, the marginal influence (magnitude) of an independent variable is difficult to
interpret, and the discussion below focuses on the signs and statistical significance of
the estimated coefficients.
For brevity, a statistically significant variable is termed as "influencing" the
dependent variable or being "statistically significant" rather than stating, "according to
this subsample of NELS this variable has a statistically significant influence on the
dependent variable because the null hypothesis that, in the population, this variable has
no influence on the dependent variable is rejected with a degree of confidence of 90
percent or greater." Similarly, statistically /^significant variables are interpreted as
"not influencing" the dependent or being "statistically insignificant" rather than stating,
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"according to this subsample of NELS this variable has a statistically insignificant
influence on the dependent variable because the null hypothesis that, in the population,
this variable has no influence on the dependent variable fails to be rejected with a
confidence level of 90 percent or greater."
There is another difficulty involved in the interpretation of the coefficients in
both the effort and achievement equations. During the estimation of the three effort
equations, the log-likelihood function would not converge in LIMDEP. This problem
is common, so much so that possible solutions are presented in the LIMDEP manual
on page vii, between the Preface and the [Table of] Contents. In order to assist
LIMDEP, some of the independent variables are scaled down. For example, the
family's income needed to be multiplied by 0.00001. The scaling factors are reported
in Table 1. The coefficients o f all the effort and achievement equations are fo r the
scaled down independent variables. Re-adjusting the coefficients would have
necessitated the use of scientific notation.40 Note, the means and standard deviations
in Table 2 are not scaled down. The numbers reported in Table 5 are not influenced
by the scaling down of the independent variables.
Dependent Variables
Estimation issues aside, there are three measures of parental effort (E). They
are based on the response of the child to three questions: (Check) how frequently his
or her parents "check on" his or her homework, (Discuss) how frequently his or her

40 For example, the coefficient on family income in the Discuss in Table 4 is
0.4628. Re-adjusted for the scaling causes this coefficient to be 4.63E-07.
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parents "discuss things” studied in school and (Events) whether the parent attends
"school events” in which the child participates. Again, Table 1 contains definitions of
these and other variables.
Check is a problematic measure of parental effort, because it is ambiguously
related to the production of achievement. The causality between achievement and the
act of "checking on" homework is in doubt, especially for 10th graders who are well
into their education. For some families, "checking on" homework may indicate more
effort and thus more achievement, while for other families, it may indicate the child
needs help because they are not achieving. This problem makes it difficult to interpret
results and may make the coefficients indistinguishable from zero.
As a measure of parental effort, Event is also problematic. Whether parents
go to events the child participates in is relative to the number of events in the school.
Unfortunately, Event is not adjusted for the number of school events because this
number is not available. As a result, it will not be surprising to see a positive
relationship between parental effort and the amount of school resources.
Perhaps the purest measure of parental effort is how often parents discuss
things learned in school with their child (Discuss). This measure reflects the overall
interest and involvement of the parents. However, discussing things is probably the
least time consuming of the three measures (especially Event); therefore, the parents'
wages may not accurately reflect the opportunity costs of the effort they expend.
Independent Variables and Hypothesis Signs
In accordance with the general framework of Chapter I and the theoretical
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model explored in this chapter, parental effort (E) and a child's achievement (A) are
influenced by the school and household environments. A set of independent variables
is used to represent these environments. These variables are broken down into five
groups which are schooling, child, parent, family and demographic. As a guide, their
hypothesized influences on the parental effort (E) and achievement (A) are outlined in
Figure 3.
To begin, the schooling (services received at school) received by the child is
represented by a set of school characteristics. Of these school characteristics, three
represent the school's teachers: the teacher student ratio (Tea/Stu), lowest salary
received by a teacher (LowSal), and the percentage of teachers with a Master's or a
doctoral degree (%Degree). A higher teacher student ratio (Tea/Stu) provides a child
with better instruction and thus represents more schooling. The higher the lowest
salary (LowSal) the better paid faculty and thus better schooling, assuming better paid
faculty are better instructors. The greater the percentage of teachers with advanced
degrees (%Degree), the better the instruction is at the school; i.e., more schooling.
A child's school experience is greatly influenced by the students with which he
or she associates. There are also two measures of the child’s peers: the percentage of
the student body net in the school's subsidized lunch program (%NonLun) and the
percentage of non-minority students in the student body (%NonMin). A student in a
subsidized lunch program is likely to come from an income constrained family that
provides fewer educational opportunities. Associating with such constrained children
may diminish the schooling of other children. Thus, an increase in the percentage of
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the student body not in the school's subsidized lunch program (%NonLun) represents
an increase in schooling. Similarly, given past discrimination, minority students may
have had fewer educational opportunities. Therefore, an increase in the percentage of
non-minority students in the student body (%NonMin) also represents an increase in
schooling.
The last variable to represent schooling is whether a child is in a non-urban
environment. Schools in urban areas are more likely to face a whole host of
problems, such as aging infrastructure, inadequate educational material and underfunding. Thus, being in a non-urban environment (NonUrb) represents an increase in
schooling.
Note that an increase in each of the schooling variables represents an increase
in schooling, hence, the use of the teacher-student ratio instead of the more commonly
used student-teacher ratio. The influence of an increase in schooling on parental effort
is ambiguous according to the theoretical model above; thus, there are no expectations
regarding the influence of the schooling variables on parental effort (Check, Discuss,
Event). However, in the production of achievement, an increase in schooling is
expected to increase the level of achievement (Achieve). If a child receives more
services, then he or she will achieve more.
Turning to the characteristics of the child, in accordance with the education
production function literature, the 8th grade score (Prior_A) is entered as an
independent variable in the achievement equation in order to reduce the influence of
inherent intelligence. Including Prior_A transforms the achievement equation such
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that the family is producing "value-added" to the test score.41 An increase in Prior_A
is expected to increase a child's current achievement (Achieve), because a child who
does well in 8th grade should do well in 10th grade.
The level of prior achievement (Prior_A) is also included in the effort
equation. A child that has did well in the past may reflect past parental effort or
reflect that such a child doesn't need parental effort in the current period, which
suggests a negative relationship between prior achievement and current parental effort.
However, such a child's parents may be likely to supply the same high level of effort,
which suggests a positive relationship between prior achievement and current parental
effort. As a result, there is no firm expectation with respect to the influence of prior
achievement Prior A on parental effort.
Whether a child is considered a problem child (by the parents) (BadChild) may
attract or repel parental effort. Parents may be trying to rectify the problem with
increased effort, or they may not wish to invest effort in a problem child because the
effort may be in vain.42 Or perhaps the causality is reversed: the child is a problem
due to the lack of parental effort. In the end, no conjectures are made about the
influence of a problem child on parental effort. In production, a problem child
(BadChild) should diminish the level of achievement produced (Achieve). If the
opposite holds true, then perhaps the parents' view of the child is not entirely valid.

41 Of course, the "value added" may be a function of inherent ability.
42 Parental effort may be negatively related to a problem child because a problem
child reports effort differently than a none problem child.
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The last o f the child's variables to enter into the supply of effort and
production of achievement is whether the child is female (Girl). Similar to the
reported lack of attention received from teachers, female children may attract less
attention from their parents as compared to male children. However, it may be the
case that parents compensate for the lack of attention at school by providing more
effort. Thus, the expected influence of a daughter (Girl) on parental effort is
ambiguous. Likewise, in production, the gender of the child may have a positive or
negative influence on achievement. The coordination of a girl's education may be
easier than a boy's if they tend to be better behaved, but the inclusion of prior
achievement and whether the child is a problem child should account for difficult boys
(or girls).
Turning to the characteristics of the parents, parental education (M_Ed and
F_Ed) ambiguously influences parental effort. On one hand, more educated parents
may recognize the benefits of academic achievement and therefore provide more
effort. On the other hand, less educated parents may better recognize the
disadvantages of inadequate academic achievement and also provide more effort. In
production, a positive relationship between parental education and achievement
(Achieve) is expected since more educated parents may be better able to coordinate
production and provide higher quality effort.
Due to past racial discrimination in the allocation of educational resources, the
schooling of non-white parents may be lower in quality than their white counterparts.
Thus the influence of a parent's race (NonWhite) may have a confounding effect on
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parental education. In essence the non-white variable controls may include some
negative effects of past discrimination.
The religious affiliation is included in both equations and reports whether the
parent that answered the questionnaire is Catholic (Catholic). No conjectures are
made regarding its sign.43
Whether the father is the parent most involved in the child's education
(F_Invol) is another characteristic included in both the effort and achievement
equations. No expectation is held regarding the influence of whether the father is the
most involved parent.
Theoretically, wage (w) is the opportunity cost of an additional unit of
parental time. The influence of wage on parental effort is ambiguous due to classic
income and substitution effects. (See equation A20 in the Mathematical Appendix the
derivation of the E*.) An increase in the wage increases income and therefore the
ability of the household to consume all goods. However, increasing wages raises the
marginal cost of a unit of achievement by increasing the foregone earnings from
parental effort; this leads to a decrease in achievement and thus effort expended.
Empirically, the mother's and father's hourly wage enter into the parental effort
equation (M_Wage and F_Wage) with no expectations regarding their influence.44

43 This variable plays an important role later in the endogenous schooling model.
44 The wage measures were created by using a NELS occupation question and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics median weekly earnings by occupation, by gender. Home
makers received the wage for his or her gender's overall market wage as a measure of
their foregone market wage. This may overstate a home-maker's wage, because he or
she is staying home forgoing his or her market wage, because he or she has a low
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Wages influence achievement indirectly through parental effort, but wages do
not directly influence coordination and production abilities of parents, especially since
parents' education is included to capture the abilities of parents. Wages do not enter
the achievement equation and are the identifying variables for the production
parameters.
One of the most interesting family characteristics is the number of siblings
(Sibs). The number of children should have a negative influence on effort.45 One
might expect the number of siblings to reduce time available (T) to spend on the
surveyed child thereby reducing the amount of effort. However, this direction of
influence may exist because sibling effort is substituting for parental effort. In the
production function, there may be significant jointness and economies of scale in the
number of children that affect positively the level of achievement produced.
With the inclusion of wages, family income (Income) should to some degree
represent non-labor income (N). Assuming achievement is a normal good, families
with more non-labor income should expend more effort in order to realize additional
achievement, for they can afford to forgo earnings. Of course, this assumes
achievement is a normal good. With regard to production of achievement, family
income represents the presence of other household inputs not taken into consideration
and thus has a positive effect on the production of achievement.

earning potential.
45 In family economics, the number of children is often consider a choice variable
and much is made of the tradeoff between child quality (achievement) and the quantity
of children.
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The impact of household capital on the provision of effort and production of
achievement is represented by the availability of study aids and household appliances.
The availability of a computer, encyclopedia and study room (Aid) (like schooling)
may complement or substitute for parental effort; therefore, no conjecture is possible
with regard to their influence on parental effort. However, in the production of
achievement, study aids should increase the productivity of the household and the
child's achievement. Along the same lines, the lack of access to time saving
household appliances, such as a washer, dryer and dishwasher (LimCap), should
reduce parental effort since it reduces the time a parent can spend with his or her child
on educational activities. Regarding achievement, limited access to such appliances
reduces the ability of parents to coordinate household production.
Controlling for other exogenous forces, regional dummy variables (NorthCen,
South, West) are included in the effort and achievement equations. No expectations
of their influence on effort or achievement are held.
Interpretations of Results
In the first step, three effort equations (Check, Discuss, Event) are estimated;
the results are in Table 4. In the second step, a linear production function is estimated
via ordinary least squares (OLS) and with parental effort represented by the expected
value of parental effort obtained from the first stage. The production functions are
presented in Table 6. Recall the standard errors are estimated using a bootstrap
procedure.
To recap, the. characteristics of schools, parents, children, and household effect
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achievement in two ways: (1) indirectly, by influencing the effort that parents supply,
and (2) directly (except wages), by influencing the production of achievement. The
expected value of effort captures the indirect impact.
Exogenous Effort and Schooling Model - Before looking at the results o f the
two step estimation procedure, a replication of the aforementioned household
production function literature is explored by estimating the achievement production
equation with exogenously determined parental effort and schooling; i.e., eliminating
the estimation of the effort equations. This replication allows for the verification of
previous studies and also provides the assurance that the data used in this dissertation
is not behaving in an unanticipated fashion.
Using the variables discussed above, except wages, three separate household
achievement production functions are estimated for each measure of parental effort
(Check, Discuss, Event). A fourth achievement equation, titled All, is estimated; it
includes all three measures of parental effort at once. The parental effort variables are
coded as dummy variables. The lowest effort categories are omitted (Check = never,
Discuss = never, Event = don't go). Check is broken into three dummy variables
(rarely, sometimes and often), while Discuss is broken into two dummy variables
(sometimes or often). The Event dummy variable represents the parents going to
school events. The ordinary least squares results of these production functions are
presented in Table 3.
Looking across the columns of Table 3, the signs of the coefficients remain the
same, whether they are statistically significant or not. In addition, statistical
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significance is consistent across all four equations. Thus, including all three measures
in one household achievement production function (All) does not lead to appreciable
multi-collinearity. Given the similarity across the four equations, only the results of
fourth equation (All) are interpreted below.
Starting with parental effort, Discuss and Event are statistically significant,
while Check is not. So, parents discussing things learned in school with their child
positively influences the child's achievement, and this effect increases the more
frequently discussion takes place, since the coefficient on Discuss=often is larger than
the coefficient on Discuss= some. Similarly, the children of parents who go to school
events achieve more than the children of parents who do not go to school events.
Checking on a child's homework does not influence the child's achievement; this may
be the result of a reversal of causality for parents with low achieving children. Low
achievement leads to more frequent checking, while more frequent checking leads to
high achievement.46
This supports the results of Stafford (1987). He estimates an achievement
investment equation rather than a household production function. The difference is in
the theoretical underpinnings which leads to the inclusion o f the mother's predicted
wage. In his regressions, F-tests reveal that a number of variables measuring
mother's time jointly influence the cognitive skills of the child. Similarly, Leibowitz
(1977) shows that a child's vocabulary increases when parents spend time reading with

46 Interpreting the numerical value of the coefficient in achievement equations is
difficult, because the test score provided in NELS is a complex calculation designed to
obtain consistency across the 8th and 10th grade examinations.
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a child.
Regarding the other important input into a child's education, the schooling
variables do not influence the level of achievement produced by the family with two
exceptions.47 The percentage of teachers with advanced degrees (%Degree) positively
influences the level of achievement produced by a family. This one result is consistent
with expectations - an increase in schooling increases achievement. However, against
expectations families in non-urban areas (NonUrb) produce less achievement then
their urban counterparts; i.e., an increase in schooling does not increase achievement.
This result may be due to noise in this measure which lumps together suburban with
rural schools and aging central cities with all other cities. Some rural schools face the
same resource problems as aging central cities. Nevertheless, contrary to
expectations, urban families still produce more achievement.
The studies of achievement with explicit measures of parental effort, Leibowitz
(1977) and Stafford (1987), do not possess measures of schooling, because these
studies are based on household surveys and have no information of the child's school.
Comparison to Hanushek (1992) and Mumane et al. (1981) is difficult, for they use
dummy variables to represent the impact of a particular school. This method is used
because their data is drawn from 13 public schools in Gary, Indiana. In both studies,
F-tests on the school dummies suggest that "the school" is influential, but the direction
of their results are not discussed by the authors.

47 There is severe multi-collinearity in this model, but it is discussed in the next
chapter.
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As for the characteristics of the child, the child's prior achievement (Prior A)
positively influenced the level of current achievement. This unsurprising result is
consistent with the findings of Murnane et al. (1981) and Hanushek (1992).48 In
contrast to prior achievement, a problem child (BadChild) makes it more difficult to
produce achievement as compared to his or her less troublesome counterpart. There is
no difference between the achievement produced by families with female 10th graders
than families with male 10th graders; the other two studies mentioned above find
similar results. However, Hanushek (1992) finds that female children outperform
male children when achievement is measured with a reading test. In addition to
parental effort, the education of the parents (Ed_M and Ed_F) also positively
influences in a child's achievement, which suggests better educated parents are better
at coordinating a child's education and perhaps they may provide better quality
parental effort. Leibowitz (1977) and Murnane et al. (1981) find evidence that
achievement increases with mother's education, but father's education has no such
influence.
Regarding the other parent characteristics, neither the race of the parents
(NonWhite), the religious affiliation of the parents (Catholic), nor whether the father
is the most involved parent (F_Invol) are statically significant. Leibowitz (1977) also
finds that race does not play a role in achievement when parental time inputs are taken

48 The null hypothesis that the population coefficient on Prior_A is equal to one
is rejected in all four equations. As a result, it would be improper to use the
difference of the 1990 and 1988 test scores as a measure of achievement. Such a
measure implicitly assumes a one to one relationship between the current and prior test
scores.
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into consideration.
Turning to the family variables, like the other two studies, the number of
siblings (Sibs) is found to negatively influence the level of achievement produced by
the household. As the number of children in the household increases, it appears that
resources are being spread thin and/or there are problems coordinating education.49
The negative influence of siblings is present in Leibowitz (1977), Murnane et al.
(1981) and Hanushek (1992). Contrary to Murnane et al. (1981) and Stafford (1987),
family income (Income) does not influence the level of achievement produced. Their
studies reveal a positive relationship between income and achievement.
Similar to Leibowitz (1977) the availability of study aids (Aid) like
encyclopedias or a computer positively impacts the level of achievement.
Families in the western region of the United States produce more achievement
than contemporaries in the other regions of the United States. No intuition exists
about why this is the case, and the demographic variables are not discussed below.
Replicating the household production function studies provides perspective on
the advancements offered below; i.e., the consistent estimation of the household
production function for achievement. It also suggests the subset of NELS used in this
dissertation is roughly in line with the data sets used in other studies.
Effort Equations - Estimating the household production function treating
parental effort as exogenous leads to inconsistent estimates. Effort is a choice

49 In a different framework, this result may suggest the tradeoff between child
quality and child quantity. Of course, achievement is measured by the performance of
only die child in 10th grade.
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variable. Parents supply effort in order to obtain their desired level of achievement.
In order to purge the household production function of the endogenous household
behavior (the correlation between e; and Vj), the effort supply equation is estimated in
the first step and the expected value of effort entered into the production function.
The results o f estimating the reduced form effort supply equation are in Table 4.
Recall the estimated coefficients that result from probit and ordered probit are difficult
to interpret. In order to facilitate interpretation, the change in the probability (at the
sample means) of the parents being in the highest category (p(Check=often),
p(Discuss=often), p(Event=go)) due to a standard deviation change in a variable is
calculated for each continuous variable. For dummy variables, the difference between
the probability of the parents being in the highest category with and without the
dummy variable (except the regional dummies) are calculated. These calculations are
presented in Table 5.
Looking across the three effort equations in Table 4, each of the independent
variables influences Check, Discuss and Event in the same fashion; i.e., the signs are
the same with a few exceptions. This reveals that these three measures are capturing
the same type of behavior, because the parents are reacting to the constraints and
characteristics of the household in the same manner. For example, the coefficients
are positive for wages, family income, study aids and parents’ education and wage,
while the coefficients are negative for limited household capital and the number of
siblings.
Looking at specific variables, an increase in each of the school variables
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represents an increase in schooling, and recall that the influence o f schooling on
parental effort is ambiguous in the theoretical model. The estimates of the three effort
equations suggest a mixed relationship between schooling and parental effort, and this
relationship differs over the three measures of parental effort. In the Discuss
equation, 5 of the 6 schooling coefficients are negative. This suggests that parents
supply less effort when the child receives more schooling; however, none are
statistically significant.
In the Check equation, the signs on the schooling coefficients are more mixed;
4 o f 6 are negative. Again, this hints that parents reduce effort when the child
receives more schooling. However, only the percentage of students not in subsidized
lunch programs (%NonLun) influences the frequency of checking. For example, an
increase in %NonLun by one standard deviation (17.4 percent) decreases the
probability that parents "often check" on their child's homework by 0.01, whereas the
probability of parents checking on homework often at the sample mean is 0.25. Thus
an increase in this one measure of schooling reduces the level of parental effort as
measured by checking on homework.
The results of the Event equation suggest a stronger relationship between
parental effort and schooling. All o f the schooling measured are statistically
significant, except the percentage of non-minority students. However, some suggest a
negative relationship, while others represent a positive relationship. Similar to Check,
an increase in %NonLun by one standard deviation (17.4 percent) decreases the
probability that parents go to school events by 0.02, where the probability of parents
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go to school events is 0.62 at the sample mean.
Similarly, an increase in the percentage of teachers with advanced degrees
(%Degree) by one standard deviation (0.2 percent) reduces the probability that parents
go to school events by 0.03. The probability that parents go to school events
decreases by 0.02 when the lowest salary (LowSal) increases by one standard
deviation ($2,900). These results suggest an increase in schooling substitutes for
parental effort.
To the contrary, the estimated coefficients on the teacher student ratio
(Tea/Stu) and the non-urban dummy variable (NonUrb) suggest a complementary
relationship between schooling and parental effort. An increase in the teacher student
ratio by one standard deviation (0.016 teachers) increases the probability that parents
go to school events by 0.03. A school with more teachers per pupil can put on more
events, and these events are avenues for parental effort. Along the same lines, the
probability of going to events is higher by 0.02 for parents in non-urban area
(NonUrb). Non-urban areas are hypothesized to have more resources and thus may
provide more events for children to participate in.
So what conclusions can be made about the influence of exogenous schooling
on parental effort? The signs in the Check and Event equations hint at substitution
between schooling and parental effort. However, only whether parents go to school
events is influenced consistently by schooling. Likelihood ratio tests of the joint
significance of the schooling variables confirm these findings. The hypothesis that the
schooling coefficients simultaneously have no influence is rejected in only the Event
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equation, but the signs of these coefficients send mixed signals. On one hand,
increases in %NonLun, %Degree and LowSal (increases in schooling) reduce
parental effort. On the other hand, NonUrb and an increase in Tea/Stu (increases in
schooling) foster parental effort.
However, a slight pattern arises in the results of the Event equation. The
substitutes for parental effort, %Degree and LowSal, reflect the quality of the
teaching staff. The other substitute, %NonLun, reflects the quality of the student
body. Now, the complement, Tea/Stu, represents the volume of teachers. (Being in
a non-urban area straddles both quality and quantity.) Holding quantity constant, the
quality of school resources is a substitute for parental effort. Perhaps parents
withdraw effort when they believe their children are in good hands. In contrast,
holding quality constant, the quantity of school resources complements parental effort.
Perhaps the quantity of school resources facilitates parental effort.
Unfortunately, the time allocation literature does not offer any insight or
support for these results. This literature looks at things like the availability of reading
material but (due to a lack of data) does not explore schooling as an input into the
household production/time allocation process. This omission also reflects the tendency
for this literature to be rooted in "housework" and female labor supply decisions,
while this study is rooted in the education literature.
The time allocation literature addresses many of the parents' and household
characteristics included in the three effort equations. In particular, it focuses on the
education of the mother. Leibowitz (1974b) and Hill and Stafford (1977, 1980) show
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that more educated mothers spend more time on child care activities. Their findings
are supported by the results of this study. Parental effort as measured by Discuss and
Event is positively influenced by mother's education (M_Ed). The same influence is
found in the Check equation, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. A
standard deviation rise in mother's education (2.7 years) increases the probability that
she and her husband discuss things by 0.03 and go to school events by 0.02. This
suggests that more educated parents provide more effort in order to obtain a higher
level of achievement.
Although positive in all three equations, the education of the father is only
statistically significant in the Discuss equation. When the father's education (F_Ed)
increases by one standard deviation (4 years), the probability that parents discuss
school with their child increases by 0.01. So more educated parents are more likely to
provide more effort, as measured by how often they discuss things learned in school
with their child. Leibowitz (1974b) finds similar behavior.
Earlier it is hypothesized that the race of the parents may represent past
discrimination in allocation of educational resources and thus have the opposite
influence of parents' education. In the Check equation non-white parents are more
likely to provide more effort as measured by checking on homework. The probability
that Non-white parents often check on homework is 0.03 more than white parents.
This contradicts expectations spelled out above, and this coefficient is statistically
significant.
Twenty percent of the sample reveals that the father is the most involved parent
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(F Invol). In the Discuss and Check equations, the coefficients on this variable are
positive yet statistically insignificant.

It is positive and statistically significant in the

Event equation. When the father is the most involved parent, parents are less likely
to go to events; the probability is reduced by 0.04. This may reveal constraints on the
mother's time that reduces the ability of parents to provide certain types of effort like
going to school events.
In the Event equation, as compared to their non-Catholic peers, Catholic
parents are more likely to go to school events; the probability is increased by 0.33
(from 0.60 to 0.93).50 Perhaps the Catholic focus on church and community, rather
than on an individual relationship with a deity, leads to more outgoing parents.
(Recall these are public school families; private school families are dropped in this
chapter.)
Turning to the child's characteristics, parental effort as measured by Event
increases with prior achievement; this suggests that the parents of high achieving
children supply the same high level of effort they did in prior years. However, this
could be due to children with higher Prior_A participate in more school events; thus,
their parents are more likely to go to these events. As mentioned earlier, as a
dependent variable, Event needs to be adjusted for how many events in which the
child can participate.
Similarly, but without such problems, a positive relationship between parental
effort and prior achievement is revealed in the Discuss equation; this coefficient is

50 The calculation of this figure has been double checked.
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positive and close to being statistically significant. This hints that Discussion of school
occurs more frequently in households with high achieving children as represented by
prior achievement.
In contrast, in the Check equation parents of a high achieving child are less
likely to check often on their child's homework. This suggests that checking on
homework is punitive or an act of trying to correct past problems. It may reflect past
parental effort or that such a child may not need parental effort in the current period,
which suggests a negative relationship between prior achievement and current parental
effort.51
In a similar characterization of the child, problem children (BadChild) have
parents that are less likely to often check on homework; their probability is lower by
0.06. The probability that such parents go to school events is 0.09 lower than their
counter-parts with a non-problem child. These results are supported by the negative
coefficient on BadChild in the Discuss equations. These findings may reflect that
problem children do not bring home homework or participate in school events. Or
perhaps there is a reversal of causality where uninterested parents lead to problem children.52

51 As a lagged endogenous variable, Prior_A may be correlated with the error
term of the effort equation and thus lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the
coefficients; perhaps, effort supply takes a while to adjust. However, dropping
Prior_A from the effort equations does not change any of the coefficients' signs or
statistical significance.
52 The first interpretation suggests that parental effort is relative to what is
happening in schoc1 and the dependent variable needs to be adjusted accordingly. The
second interpretation suggests that the problem child is a measure of child quality like
achievement and thus endogenous. Exploring these complications is left to future
research.
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It is sometimes suggested that boys crowd out girls for the attention of a
teacher. Could the same thing be happening in the home? The results of the Discuss
and Event equations say no; the opposite holds true. Female children receive more
parental effort; perhaps, parents are compensating for the lack of attention received
from teachers. Parents of girls are more likely to often discuss things she learned in
school and more likely to go to school events in which she participates.53 For girls,
the probability of discussing often increases by 0.06, and the probability of going to
events increases by 0.03. The difference between girls and boys or perhaps the
preferences and habits of the parents may be the source of this differential treatment.
Hill and Stafford's (1977) results regarding the influence of a child's gender are
mixed; in some instances, more time is devoted to sons, while in others more time is
devoted to daughters depending on parents' education.
The existence of siblings in the household reduces parental effort as represented
measured by all three measures. An increase in the number of siblings by one
standard deviation (2.2 siblings) decreased the probability of (a) checking often by
0.02, (b) discussing often by 0.02 and (c) going to events by 0.03. This supports the
notion that these parents are more constrained and/or the effort of siblings substitutes
for the effort of parents. Similarly, Hill and Stafford (1977) find that the presence of
older children reduces the housework of mothers in lower socioeconomic households.
Aid, Income and LimCap reflect the resources of the family. Across the

53 In a future study devoted to child gender, the existence of a male sibling will be
entered and interacted with the girl variable.
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board, the signs of the coefficients of these variables reveal that a lack of resources
constrains the supply of parental effort. The signs of these coefficients suggest that
family income (Income) and the availability of study aids (Aid) are positively related
to parental effort, and limited access to household capital is negatively related to
parental effort. Looking at the statistically significant variables, wealthier families
may have more time available for time consuming parental duties, like going to school
events. Limited access to household capital (washer, dryer or dishwasher), as
expected, reduces parental effort, suggesting such parents are more constrained by the
other household duties. Limited households are less likely to often discuss school and
less likely to go to school events (probabilities decrease by 0.02 and 0.08,
respectively).
Lastly, in all three equations, the mother's wage positively influences parental
effort, while the father's wage is statistically insignificant, although all are positive.
Recall that wage reflects the opportunity cost of time; however, its influence is
ambiguous because of traditional income and substitution effects.34 The results show
that an increase in the mother's wage by one standard deviation ($3.20) leads to the
probabilities of (a) checking often increases by 0.01, (b) discussing often increases by
0.01, and (c) going to events by 0.02. This result suggests that the income effect
dominates the substitution effect; in other words, the ability to consume more

34 As mentioned earlier, it is assumed in this study that parents do not receive
utility from effort other than the through the achievement it produces. In part, the
validity of this assumption determines the validity of representing the opportunity cost
of effort with market wages.
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achievement due to higher full income dominates the effect of the increase in the
opportunity costs of effort/achievement.

(See equation A20 in the Mathematical

Appendix the derivation of the E*.)
Going through the results coefficient by coefficient sheds light on relationships
between parental effort and the independent variables, but what can be said about the
three measures of effort? Looking at each equation, the Event equation is clearly
influenced by a variety of household and school variables, but as a measure of parental
effort it has problems, because the results suggest it needs to be adjusted for the
frequency that the child participates in events and the availability of school events. In
contrast, the other two measures of parental effort are not as influenced by school
characteristics but respond to the constraints and attributes of the household.
Achievement Equations - The provision of parental effort is determined by the
desire to consume achievement. As mentioned above, the chosen level of parental
effort must be represented by the expected values of parental effort, x(Check),
x(Discuss) and x(Event). As in the case of the production functions with exogenous
parental effort, a separate household achievement production function is estimated for
each measure of parental effort, x(Check), x(Discuss), x(Event). A fourth
achievement equation, titled x(AU), is estimated; it includes all three measures of
parental effort at once. As before, wages (M_Wage and F_Wage) are not included,
although now they act as the identifiers of the achievement equations. The estimation
of the fourth achievement equation includes the three expected values; therefore,
M Wage and F_Wage are not enough for identification. As a result, the x(All)
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x(AU) equation relies on wages and the non-linearity o f the expected values for its
identification. The results of the achievement equations are Table 6, and a summary
of the all achievement equations estimated in this dissertation is provided in Table 19.
As expected, parental effort contributes positively to a child's achievement.
When entered separately, an increase in the expected value of effort raises a child's
achievement. This supports the findings of Leibowitz (1977) and Stafford (1987).
One difference from the previous model (xx) is that checking on a child's homework
now increases achievement. Previously, checking on a child's homework had no
influence of achievement. However, when the three measures of effort are entered
together in the All equation, only the expected value of Event remains statistically
significant; it is still positive.
Surprisingly, adjusting for parental effort supply behavior takes away the
influence of the mother's and father's education (M_Ed and F_Ed), in all four
equations. So, other than their influence on parental effort, parents' educations do not
affect achievement. This runs contrary to the findings of Leibowitz (1977), Murnane
et al. and the exogenous effort and schooling (xx) model.
Other differences between the exogenous effort and endogenous effort models,
the negative influence of the number of siblings (Sibs) no longer exists, as measured
in all four achievement equations. Siblings no longer influence their sister or
brother's achievement. They constrain effort, but they do not strain family resources
in a direct fashion as is found in many of the previous studies of a child's
achievement, including the exogenous effort and schooling model (xx).
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Even more surprising, across the four achievement equations, the level of
family income (Family) now negatively influences a child's achievement, where it
previously had a positive insignificant influence. Low income families are expected to
have fewer resources (that are not accounted for) and thus produce less achievement,
all else held constant. No intuition exists as to why families with higher income
produce less achievement. This result contradicts the positive influence found by
Stafford (1987).
Another interesting result, is that the negative influence of a problem child
(BadChild) no longer exists. Recall the parents of problem children provided less
effort. This suggests that a problem child's achievement is due to the reaction of the
parents and not directly a result of the child's performance.
In achievement equations with Discuss and Event, female children achieve less
than their male counterparts. Recall parents of girls are more likely to discuss school
and go to events. This effort increases achievement. Adjusting for this behavior, the
direct effect of being female is to reduce achievement; this result is not supported by
other studies.
Many of the coefficients of the family variables in the achievement equation
with exogenous effort (xx model) are supported in the literature. However, the results
are not so complementary to previous studies when parental behavior is explicitly
modeled. Notably, constraints on the family resources (more children, the lack of
income, study aids and household physical capital) no longer bring down a child's
achievement. Such constraints influence achievement through the provision of parental
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effort. In addition, parents' education, a positive measure of family resources, no
longer boosts achievement.
Looking at the schooling variables, Leibowitz (1977) and Stafford (1987) do
not possess measures of schooling, while Hanushek (1992) and Murnane et al. (1981)
use fixed effects for schools. In the exogenous effort model (xx), there are only two
influential variables: (a) being in a non-urban area (an increase in schooling) reduces
achievement and (b) an increase in the percentage of teachers with advanced degrees
(an increase in schooling) raises achievement. These results hold in all four
achievement equations.
However, in the model with endogenous effort (ex), the influence of schooling
varies over the four achievement equations. Again, the percentage of teachers with
advanced degrees (%Degree) positively influences the achievement of the child;
however, it is only statistically significant in the Event and All equations. In addition,
the strange result that a non-urban environment reduces the level of child achievement
still holds in the first three achievement equations.
In the achievement equation with Event entered as the measure of parental
effort, all of the schooling variables are influential. The influences of the student
body variables (%NonLun and %NonMin) are mixed. The measures representing the
teaching staff (LowSal, Tea/Stu and %Degree) show a positive relationship between
schooling and achievement. These are the variables that policy-makers can influence.
However, given the lack of support in the other achievement equations, it is difficult
to draw sweeping conclusions about policy.
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Conclusions of the Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model
The focus of this chapter is to explore the response of parental effort to
changes in schooling under the assumption that schooling is exogenous. Along the
way there is general support for many of the findings in the time allocation and
household production function literatures. As for effort and schooling, the results are
mixed. Some suggest complementarity, while others suggest substitutability. The
effort of going to school events in which the child participates is influenced by school
resources. From this measure of effort, it is shown that the quantity of school
resources complements parental effort, while parents substitute for the quality of
school resources. In order to boost achievement, policy-makers may consider
providing more opportunities for families to participate rather than providing a
substitute (better quality teachers). Regarding the other measures of parental effort,
the signs of the coefficients are almost exactly the same, but these coefficients lack
statistical significance.
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CHAPTER IV

ENDOGENOUS EFFORT AND ENDOGENOUS SCHOOLING MODEL

Until now, the services a child receives at school are modeled as being out of
the family's control; i.e., schooling is exogenous. Below, this assumption is dropped.
Instead, schooling is assumed to be purchased by parents as an input into the
production of achievement. The parents realize their preferences in purchasing
schooling and supplying of effort. This is closer to Becker's (1965) model where the
family may choose market goods (xj) and household time inputs (tj. The production
function for achievement represents the mixture of schooling and parental effort.
When parents can choose the level of schooling received by their children, the
substitutability or complementarity of parental effort and schooling is located within
the cross price effects. Rather than providing families with resources directly, policy
makers may try to boost achievement by making schooling cheaper and easier to
obtain. Two theoretical models are presented below to explore endogenous parental
effort and schooling. These models differ over how parents are able to purchase
schooling.
Simple Model of Endogenous Effort and Schooling
In this simple endogenous schooling model, the family is free to choose
schooling. Specifically, parents simultaneously choose schooling, parental effort, and
leisure in order to maximize utility. However, no explicit assumptions are made about
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how parents go about obtaining schooling, except that it is available at constant prices.
The set up of the parents' problem is similar to the case of exogenous schooling. The
parents' problem is
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p ^ c c w'2Gcc][C(M) ^ + ^jS ss + ^ P ^^c c ]

- W iJ J t * V Jee * » 2U c J W J cc\[wp'Ucc]

- I v X c t t v ’X c ttU jJ sfs VJss * P’^ c c 1

< o

imposed).
(38)

The parents maximize their utility by choosing parental effort, schooling and leisure:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
E = £(w,

s

T, N, p s),

On

= S(w, r, w
, ps),

(W

r,

W!)

L - L(w,

« , p s).

As before, the production function for desired achievement is residually found,
A

=/(£Cw, r, A
T
,ps), S(w
, r, A
T
,p1)).

(«)

The community and school may influence the family's decisions by influencing
the price of schooling. A change in the price of schooling influences achievement by
changing the amounts of schooling and parental effort used in the production of
achievement. These two influences are
Aps = f sSps + f EEps.

(43)

Recall, wage (w) represents a change in the opportunity cost of the time. The
response of parental time to a change in this opportunity cost is

~ < W < F u \V jl * V J a l

* IT-L-E1E„ > =< 0.

<«)

As in the exogenous schooling model, there is a negative substitution because effort is
more expensive with a rise in wage. There is also a positive income effect because
the family has more income with a rise in wage.
Recall that when schooling is exogenous, the effect of a change in wage is
Ew = GUcUll + [T-L-E]E n >=< 0.
The ability to substitute between effort and schooling in production is impossible.
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However, with schooling now endogenous, parents have the ability to switch to more
schooling when faced with an increase in the opportunity cost of effort. This
substitution toward more schooling is imbedded in the substitution effect with the
additional term, U ^ fs2 + U ^ . This term captures the productivity and utility
generating capacity (via achievement) of schooling.
In the endogenous schooling model, whether achievement is a normal good
depends on the relationship between effort and schooling in production:

a n

=/,["/*

(46)

- P Sf s e \ + f s ^ P Sf e e ~ w f s J -

In short, the effect of income depends on complementarity/substitutability and
opportunity costs of effort and schooling. This in turn determines whether effort and
schooling are normal or inferior goods (inputs). The signs of E*, and SN are
ambiguous, and thus the sign of AN is ambiguous.
The response of schooling to a change in the price of schooling is

V = - V * G U Jyv'U ccU J * GVJlVjJ / ^ U J ^ V

c.

* U J < 0,

(47)

where SN is the response of schooling to a change in non-labor income (N), and G is
negative and the reciprocal of the | G31. If the price of schooling decreases, then
parents purchase more schooling, assuming that schooling is not an extremely inferior
good. The first two terms of Spi are the income and substitution effects, respectively.
The last term is another substitution effect that follows from the fact that the relative
price of schooling and parental effort changes. Since both schooling and effort are
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assumed to positively effect achievement, parents can substitute schooling for parental
effort in the production of achievement; i.e., with a decrease in its price, schooling
becomes a more attractive input as compared to parental effort.
The response of parental effort to a change in the price of schooling is
Et , = - e „s -

g u c\p swucculj

- G t y i ^ / s/ £][W2i;cc ♦ v Lj
(48)

- GUclU J s 1)lw 2Ucc ♦ ULJ
Together, the first two terms are the standard cross-price effect. The last two terms
are similar to the achievement and productivity effects in Es of the exogenous
schooling model (ex) in equation (28). In Ep«, these two effects follow from the fact
that an increase in the price of schooling negatively influences the quantity of
schooling demanded (S) thereby influencing the production relationship between
schooling and parental effort. The positive achievement effect reflects the fact that an
increase in the price of schooling (pst ) causes parents to purchase less schooling (S i)
and increase their effort (Et), all the while maintaining the same level of
achievement. In contrast, the negative productivity effect reflects the fact that an
increase in the price of schooling (psT) reduces the amount of schooling purchased
(S40 and lowers the marginal productivity of parental effort (fe), which causes an
increase in the per unit opportunity cost of achievement. Effort is reduced (E i),
because it is now less effective. Comparing Ep» and Es from the exogenous schooling
model (ex), the achievement and productivity effects are now functions of the marginal
utility of money (Uc). This difference follows from the fact that the achievement and
productivity effects now filter through a change in the relative price between schooling
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and parental effort.
As in Becker and Tomes (1976), a policy-maker's attempt to increase
achievement by subsidizing the family's purchase of schooling may be mitigated by a
redistribution of household resources. The effect that a subsidy has on achievement
may be dampened because the family purchases more schooling, but parents may
reduce effort.
Realistic Model of Endogenous Schooling
In the simple model of endogenous schooling, no explicit assumption is made
about how parents purchase their optimal level of schooling, except that it is available
at a constant price. A more realistic model of endogenous schooling is presented
below in order to more accurately represent the purchasing of schooling. In this more
complex model, there are two ways parents can obtain their desired level of schooling.
First, parents can leave their current school district and move to a public school
district that provides a more appropriate level of schooling. This follows Tiebout's
(1956) model of choosing publicly provided goods. Second, parents can forgo the
local public school and send their child to a private school that offers a more
appropriate level schooling.
Price of Schooling
Before modeling the parents' problem, certain assumptions about the price of
schooling are made. The amount a person pays for a good is a function of the price
of the good. In the exogenous schooling model (ex), the amount paid for schooling is
relative to the exogenous level of schooling but is fixed. In the simple endogenous
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schooling model, the price of schooling is constant, and the amount paid for schooling
is linearly related to the amount of schooling purchased. In this more complex model,
the way a family chooses schooling is taken into consideration. Choosing schooling
via Tiebout behavior implies that the family may also choose (to some degree) the
amount they pay for schooling. However, there are other costs to obtaining school
services that the family has no control over. As a result, the fee (F) a family pays for
schooling is assumed to be a function of schooling (and is endogenous) but is
influenced by exogenous choice set characteristics.
To begin, the school fee (F) that families pay is assumed to be a function (but
not necessarily a linear function) of schooling (S). The marginal price of schooling is
thus the change in this fee (F) due to a one unit change in schooling (5F/3S). The
school fee for public schools (FB) is also a function of the composition of local
taxpayers (DB).55 Public school families pay for schooling via taxes (and housing
prices). From the vantage point of these families, public schooling is subsidized by
taxpayers without school age children (such as firms and the elderly). For private
schools, the school fee (FR) is determined by the characteristics of the school (DR).
For example, a religiously affiliated school may be subsidized by a congregation
and/or by teachers who accept compensation from a "Higher" source. Such
characteristics reduce the school fee (FR) paid by private school families. These
school fees are summarized as

55 Variables for public schools are denoted with a superscript B, while variables
for private schools are denotes with a superscript R.
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F b(S b, D b),

W9)

F*(S* D*).

(5°)

These school fees are a matter of choice for parents. In part, the school fee
follows residually from the family's choice of schooling. Of course, when choosing
the level of schooling, parents also consider the availability of subsidies (D). If
schooling is held constant, then parents choose the school with the most subsidies.
However, to some degree the fee parents pay for schooling is out of their
control; it is determined by the characteristics of the family's choice set. To explain,
Tiebout (1956) assumes no transactions costs or institutional irregularities to hinder
choice of local jurisdiction. As for the purchase of schooling, these assumptions
translate into the following scenario: parents choose a school from a choice set that
costlessly sits in front of them and contains a continuous variety of schools. However,
choosing a publicor privateschool is not quite so simple. In reality,

thechoice set of

schools exists over a physical area and does not alwayscontainall varieties,
transactions costs are incurred.

as a result

In addition, competition within a choice set may

reduce the schooling fees of all the schools in the choice set. Parents looking to send
their child to private schools face the same restrictions.
Families do not choose their choice set; it is exogenous. In order to capture
these limits and transactions costs associated with a family's choice set, a proportional
shift parameter is assumed to augment the family's school fee (F),
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kbF*(Sb, D b),

<51>

k? F \S * ,

<52>

D *).

In essence, the fee/schooling schedule proportionally shifts from choice set to choice
set. (See Figure 2.) This proportional shifter (k) does not vary within a choice set
but rather varies over choice sets and thus over families that reside in areas with
different choice sets.Public

school families face kb.Private

schoolfamiliesface kr ,

because private schools exist over a physical area which doesnot alwayscontain

all

varieties.
With these definitions of the school fee and the proportional choice set shifter,
the public school family's budget constraint is
wT + N = C + wE + wL + k?F b(S b, D b).
Given this specification, the marginal price of schooling is

kbx 3F/3S.

<53>
An increase in

the proportional choice set shifter (henceforth the "price shifter") represents an
increase in the opportunity cost of schooling. Certain characteristics of the family's
choice set make it cheaper or costlier for the family to obtain schooling. In essence,
the opportunity cost of the same level of schooling exogenously varies from choice set
to choice set according to the price shifter. As before, a change in effort due to a
change in the opportunity cost of schooling reveals information about the
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substitutability or complementarity of parental effort and schooling.56
Parents' Problem
For the moment, the existence of private school alternatives is ignored. In the
endogenous effort and schooling models (ee), parents satisfy their demand for
achievement by demanding school services (S) and supplying effort (E). Given the
reconfiguration of the family's full income constraint, the parents' problem is to
maximize utility by choosing leisure (L), effort (E), schooling services (S) and school
subsidization from the local community (D):
max U(J[E, S ), wT + N - wE - wL -

k F(S,

D), L),

(54)

where U(*) is the utility function; f(*) is the household's achievement production
function; w is the market wage; T is the maximum Time available to the parents, and
N is non-labor income. The solution to the parents' problem is
E

=E(T, N, w, k),

(55)

S

=S(T, N, w, k),

(56)

D

=D(T, N, w,

k).

(57)

L

=U T , N, w,

k).

(58)

And the desired level of achievement demanded may be residually obtained by

56 Variation of choice set characteristics over families in my sample provides the
variation to explore the substitutability or complementarity of parental effort and
school service.
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plugging the effort and school inputs equations into the achievement production
function:
A = f(E (T , N, w, K),

S(r,

AT, w, *)).

The influence of a change in the price shifter

(k )

(» )

on the demand for schooling

and supply of effort is similar to the influence of a change in the price of schooling in
the simple model of endogenous schooling, equations (47) and (48).
Given the existence of private schools, parents have an additional way to adjust
the inputs in the production of achievement. Parents choose between private and
public schools according to which type of provider yields the greatest utility.
However, the private school family forgoes the services of its local public school (S8"
0, yet must also pay the fee faced by public school families. The overall fee paid by
a private school family is
F* = k*F*(Sr , D*) +

kb F b (Sb'/,

DB~f),

WW

where KBFB(SB_f, D8"*) is the fee of the foregone local public school which depends on
foregone local public schooling (SB'f) and local subsidies (DB'f). An important
assumption is that private school parents do not receive utility from the foregone
public school, but they must still pay for the foregone local public school through
property taxes and housing prices.57
The budget constraint of the public school families is similar but simpler; they
do not pay for the local private school they are forgoing. The fee paid by a public

57 Unfortunately, NELS does not have data on the foregone local public school.
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school family is
FB =

kb F b(Sb,

Db).

<61>

When faced with private school alternatives and the ability to choose the school
specific fee, the parents' problem in its most general form is
max U( /( £ , [ l - j q s 1* + RS*),

w T + N - wE

- wL -[1~R ]F b - RF * L).

R equals 1 if the parents send their child to private school or equals 0 if the parents
send their child to public school.
Parents maximize utility by choosing whether to participate in private
schooling. In order to formalize this choice between private and public schooling, the
parents' indirect utility function is defined as
VCR, T, N, w, [I-*]*8, Rk* R k8).

<63>

If the parents send their child to public school (R = 0), their indirect utility function is
as follows:
FfO.r.W.w.K®) = U(fCE\ Sfl*), wT+N-wE* - w L ' - k? F b(S b\ D b*), I ) .
Variables denoted with a superscript * are optimally chosen when the parents solve the
problem,

maxE,s‘,D‘,L UC/CE, S B),

w T + N - wE

- wL - k? F b (S b, D B), I).

«»5)

Similarly, if the parents send their child to private school (R = 1), their indirect utility
function is
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S8'*), w T + N - w£** - wl**

K(l, r , w, F 1**, F * 8) =
-

k*F*(Sr ' \

_
(60)

D 8**) - kbF b(Sb_/**, D b /*’), I**).

Variables denoted with ** are optimally chosen when the parents solve the following
problem in equation 63,

U(.f(Et S B), wT + N — wE - wL

(67)

- k?F r (Sr, D r ) - 1^ F B(SB~f, DB~f), L).
Note that E \ E** are not necessarily the same value, nor are any of the other
optimally chosen values. Parents choose between private and public schools according
to these indirect utilities. If the critical value,
Rc

=F (l, T, N, w, k8, o

- V(Q, T,; N, w, k8),

<«>

is greater than zero, then the parents send their child to one of the private schools in
their choice set of private schools; otherwise they send their child to one of the public
schools in their choice set of public schools.
Given the definition of the critical value, if Rc is less than or equal to zero,
then the solution to the parents' problem is
R =0

(public school)

(69)

E = E(T, N, w, k*)

(70)

S = S B = S(T, N, w, ic8)

<71)
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D = Db =

Z)(r, N,

w, k®)

f72)

On the other hand, if Rc < 0, then the solution to the parents' problem is
R = 1

(private school)

£ = E(T, N, w, k*,k®)

S

=S* =S*(r,

w,

<74>

k*, k
®
)

D® = D*(T, N, w, k®, k®)

SB'F = S b~f (T% N,
d b - f = d b - f (j.

Wt

L=L(r, V
, w,

w
,k
®
, k®
)
^

kb

(73)

)

k
®
,k
®
)

<
75>
(76>

(77)

(78)

<
79>

Recall that private school parents choose the level of foregone public schooling and the
local subsidies of public schools. Note that the endogenous school fee is residually
found via the optimal choices of schooling and subsidies.38
Comparative static analysis is not possible because of the discrete nature of the
private/public decision. However, comparative statics on the critical value (Rc)

58 Of course, if the private school parents do not receive any benefit from the
foregone public schooling they would choose the lowest possible level of public
schooling to minimize the public school fee they must pay via property taxes and
housing costs. However, in reality, the quality of the foregone public school may
provide them with some "public goods" type benefits or may be bundled with other
desirable local amenities. This realistic perspective is supported by the findings in the
literature.
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describe whether that family switches from private to public school or vice versa.
Recall this critical value represents the net indirect utility parents derived from sending
their child to private school rather than public school. An increase in the net indirect
utility may cause a public school family to switch to a private school. A decrease in
the net indirect utility may cause a private school family to switch to a public school.
Expanding the expression of net indirect utility yields
R c =U (J (E "(T , N, w, k",

N, tv, k8, k8)),

w T+ N -v/E "(.T, S , tv, ic* K * ) - w t" ( r , N, tv, K*, k>)
-K*F *(S*"(T, N, w, K* K * ) ,0 '" ( r , N, w, K* K®))
-r * F B(SB-F“ (T<N, w, K*,
L " {T , N, w,
-U (A E -(.T , N, tv,

k

kb),D b -f --(T,

N, w, k*, k8)),
(80)

", k *))

tc*),S*-(r,

N,

w, *»)),

» T * N -w E '( T , N, w, t c * ) - tv f ( r , N, w, tc*)
-xf>FB(.SB‘ (T, N, tv, K8), D b'(T , N, tv, ic8)),
L '(T , N, tv, tc8)).
An increase in the private school price shifter

(k r )

reduces the net indirect

utility such that a private school family switches to public schools,

(81)

UCFS + ULL f < 0 (given assumptions).
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The utility derived from the bundle that includes private schools (VR) decreases
(assuming effort and private schooling are not perfect substitutes and private schooling
is not an extremely inferior good), while the utility derived from the bundle that
includes public schools (VB) is not changed.
When considering an increase in the public school price shifter (kb), the
comparative statics are not so simple because both utilities (VRand VB) decrease,

- V J CE -J * UA/ Ss y

- Uc KRF ‘ s y

- Uck’ f £ d $ " - Uc r? F ‘ s y "

- Uc r ? F ‘ Dy - V

'

* Uc -U c w E f - Uc w L -;

CF ‘ ♦ Vt L ?

- V J sS‘J - Uc + Uc w E j * Vc w L j

* Uc * * F f s * * Uc t?F% D ‘; * V cf ‘ - Ul L 'J >=< 0.

An increase in

kb reduces

the ability to purchase public and private schooling since the

household must pay the increased cost of public schooling, whether or not they send
their child to public school.59
A change in a particular variable may cause a change in the critical value, Rc,
such that there is a switch from private school to public school or vice versa.
Assuming a change in a particular variable does not cause a family to change

59 Although one could imagine a "relative price" between private and public
schools, such a relative price does not exist in this switching model, because parents
ether send their child to public or private school. In other words, there is no smooth
substitution of one for the other.
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institutions, the comparative statics for schooling demand and effort supply are similar
to those of the simple endogenous schooling. A change in the choice set's
proportional shift parameter

(k )

is similar to a change in the price of schooling and

therefore affects the demand for schooling and supply of effort in a similar fashion to
equations (47) and (48).
Looking over all of the theoretical models, the ability of the policy-maker to
boost achievement depends on how parents adjust their behavior. In the exogenous
schooling model, policy-makers boosted achievement by giving the family more
schooling. In response, parents either help or hinder the actions of the policy-maker
by increasing or decreasing parental effort, respectively. In the endogenous schooling
models, the family may adjust parental effort and/or schooling in response to an
exogenous increase in schooling. Suppose the policy-maker tries to boost achievement
by helping parents to obtain more public schooling (a decrease in the kb). Parents
may then demand more schooling but supply less effort, thereby keeping achievement
the same. In addition, the parents may take their child out of private school and put
him or her into the public school because of the change in the net indirect utility (R°).
Again, the family can hinder or complement the efforts of the policy-makers to raise
achievement, but now parents have more variables to adjust. In short, as the
complexity of the parents’ problem increases in order to allow more control over
inputs into the production of achievement, parents have more ways to adjust to the
actions of policy-makers.
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Empirical Analysis
As before, the relationship between schooling and parental effort is an
empirical issue. In order to estimate the endogenous schooling model with the
availability of private school alternatives, a three step approach is used. The steps are
outlined in Figure 3.
Using public and private school families, the first step is to estimate a private
school participation equation,

Ri = b'X l + ult

(*3)

where Rjc is, as in equation (68), the difference from indirect utility obtained from
private school services and that obtained from public school services. X( is a vector
containing the variables that influence the parents' choice of schooling and parental
effort. These variables are basically family and choice set characteristics of private
and public schools; i.e., variables of the indirect utility functions.
At this point it is worth reiterating that families in the same choice set face the
same choice set shift parameter. The exogenous variation in the price shifter occurs
across choice sets. As a result, the effect of the price shifter is similar to a choice set
fixed effect.
The second step is to estimate the reduced form equations for schooling
demand and effort supply,60
-B

t/v B ,

E,B

= y Xt + e{

., J

if

!v

-u ,,

60 The leisure (L), local characteristics (D) , and foregone schooling (SB'F)
equations are omitted.
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Sf =

P V + t - 'B

i f 1% <:-u(,

(85)

E* =

YV

+ *f'*

i f 1 % > -u„

(86)

S* =

P * V + e f ,Jl

i/

&%

(87)

> -a

The sample is split between private and public school families, and separate equations
are estimated for the two groups. Equations (84) and (85) represent public school
families, while equations (86) and (87) represent private school families. The vectors
XjBand X R contain the variables in the X; of the private school participation equation.
In accordance to the theoretical model above, X® contains
and

k

b.

k

b,

where X R contains

kr

Figure 4 contains an outline of the identifying restrictions that allow for the

estimation o f each step in the model; note, this figure refers to variables for the choice
set variables that are described shortly.
The third step is to use the expected values from the second step to estimate
the achievement production function;

The vector x; contains the elements of X; except for two things. Wages and the price
shifter only influence household production via the supply of effort and purchase of
schooling because they reflect the opportunity costs of the parents' choices.
Estimation Techniques and Issues
As in the previous chapter, the nature of the data and this multi-step empirical
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model necessitates the use of different econometric techniques and makes it difficult to
interpret the estimated coefficients. Including the private school participation decision
increases the complexity of the econometric techniques. Figure 6 provides an
overview of the estimation techniques and statistical packages used in this three step
process.
Of course, a major difference between the estimation of the exogenous
schooling models (xx and ex) and the endogenous schooling model (ee) is the
consideration of private schooling participation. Recall the critical value (R°) that
determines whether a family participates in private schooling is the net indirect utility
from attending private school. Of course, a numerical value for Rc is not available,
but private school families reveal that their Rc's are greater than zero by sending their
children to private schools. Using this information, Rc is represented by a dummy
variable (R) which is one for private school families and zero for private school
families. In the first step of estimation, the private participation equation is estimated
using this dummy variable and the probit model which is described on page 42.
The second step of the estimation process is to estimate the reduced form
parental supply effort and schooling factor demand equations. Schooling is the level
of services received at school. The factor demands for these services are represented
by six reduced form factor demand equations based on the measures of schooling used
in the exogenous schooling model (Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, NonUrb, %NonLun
and %NonMin). Separate equations are estimated for public school families and
private school families, because in accordance with the theoretical model these
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families face different price shifters, even when they are in the same physical area.
The results of the participation equation are used to adjust the schooling and
effort equations for the decision to go to a public or private school. In short, each
schooling and effort equation is adjusted for selectivity into the public or private
school population. If the parental effort and schooling equations are not adjusted for a
family's selection into public or private schools, then the estimated coefficients are
inconsistent due to self-selection bias; the specification error of an omitted variable is
committed according to Greene (1993).
Specifically, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated using the estimated
coefficients of the participation equation. It captures the family's selection into the
selection of the private school sector; and for reasons mentioned above, it must enter
into the estimation of schooling and effort.61 The equations with continuous dependent
variables (Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, %NonLun and %NonMin) are estimated via
OLS.

Entering the inverse Mills as an independent variable in these equations

controls for the correlation between the private school participation decision and the
schooling decisions; i.e., the correlation between ux and e;s. It should be noted that
including the inverse Mills ratio introduces heteroskedasticity because the correlation
between the effort/schooling decision and the private school decision varies from
observation to observation and because the true coefficients are not being estimated.
LIMDEP compensates for this heteroskedasticity.

61 For programming simplicity, when estimating the schooling and effort equations
for public school families, a public school participation equation is estimated in order
to provide the proper inverse Mills ratio.
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As in the previous chapter, the equations with the categorical dependent
variables need to be estimated with qualitative-variable models: probit (Event and
NonUrb) and order probit models (Check and Discuss). Simply entering the inverse
Mills ratios into the probit or order probit model provides consistent estimates of the
coefficients but does not allow for the correction of the introduction of
heteroskedasticity. To rectify this problem, the participation equation and the effort
(or schooling) equation are simultaneously estimated via full information maximum
likelihood estimation (FIML). This technique provides the proper standard errors by
estimating a log-likelihood function that capture the two decisions; it also provides
more efficient coefficients.62
The inverse Mills ratio is included in the achievement equations in order to
capture the influence of selecting into a particular sector. The private school
participation decision is analogous to the schooling and effort decisions. In short, each
equation is estimated to eliminate selectivity bias, thereby providing consistent
estimates of the household production function. As in the previous chapter, including
the expected values of parental effort causes the same difficulties with the standard
errors of the achievement equations. As a result, the same bootstrapping procedure is
used to calculate the correct standard errors in these equations. (See page 45 for a
discussion of this procedure.)
Description o f New Variables

62 For each of these full information maximum likelihood estimations new
parameters are generated for the participation equation. These results are not
reported.
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Another difference with previous estimations is the price shifter which enters
into the participation, parental effort and schooling equations. Before describing the
set of variables that represent the price shifter, the family's choice set must be
defined. The borders of a family's choice set are likely to vary over families, for the
borders are influenced by many different variables. For example, the choice set of
schools may be within x miles of the parents' home towns. Or, it may be within x
miles of all the labor market opportunities of the family's main wage earner. Thus,
using a single definition of the choice set for every family in the sample is somewhat
arbitrary; plus, "x mile" may differ according to transportation access.
Nevertheless, a single definition is needed. The choice sets borders must in
some fashion hinder the family from choosing schools outside the borders. Drawing a
circle around a family's home based on traveling distance would capture the ability of
a family to choose a school by driving their child to a different school. Assuming
Tiebout behavior, drawing a circle around a main wage earner's employer based on
traveling distance to work would capture the ability of a family to choose a school by
moving to a different town. However, the drawing of circles is somewhat arbitrary,
because school y within the circle may not be feasible, while school z just outside the
circle may be feasible. For example, school y may be on the other side of a
mountain, while school z is just down the road but outside the circle. In addition, the
National Center for Education Statistics does not provide zip codes. (They only
provide very limited zip code level data but not the zip codes.)
Instead of defining the family's choice set via travel costs, in the empirical
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analysis below the family is assumed to be bound by state borders. While state
borders are also somewhat arbitrary, they do limit the number, variety and
competition among schools from which the family may choose. Transporting a child
across state borders to another public school is prohibited in most states. State
borders represent state policies, and these policies may provide disincentives to move
across state borders by, for example, influencing a family's tax burden. In addition,
the National Center for Education Statistics provides the family's state in the
Restricted-Use NELS.
Recall the price shifter (k) reflects the ability or costliness of the family to
obtain its desired level of schooling. The price shifter is represented by variables that
make it harder or easier for a family to switch schools and provide the family with
fewer or more choices; it also represents how competition may influence the school
fee. They shift the family's total outlay schedule for schooling. Unfortunately, some
of the choice set variables reflect a higher price shifter, while others reflect a lower
price shifter. These variables are described below and briefly in Table 7, and the
Data Appendix provides the source of these variables.
The process of choosing schooling is smoothed (less costly) when parents have
more schools from which to choose. More schools represent more options and
potentially more variability within a family's choice set.63 More schools may also

63 The number of schools may reflect the population of the state. Adjusting the
number of schools by dividing by the school age population (schools per child) was
considered but not accepted as a variable in the analysis, for it is essentially changing
the definition of the choice set. For it is the borders that restrict the family, not the
borders relative to the number of people, unless it is believed that population restricts
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reflect greater competition among schools. An increase in the number of schools in a
state (N um t) represents a decrease in the price shifter (k^) and thus the fee (total
outlays) for schooling. B_Num and R_Num represent the number of public and
private schools, respectively.
The density of schools (per square mile of land) gives an idea of the travel
costs when obtaining the services of a different school. It is costlier for a family in a
large state with a small number of schools to adjust school quality as compared to a
family in a small state with a large number of schools. In addition, if schools are
closer together, then there may be more competition. An increase in the density of
schools in a state (Dent) decreases the price shifter (ici). B Den and R Den
represent the density of public and private schools, respectively.
The composition of the state's population in terms of urban and non-urban
influences the similarities among public schools. For example, a state that is 100
percent non-urban has more similar public schools than a state with half its population
in urban locations and the other half in non-urban locations. The absolute value of 50
minus the percentage urbanization (Alike) represents the lack o f variation or alikeness
of the population and thus the alikeness of the public schools.64 Of course, this
variable assumes that public schools in urban and non-urban areas are qualitatively
different. This variable is a measure of the lack of variation among public schools in
the state. An increase in variation (Alike T) represents an increase in the price shifter

a family's choices.
64 The percentage of schools in urban locations is not available on the state level.
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( k bT ) «

Similarly, the percentage of state and local revenue for primary and secondary
schools raised obtained from local sources (Local) represents the variation in public
schools. The more localities in a state depend on local revenue, then the more likely
public schools are to vary across the state. An increase in this proxy of variation
(Local f ) represents a decrease in the price shifter (k8! ) .66 Federal aid to states is
not included because it is not clear how much filters to the local level.
In addition, whether the state government supports or allows local school
choice programs (Choice) is also used to represent the price shifter for public schools.
In general, these choice programs allow parents to send their child to a public school
other than the public school of the area in which they reside. In other words, parents
can obtain a more appropriate level of public schooling without incurring costs. The
ability of parents to choose more freely may also induce greater competition among
schools. If Choice is one, then the price shifter is reduced (xBi ) .
Regarding the price shifter for private schools (kr), the percentage of private
school enrollment in religiously affiliated schools represents the degree to which
parents may choose from a subsidized school, assuming religiously affiliated schools

65 It is unfortunate that all of the choice set variables could not represent an
increase in the price shifter. Such considerations were not in the forefront during the
compilation of these variable.
66 However, if state revenue reflect attempts to mitigate variation across public
schools (mitigate unequal educational opportunities), then the opposite relationship may
hold.
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are subsidized by donations.67 This measure of potential subsidization enters into the
effort and schooling equations of parents whose children are enrolled in private
schools. An increase in the number of religious affiliation (Religious

T)

represents a

decrease in the price shifter (kH).
To summarize, for public schools, the price shifter is depicted with B_Num,
B D en , Local, Choice and Alike. Except for Alike, an increase in these choice set
variables leads to a decrease in the opportunity cost of schooling (the shifter). For
private schools, the shifter is depicted with R_Num, R Den and Religious.
Private school participation is going to be influenced by the price shifter for
both public and private schools. Like a relative price, families compare the relative
opportunity costs of private and public schooling.

As a result, the price shifters for

both the private and public schools should enter into the private school participation
equation. To represent this relative shifter, R Num, B_Num, R Den and B Den
collapse into one variable, the ratio of private to public private schools (R to B). For
example, an increase in the number or density of private schools (R to B t ) decreases
the price shifter of private schools (kr) thereby decreasing the relative shifter.68 The
other representations of the price shifter do not collapse so readily; thus, they are
entered individually in the participation equation. Note, the influence of the public

67 The religious compositions of private schools by state is not available, thus
enrollment figures are used. The average tuition for the private schools by state is not
available.
68 R to B may also indicate the quality of public schools in a state. In states with
low quality public schools, there may be more room for private schools to enter the
market.
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shifter on private school participation is expected to be the opposite of the private
shifter's influence.
Hypothesized Signs
Figure 7 maps out the expected relationships for public school families. In this
model's estimation process, there are four basic dependent variables: private school
participation (R), parental effort (E), schooling (S) and achievement (A). As in the
exogenous schooling model (ex), Check, Discuss and Event depict parental effort,
and Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, NonUrb, %NonLun and %NonM!n depict
schooling. The independent variables are broken down into two basic groups: (a)
opportunity costs - wages and the price shifter, and (b) household characteristics - the
previously mentioned attributes of the parents (except wages), child and family. The
means and standard deviations of the variables are presented in Table 8 for the 4159
public school families, 809 private school families and 4968 total families.
Regarding the opportunity cost variables, parents' wages are assumed to be the
opportunity costs of parental effort, while the influence of the price shifter is assumed
to be the opportunity cost of schooling. As discussed above, an increase in wages
ambiguously influences parental effort due to income and substitution effects.69
However, assuming that achievement (and therefore effort) is not an extremely inferior
good, wages are expected to negatively influence the supply of effort.
Likewise, the price shifter ambiguously influences the demand for schooling.

69 The substitution effect is more complex due to the achievement and productivity
effects. The family now can substitute among inputs in the household production
process and the productivity of schooling and effort change.
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Recall an increase in the shifter raises the price of schooling, KXdF/dS; i.e., it
increases the opportunity cost of schooling. It follows that a change in the shifter
influences schooling according to income productivity and achievement effects (see
page 35). However, assuming that achievement (and therefore schooling) is not an
extremely inferior good, the price shifter is expected to negatively impact the demand
for schooling.
The cross price effects of wages and the price shifter are the major focal points
of the endogenous schooling model. Theoretically, the influences of wages on
schooling and the price shifter on parental effort are ambiguous because of the
income, achievement and productivity effects (equation 46). In general, if the
coefficients on wages in the schooling equations are positive, then families are
substituting schooling for effort. In contrast, if these coefficients are negative, then
they suggest that schooling and effort are complementary. The same interpretation
holds for the relationship between the price shifter and parental effort; therefore, no
expectations are held regarding the sign of these coefficients. It is an empirical
matter.
As in the third chapter, the opportunity costs of parental choices enter the
achievement equation only through their effect on effort and schooling. They act as
identifiers of the achievement equation.
The expected influences of the other household characteristics are only briefly
discussed, because much of the rationale is stated in the exogenous schooling model.
The participation, schooling and effort equations are referred to as "R, S and E".
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Purchasing more school services or supplying more effort increases
achievement. In addition, if households are rational, then private school participation
is a boost in schooling; they wouldn't purchase (at an additional cost) a reduction in
schooling. As a result, some household characteristics are expected to influence the
supply of effort, the purchase of schooling and participation in private schooling in the
same direction.
However, constraints on a family's household resources may restrict the
family's ability to supply effort and cause them to purchase more schooling. The lack
of household resources is reflected in the limited access to capital (LimCap) and the
presence of more children (Siblings). The quality of "effort producing resources" is
reflected in the parents' education (M_Ed, F_Ed and NonWhite) and the availability
of study aids (Aid). Families with more or better household resources are expected to
supply more effort and thus purchase less schooling and are less likely to participate in
private school. In the achievement equation, the expected signs of these variables are
the same as in the exogenous schooling model (ex).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Prior_A is prior achievement and it
enters the achievement equation to control for endowed intelligence. It also enters into
R, S and E equations. A child that has achieved well in the past may reflect past R, S
and E; therefore, such a child may need less R, S and E in the current period, which
suggests a negative relationship between prior achievement and R, S and E.
However, such a child's parents may be likely to provide the same high level of R, S
and E as before, which suggests a positive relationship between prior achievement and
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current R, S and E. As a result, there is no firm expectation with respect to the
influence of prior achievement on R, S or E.
A problem child (BadChild) may attract or repel R, S and E. Parents may be
rectifying the problem with increased R, S and E. However, they may not wish to
invest R, S and E in a problem child for they may be in squandered. In production, a
problem child (BadChild) makes achievement harder to produce.
Similar to the lack of attention received from teachers, female children may
receive fewer family resources such as R, S and E. However, parents may allocate
more R, S and E to their daughters to compensate for the lack of teachers' attention.
Thus, the influence of Girl on R, S and E is ambiguous. Likewise, in production of
achievement, the influence of the child's gender is vague.
With the inclusion of wages, family income (Income) should to some degree
represent non-labor income (N). Assuming achievement is a normal good, families
with more non-labor income should expend more R, S and E aimed at raising
achievement. With regard to production of achievement, an increase in family income
may represent an increase in other household inputs that boost achievement.
Since many private schools are affiliated with Catholic churches, Catholic
parents (Catholic) are expected to be more likely to send their children to private
schools. After controlling for private school participation, no conjecture is made
about the influence of the family's religious affiliation on schooling or effort.
No expectation is held regarding the influence of whether the father is the most
involved parent (F_Invol). The same is true for the regional dummy variables

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
(NorthCen, South, West).
Interpretation of Results
Estimating the endogenous effort and schooling model with private school
opportunities leads to the estimation of 27 equations. However, summaries of all the
results o f the endogenous schooling model (ee) are provided in tables 16, 17 and 18.
For explicit results, table 9 contains the estimates of the participation which is
estimated using information from all families (public and private school families). For
public school families, table 10 contains the estimates of the parental effort equations
(Check, Discuss and Events), and table 11 provides the estimates for the six measures
of school services, and table 13 contains the estimates of the achievement equations.
Results for private school families are in Tables 14, 15 and 16.
Opportunity Cost Variables - The coefficients on the choice set variables are
interpreted first. These coefficients provide insight into the complementarity and
substitutability of schooling and parental effort. Starting with the influence of the
price shifter in the participation equation, an increase in the ratio of private schools to
public schools in a state (R to B) represents a decrease in the relative price shifter of
private schools. (R to B t -»• tcRi and/or kbT) The positive coefficient on R to B
suggests that parents are likely to send their child to a private school when the
characteristics of their overall choice set makes it easier (less costly) for them to
purchase private schooling as compared to public schooling. In other words, parents
take advantage of lower opportunity costs.
The same hold story holds true for the positive coefficient on Alike, the
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alikeness of the state's public schools. (Aliket -»

kbT)

A s it becomes more difficult

to find their optimal level of schooling because all the public schools are alike, the
family turns to private schools. Parents are reacting to the higher opportunity costs of
public schooling and turning to private schools.
However, the opposite relationship is suggested by the positive coefficient of
the state's support for choice programs (Choice). An increase in this measure implies
a decrease in the price shifter of public schools (Choicet -»

k b >1)

and thus an increase

in relative price shifter of private school. The positive coefficients suggest that a rise
in this relative price shifter increases likelihood of participating in private school. In
other words, making it easier for families to choose public schools leads families to
increase their demand for private schooling. This is contrary to expectations. Choice
may be picking up other public choice explanations.
Notably, the percentage of religiously affiliated schools (Religious) is
statistically insignificant. This variable represents the availability of subsidized private
schools was expected to be statistically significant. In the end, the influence of the
relative price shifter on private school participation suggests that parents are
responding to the opportunity cost they face.
Regarding the other opportunity cost variables, the wages of the parents are
statistically insignificant in the participation equation, thus no conclusions may be
drawn.
Public School Families - To simplify matters, the effort supply and schooling
factor demand equations for only public school families are interpreted in this section.
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As in the exogenous schooling model (ex), the parents' wages (M Wage and
F Wage) reflect the opportunity cost of parental effort. Surprisingly, mother’s wage
positively effects all of the measures of parental effort, which runs against
expectations, since as wages increase effort becomes more costly. Even the most
time-consuming measure of effort (going to events) is not deterred by the opportunity
cost of the time as measured by wages. In the theoretical model, the influence of
wage is a function of income and two substitution effects. This suggests that the
income effect outweighs both of the substitution effects.
Theoretically, the relationship between schooling and the price shifter (kb) is
also ambiguous but expected to be negatively related; therefore, positive signs are
expected on the choice set variables, except for Alike.70 Looking at the all of the
choice set variables, there are numerous statistically significant coefficients (24 of 30).
Of these coefficients, some have the expected sign (14 of 24). These coefficients
suggest that a rise in the price shifter decreases the family's demand for schooling.
Parents reduced schooling in response to an increase in the opportunity cost of
schooling. The remaining coefficients (10 of 24) run contrary to expectations,
suggesting that parents increase schooling in response to an increase in the opportunity
cost of schooling.
Looking for a pattern in these results, schooling as represented by the teacher
characteristics (Tea/Stu, LowSal and %Degree) appears to be negatively related to

70 This interpretation is not backwards, because an increase in a choice set variable
represents a decrease in the price shifter, except for Alike.
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the price shifter (9 of 12); i.e., the ability of the families to choose schooling increases
demand for schooling. "Appears to be" is stated, because there are three coefficients
that suggest the opposite relationship. As for the coefficients on the other school
characteristics (NonUrb, %NonLun and %NonMin), their signs are even more
mixed.
Table 12 reports F-tests (Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, %NonLun and
%NonMin) and a likelihood ratio test (NonUrb) for various groups of variables. For
the choice set variables, these tests suggest that for public school families (and private
school families) the opportunity cost of schooling influences the demand for schooling.
Going variable by variable, the number of public schools in the state (B_Num)
positively influences the demand for quality teachers (as measured by LowSal) and the
decision to move to a non-urban area. More choices (a decrease in the price shifter)
lead the family to purchase more schooling. However, the number of schools
(B_Num) is negatively related to schooling demand according to the coefficients on
Tea/Stu, %NonLun and %NonMin. This suggests more choice leads to less
schooling. In the end, the influence of the number of schools is mixed.
An increase in the density of schools (a decrease in the price shifter) leads to
an increase in schooling demand as represented by Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree and
NonUrb. This suggests that families demand more schooling when schools are more
readily accessible. Only the coefficient on %NonMin refutes this relationship.
An increase in the state's schools dependence on local revenue (Local) (a
decrease in the price shifter) leads families to demand more schooling as represented
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by Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, %NonLun and %NonMin. In other words, families
demand more schooling when there is increased variability in the choice set. This is
the only representation of the price shifter to have a consistent influence across
schooling measures.
Families in states that support or allow local choice programs (a decrease in the
price shifter) demand more schooling (Tea/Stu and %NonLun) but also less schooling
(%Degree, NonUrb and %NonMin). Their ability to switch schools has an influence
on their demand for school services.
Similarly, the similarity of local population density (Alike) influences schooling
demand in a mixed fashion. An increase in the similarity in the choice set's
population (an increase in the price shifter) leads families to demand more and less
schooling, depending on the service being demanded.
With respect to the complementarity and substitutability, the influence of the
choice set variables on parental effort represent cross-price relationships. However,
the results are sparse. Three of fifteen coefficients are statistically significant. How
frequently parents discuss school with a child (Discuss) is positively influenced by the
number o f public schools in their choice set. In other words, with more public school
opportunities (as the price shifter falls) parents provide more effort. This suggests a
complementary relationship between schooling and effort. The same relationship is
revealed in the Discuss equation; the negative coefficient on Alike suggests that as the
price shifter decreases parents also reduce their own effort to produce achievement;
schooling and effort are complements.
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However, the substitution of effort for schooling is suggested by the negative
coefficient of Local in the Event effort equation. Nonetheless, according to likelihood
ratio tests (Table 12), the opportunity costs of schooling do influence the supply of
effort as measured by Discuss and Event, which in and of itself is an interesting
result.
In the schooling equations, the complementarity or substitutability of schooling
and effort is also revealed in the relationship between wages (M_Wage and F_Wage)
and schooling. The statistically significant, positive coefficients on wages (3 of 12)
suggest that as the opportunity cost of parental effort increases parents are switching to
schooling in order to produce achievement. Roughly, parental effort increases when
the price of schooling decreases. However, two of the twelve coefficients are
statistically significant and negative; these suggest complementarity. Joint tests of
significance in Table 12 suggest that wages influence the demand for teacher
characteristics (Tea/Stu, LowSal and %Degree) and one of the student body variables
(%NonLun).
With such conflicting results in both the effort and schooling equations, no hard
conclusions are forthcoming. It is not surprising that with the plethora of school
services and forms of parental effort that conflicting results are found. The family's
menu of inputs that produce achievement is complex. Some may be complements,
while others are substitutes. The problem is that there is no single measure of overall
effort and overall schooling. Nonetheless, joint tests of significance do suggest that
cross opportunity costs do influence the mix of inputs used in the production of
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achievement.
Private School Families - The effort and schooling equations of private school
families shed very little light on the complementarity or substitutability of schooling
and effort. The results for private school families are even more sparse. None of the
coefficients on wages in the schooling equations are statistically significant. In the
effort equations, only one coefficient on the price shifter of private schools (kr) is
statistically significant. A decrease in the density of private schools (R_Den) (an
increase in the price shifter) leads parents to "discuss things" more frequently. This
suggests schooling and effort are substitutes. But this is only one of the nine
coefficients. Thus, private school family behavior provides no conclusive answer to
the question of the substitution of effort and schooling.
A surprising result from the schooling equations of private school families is
the influence of the public school price shifter (<B). Recall this shifter represents the
fact that private school families forgo the local public school and still pay for it. Since
these estimates are adjusted for the decision to attend private schools, these results
suggest a deeper relationship between public school opportunities and private schools.
Once the parents have decided to send their child to private school the public school
opportunities still influence the private school services the family chooses to purchase.
Many o f the statistically significant coefficients (10 of 16) suggest that an increase in
the public school price shifter decreases the private school family's demand for private
school services. In other words, after committing to a private school, the greater their
opportunities to adjust public schooling the less private school services they demand.
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Of course there are statistically significant coefficients (6 of 16) that suggest an
opposite relationship.
Nevertheless, the statistically significant influence of the public school price
shifter variables is surprising. F-tests and likelihood ratio tests reveal that the public
school price shifter influence all of the private school characteristics. This deeper
relationship between public school opportunities and private school might reflect
competition among private and public schools within a given state. This competition
could be for students and/or resources. Another story could be that public school
opportunities influence the entry of private schools into the market and composition of
their services. The more public school opportunities, the better or more exceptional
private schools must be to gain entry into the market.
The influence of the public school choice set variables on the parental effort of
private school families is also surprising. Again the signs are mixed, but likelihood
ratio tests reveal that Discuss and Event are influenced in a systematic way by these
variables. Clearly, a deeper relationship exists between public school opportunities
and the behavior of private school families. Access to data on the foregone local
schools of the private school families is necessary to investigate these results and
alternative stories further.
Household Variables - Opportunity costs aside, the composition of the family
and its resources is expected to influence the demand for achievement and thus
influence the demand for schooling and supply of effort. The interpretations below
draw upon the participation, schooling and effort equations (R, S, and E) of both
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public and private school families. Some interesting patterns arise.
A mother's education (M_Ed) is one of the main focuses of the time allocation
studies. In R, S and E, when statistically significant, the coefficient on mother's
education is positive (except in one of the schooling equations) but is statistically
insignificant in the achievement equations. These results suggest that public school
families with better educated mothers demand/supply more of the inputs that increase
achievement but do not effect achievement directly. (In addition, these results do not
support the idea that better educated mothers specialize - supply more effort and
employ less schooling because they are better at providing effort.) The many negative
coefficients on NonWhite in R, S and E support this conclusion. Recall that the race
of the parents may reflect the quality of their education (past discrimination).
The coefficient on the number of siblings, when statistically significant, is
negative in R, S and E. This suggests that "more children in the household"
constrains the provision of all the resources aimed at producing achievement, rather
than directly influencing the mix of resources (a switching from effort to schooling).
For the most part, family income (Income) positively influences private school
participation, schooling and effort. This suggests that achievement is a normal good.
For the most part, family income (Income) positively influences private school
participation, schooling and effort. This suggests that achievement is a normal goods.
From a different vantage point, Hanushek (1992) estimates an equation
representing "parental choice of teachers". An individual teacher's quality is
measured by the average test score of students in his or her class. Hanushek's (1992)
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results are inconclusive because the coefficients of household characteristics are
statistically insignificant. In the schooling equations, teacher characteristics (Tea/Stu,
LowSal and %Degree) refers to a school's faculty not an individual teacher. With
this in mind, the results suggest that various family characteristics are important in
determining the attributes of a child's potential teachers. Although, as before, the
results are contradictory. Focusing on public school families, according to the
Tea/Stu equation parents with more years of schooling are choosing to send their
child to a school with more teachers per child (more teacher attention). However, this
is contradicted by the coefficient in the LowSal equation. Similarly, non-white
parents send the children to schools with less teachers per child. This is contradicted
in %Degree and LowSal equation. The results for family income are the same.
Families with more income demand more attention from teachers. In the end, the
results suggest that various family characteristics are important in determining teacher
attributes but not in a cohesive manner.
Before moving on to the achievement equations, the differences between
private and public school families are worth exploring. A striking difference is the
role o f household constraints on the supply of parental effort. In public school
families, parental effort is constrained by income, children (siblings) and the lack of
household capital. For private school families, these variables are statistically
insignificant (except one coefficient) in effort supply equations of the private school
families. In addition, parental effort in public school families is positively related to
the education of the parents, while there is no evidence of such an influence for
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private school families.
A noteworthy similarity between private and public school families is the
influence of the child's gender on parental effort as measured by Discuss. In both
groups, parents are more likely to discuss things learned in school with their daughters
than their sons. Perhaps parents are compensating for the notion that girls are
overlooked in the classroom. The cause of such a result is left to future research.
Adjusting for Selectivity - At this point it is also worth noting the effect of
adjusting the effort, schooling and achievement equations for selectivity into public or
private schooling. The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios (Lambda) are
statistically significant in many of the schooling equations. This suggests that the way
in which families select into public or private schools influence their decisions to
demand school services. This makes sense because they are both similar decisions.
Selecting into a public school is associated with increases in the demand for
teacher quality (LowSal and %Degree) and with a reduction in the demand for teacher
(Tea/Stu). It is also associated with a decrease in the demand for the characteristics
of the student body (%NonLun and %NonMin). If they decide to send their children
to public schools, then they want good quality teachers but sacrifice the quality of the
student body. Selecting into a private school also influences the demand for school
services in a fairly similar fashion but in the opposite direction.
The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios' (Lambda) are statistically
insignificant in the effort equations except the Discuss and Event equations for public
school families. This suggests that the way in which families select into public
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schools influence their decisions to supply effort demand school services. Selecting
into a public school is related to a decrease in the supply of parental effort (Discuss
and Event).
Achievement Equations - Much of the interesting results lay in the schooling
choice and effort supply, because the focus of this dissertation is on the "determinants
o f the determinants" of achievement; for example, family income determines effort
which determines achievement. However, to follow through with the theoretical
framework the achievement equations are estimated in the third step. Specifically, the
expected values of parental effort and schooling are entered into the achievement
equations to represent the desired level of effort and school services. These expected
values provide a measure of parental effort that is uncorrelated to the error terms of
the achievement equations. Household variables are also included to represent
household technology. The opportunity cost variables are excluded, because they are
assumed to influence achievement only through the supply of inputs.
The results for both public and private school families (regardless of how
parental effort is entered) are very sparse. Table 19 provides guidance. As expected
the prior level of achievement raises current achievement, but recall it is included to
transform the dependent variable from an absolute measure to a "value added"
measure.
With the assumption and modeling of endogenous schooling, parental effort is
no longer statistically significant. As a result, no conclusions may be drawn regarding
the influence of parental effort on achievement.
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Likewise, the results of the expected values of school services are weak and
contradictory when statistically significant. For private school families, purchasing
better paid teachers raises the child's performance. A surprising result for public
school families is that the teacher student ratio negatively influences a child's
achievement in some of the specifications.
The statistical insignificance of the inverse Mills ratio in the effort equations of
private school families suggests that selectivity is not related to their decision to supply
effort. Similarly, Lam bda's statistical insignificance in achievement equations of all
families suggests the household's production of achievement is not related to the
family's public/private school decisions. Overall, the action takes place in the choice
of inputs, prior to the production of achievement.
As for the household characteristics, the strange result of family income
negatively influencing achievement that is found in the exogenous schooling model
(ex) still exists for public school families. No intuition is readily available to explain
this result. However, the opposite relationship occurs for the private school families.
Other interesting results are that siblings appear to reduce the supply and
demand of effort and schooling but not achievement directly. The results for mother's
education suggest that public school families with better educated mothers
demand/supply more of all the inputs of achievement. The statistical significance of
the inverse Mills ratio in the schooling equations suggests that the way in which a
family selects into a public or private school influences the family's decisions to
demand school services.
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Comparing the All achievement equations of the exogenous and endogenous
schooling models (ex and ee - Tables 6 and 13), the signs of the coefficients differ a
great deal and no patterns are forthcoming. The complexity involved in modeling the
family's choice of school services appears to wash out the ability to draw conclusions
about the household production of achievement. The lack of statistical significance
may result because the variables are not influential or the estimated coefficient is
imprecise (standard errors being too large). Relying on the opportunity cost variables
and non-linearities to identify the influence of so many endogenous variables severely
reduces the ability to draw conclusions. This highlights the need to devise an
alternative way to represent schooling and effort, perhaps with indices.
Comparing the achievement equations of the exogenous (ex) and endogenous
(ee) schooling models reveals the magnitude of this problem. In particular, prior
achievement (Prior_A) is statistically significant in all specifications of the
achievement equation. However, the absolute values of the t-ratios for Prior_A are
dramatically smaller in the endogenous schooling model (ee). This suggests an
explosion of the standard errors due to multi-collinearity.71 In general, the degree of
multi-collinearity among the independent variables in an econometric model can be
measured by the condition index. A rule of thumb is that any condition index over 30
signifies severe multi-collinearity. The condition index of the Discuss achievement

71 This comparison is not entirely tractable because ee's achievement equations are
adjusted for selectivity which is another source of multi-collinearity. Removing the
inverse Mills ratio from the achievement equations does not change the results in any
appreciable manner.
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equation of the endogenous schooling model is 1,249 - very severe multi-collinearity.
In comparison, the condition index of the Discuss achievement equation of the
exogenous schooling model is 209 - less severe but still severe multi-collinearity.
Such problems are common with empirical models that push the data.
Conclusions of the Endogenous Schooling Model
Given the endogeneity of schooling, the complementarity or substitutability of
schooling and parental effort is revealed in the response of parents to changes in the
relative opportunity costs of these inputs. The reduced form equations for schooling
demand and effort supply yield conflicting results. The coefficients on wages in the
schooling equations and the coefficients on the choice set variables in the effort
equations represent cross-price relationships. Of the 48 cross price coefficients, 5
suggest substitutability; 4 suggest complementarity; the remaining 39 are statistically
insignificant. This "bean counting" method is inconclusive.72 However, F-tests and
likelihood ratio tests reveal that in general parents are responding to changes in cross
opportunity costs - wages influence schooling while the price shifter variables impact
parental effort. These tests of joint significance also suggest that parents are
responding to own opportunity costs - wages influence parental effort and the price
shifter impacts schooling. Nevertheless, these scattered results highlight the need for
overall measures of schooling and parental effort. Creating an index poses the
problem of how to weight each measure of school service or parental effort.

72 The ability to perform cross equation hypothesis testing is hampered by the
diversity of estimation procedures.
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With regard to the production of achievement, having to control for the supply
of effort and demand for schooling creates estimation problems that are solved by
instrumenting the parents' choice variables. However, by doing so, the ability to
(empirically) draw conclusions is diminished due to multi-collinearity. In short, the
lack o f statistical significance in the achievement equations of the endogenous
schooling model (ee) is to a large degree due to the imprecision of the estimated
coefficients (large standard errors) rather than the lack of importance (small
coefficients).73 This is not an entirely unexpected result given the use of so many
expected values and controlling for sample selection.
Comparing the Results s f the Exogenous and Endogenous Schooling Models
Multi-collinearity aside, comparing the exogenous (ex) and endogenous (ee)
schooling models provides insight into how parents may respond to the initiatives of a
policy-maker. In the exogenous schooling model (ex), the level of schooling provided
by the local public school influenced parental effort as measured by Event. A pattern
emerged that parental effort substitutes for the quality of teachers but is complemented
by the quantity of teachers. The policy-maker looking to boost achievement may
consider providing more teachers per pupil to foster parental effort. Recall Event
boosted achievement in this model. In the endogenous schooling model (ee), parental
effort and schooling respond to changes in opportunity costs, thus it would be prudent
for the policy-maker to take advantage of these responses.

73 The coefficients in the achievement equations in the two models are similar in
size. This and the lack of significance in the ee achievement equations highlight the
severity of the multi-collinearity in the ee achievement equations.
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But which model is the correct model? Are parents able to choose schooling?
Is schooling endogenous or exogenous? In order to answer this question, a weak
exogeneity test is performed for public school families. To facilitate this test, effort
equations (similar to those in the exogenous schooling model) are estimated.74 The
actual values of the schooling variables enter into these equations along with the
residuals of the schooling equations of the endogenous schooling model. These
residuals are measures of the error terms of the schooling equations (es). The
coefficients on these residuals represent the correlation between the schooling and
effort decisions, Cov(eE,es). If these residuals are jointly statistically insignificant
(indistinguishable from zero), then schooling is exogenous; in other words, the
hypothesis of no simultaneity between decision to supply effort and the decision to
purchase schooling fa ils to be rejected.15 If these coefficients are jointly statistically
significant, then effort and schooling are simultaneously chosen by parents; schooling
is endogenous.
Likelihood ratio tests provide the test of joint significance. For Check,
Discuss and Event, the likelihood ratio statistics are 2.57, 22.99 and 7.69,
respectively. According to these chi-squared statistics, the hypothesis of exogeneity
fails to be rejected for the Check and Event equations, while it is rejected with a
degree of confidence of 99 percent for the Discuss equation. The Check and Event

74 The inverse Mills ratio is included to adjust for sample selection.
75 According to Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988), this test
is asymptotically equivalent to a Lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity.
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equations therefore suggest schooling is exogenous, but the Discuss equation suggests
that schooling is endogenous. The Check measure of effort has been wrought with
problems from the very start because of its nature.76 Discuss and Event are more
straightforward measures of parental effort. Given these mixed results, no conclusions
can be drawn regarding the exogeneity or endogeneity of schooling for public school
families.
The ramifications of finding endogenous schooling in the Discuss equation
extend to the researcher and the policy-maker. If schooling is truly exogenous, studies
of parental effort and student achievement like the exogenous schooling model have
efficient and consistent estimates. However, if schooling is truly endogenous, then
such studies must control for the family's ability to choose schooling in order to obtain
consistent estimates. Incorrectly treating schooling as endogenous yields consistent but
inefficient estimates, while incorrectly assuming exogeneity yields biased and
inconsistent estimates. Given this, a conservative researcher should treat schooling as
endogenous.
For the policy-maker, endogenous schooling implies that changing the level of
schooling or the opportunity cost of schooling may distort the behavior of the family the effort they supply and the schooling they purchase. With endogenous schooling,
the family has even more ways to hinder or help policy objectives. The key is to
influence parental behavior in a complementary fashion such that parents purchase

76 For some families, "checking on" homework may indicate more effort and thus
more achievement. While for other families, it may indicate the child needs help
because they are not achieving.
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more schooling and/or supply more effort.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS

Returning to the beginning, the objective of this dissertation is to explore the
"determinants of the determinants" of a child's achievement. It is assumed that
schooling, parental effort and other household characteristics determine a child's
achievement, where parental effort and schooling are chosen by parents. In turn,
these choices are determined by the constraints, preferences, abilities and opportunity
costs of the parents. Parents satisfy their demand for a child's achievement by
supplying effort and purchasing schooling. Of particular interest is the interaction
between parental effort and schooling. Are they substitutes or complements?
In modeling the constrained choices of parents, this dissertation develops three
theoretical models. These models vary with respect to the ability of parents to choose
schooling. However, no matter how parents choose schooling, if policy-makers
attempt to boost achievement by providing or subsidizing schooling, then parents can
either help or hinder this policy - parental decisions are distorted. Allowing parents to
choose schooling simply allows them another way to react to policy and adjust the
production of achievements accordingly.
Distortions in behavior due to government programs are not new. A
commonly told story in public finance classes is that giving a family Food Stamps does
not increase the family's expenditure on food by the full amount of the Food Stamps.
125
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This "leakage" results because some of the cash formally spent on food is now spent
on non-food items.
However, as shown in the theoretical models, the inclusion of the household
production function introduces a new twist in the distortion of parental choices.
Parents adjust the production of their desired level of achievement by adjusting the
supply of effort and the purchasing of schooling. So, if the government influences the
purchase of schooling then the supply of effort may be distorted. However, this is not
the new twist. The new twist is that the distortion depends on the relationship
between the inputs. In short, the public provision or subsidization of schooling may
induce more parental effort because schooling and parental effort complement one
another. Or, the opposite may hold true - giving or subsidizing schooling may reduce
parental effort because schooling and parental effort are substitutes. In the end, the
impact of government educational programs on parental effort is theoretically
ambiguous and is thus an empirical issue.
Empirical Findings
One way of looking at the methods of this dissertation is as an empirical
merger of the household production and time supply literatures with a little help from
public finance. One of Mincer's (1977) criticisms of Hill and Stafford's work is that
it fails to show empirically a relationship between parental time inputs and a child's
achievement. This dissertation fills this gap by borrowing from Hanushek (1992) and
by following the methods of Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). Along the way,
consistent estimates of the household production function are obtained and the
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exogeneity of schooling is tested.
Empirically exploring the decisions of parents and the potential influence of
public programs leads to the estimation of two empirical models. These models differ
with respect to the ability of the family to choose schooling. In the first model,
schooling is assumed to be exogenously determined through the public provision of
schooling. The reaction of parental effort to a change in the public provision of
schooling is found by estimating the parents' reduced form effort supply equation. In
this equation, the coefficients of various school services represent the overall
substitutability and complementarity of schooling and parental effort.
In the endogenous schooling model, parents choose schooling among private
and public schools within their choice set. In this case, parental behavior is revealed
by estimating reduced form equations for effort supply and schooling demand.
Potentially, government policy boosts achievement by making it easier for parents to
purchase schooling (thereby reducing the price shifter). In this model, the
substitutability and complementarity of schooling and parental effort is revealed by
income and cross price effects.
The results of these two models suggest a mixed relationship between various
forms of parental effort and school services. In the exogenous schooling model, the
parental effort measure Event shows that parents withdraw effort as schooling increase
but provide more effort when the relative number of teachers increases. No such
conclusions can be drawn from the other measures of effort (Check and Discuss) or
from the endogenous schooling model's schooling equations; the results are too
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conflicting. However, the opportunity costs of effort and schooling are still important.
Nevertheless, whether schooling is actually a matter of choice is tested, and schooling
is found to be exogenous and endogenous depending of the measure of effort used.
Policy Conclusions
An economist evaluating the effectiveness of government programs aimed at
boosting achievement must consider the distortionary effect the programs have on
household production and consumption. If parents withdraw effort in response to
improved schooling, then the policy-maker who ignores this may over-estimate the
influence that a school improvement program may have on student achievement. If
parents supply more effort with improved schooling, the policy-maker who ignores the
response of parents may under-estimate the influence that school improvement
programs have on the level of student achievement.
According to Becker (1993, p.274), "[r]edistributions of expenditures within
families induced by government subsidies can explain why many programs appear to
have weak effects on participants." Empirically, Peltzman (1973) found some
evidence that tuition subsidies to higher education reduce family expenditures on
higher education. The findings of this dissertation suggest that the relationship
between school inputs and parental effort is diverse and complex. Depending on the
school input and measure of effort, the two can be either substitutes or complements.
Any policy-maker wishing to compensate for the distortion of parental behavior needs
to consider the specific elements of the policy. "Throwing money at schools" may be
in part subsidizing alternative parental activities rather than boosting student
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achievement; however, it may also be providing incentives for parents to supply more
effort. It depends on what the money is being "thrown at".
Concluding Remarks
The ability of policy-makers to improve the level of student achievement
depends not only on the efforts of students and teachers but also on the effort of
parents. Understanding parental behavior is crucial to public policy, since the
response of parents to public policies may hinder or help the effectiveness of these
policies.
In the process of investigating parental effort, schooling, and achievement, the
literature is advanced in four ways. First, the commodity demand/production function
for child achievement is consistently estimated. Previous studies treated effort and
schooling as exogenous to household production. Second, following the comments of
Mincer (1977) and the work of Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983), the time-use and
household production function literatures are merged with regard to student
achievement. In general, the findings of these literatures are supported in this
dissertation. Third, different assumptions regarding the provision of schooling are
explored in the context of household production and time allocation; i.e., the existence
of private schooling and the ability of families to choose public schooling are
considered in the context of household production and time allocation. It is found that
parents choose schooling. Thus, treating schooling as exogenous leads to
inconsistently estimated results. Lastly, Becker and Tomes (1976) assertion that the
distortions in household resource allocation run counter to the objectives of the policy-
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maker is empirically investigated for the first time with regard to primary and
secondary education. It is found that the allocation of parental effort and the
purchasing of schooling are influenced by the opportunity cost o f schooling over which
the policy-maker may control. The key is influence parental behavior in such a way
that purchase more schooling and/or supply more effort.
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Appendix of Figures

Figure 1 - Exogenous Schooling and Simple Endogenous Schooling Models
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Figure 2 - Realistic Endogenous Schooling Model
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Figure 3 - Expected Relationships
Tea/Stut
LowSalt
% Degree t
NonUrb t
NonLun t
% NonMin t

■ fs t]-^ flT l
Prior_A t —

1E t ]

Ta FI M

a

?1

[ At ] ^ — [AT 1

| B a d C h i l d 1 f f FI ------ [At] M a D

|Girltf—^-fiTt]------fAtl M X t l
lE d tf- ^ - f lT l------fAtl
| Non White t |—^ —fE~Tl
Catholic t

fAtl

fXFl NM

a TI

^-flF I— [as! ^ -T a TI

|F_lnvolt"--^ - {Et}
| Wage 11

[ft]

(At]

—fAT 1

(At)

Isibs t h^ -ffn— ia tP m a ti
[incometj “^ -{Etl-----[At] "^—-{Atl
1Aid t H ^-fIFl-----f X ^ P M A t l
LimCap t ] —

[ Ei }———(Ai l

—[A i]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

Figure 4 - Estimation Techniques and Statistical Packages (ee)
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Figure 5- Estimation Process (ee)
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Figure 6

- Identifying Restrictions (ee)
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Figure 7 - Expected Signs for Public School Families
BJtMt

BMCkiUf

Pnoc.Af

0^ 1 at

flf)
. S tl—fSt]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix of Tables
Table 1 - Description o f Variables

Check

0,
1,
2,
3,

if child report his/her parents NEVER checks on child's homework
if parents RARELY checks
if parents SOMETIMES checks
if parents OFTEN checks

Discuss

0, if child report his/her parents NEVER discuss school with child
1, if parents SOMETIMES discuss
2, if parents OFTEN discuss

Event

0, if child report his/her parents DO NOT GO to school events
1, if parents GO to school events

SfihflOl
Tea/Stu

ratio of teachers to students in the child's school (times 0.00001)

LowSal

lowest salary paid to a teacher at the school (times 0.01)

%Degree

percentage of teachers with a Masters or Ph.D. degrees (times 0.01)

NonUrb

1, if child's school is not in a central city
0, otherwise

%NonLun

percentage of students in the school's free or reduced price (times 0.01)

%NonMin

percentage of students in the school that are non-minorities (times 0.01)

cm
Achieve

child's scores on standardized reading and mathematics questions from
standardized examinations taken in 1990 (times 0.001)

Prior A

child's scores on standardized reading and mathematics questions from
standardized examinations taken in 1988 (times 0.001)
Continued
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Table 1 - Continued
Child - Continued
BadChild

1, if parent reports that child has behavior problems
0, otherwise

Girl

1, if child is female
0, otherwise

Parent
M_Ed

number of years the mother spent in school (times 0.01)

F_Ed

number of years the father spent in school (times 0.01)

NonWhite

1, if child is non-white
0, otherwise

Catholic

1, if parent who answered the survey is Catholic
0, otherwise

F_Invol

1, if father is reported to be the most involved
0, otherwise

M_Wage

wage of the mother, the opportunity cost of parental effort (times

0 .01)
F_Wage

wage of the father, the opportunity cost of parental effort (times
0 .01)

Family
Sibs

number of siblings, including step-brothers and step-sisters (times
0.01)

Income

total family income from all sources in 1987 (times 0.000001)

Aids

1, if has encyclopedias, a computer, or study room
0, otherwise
Continued
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Table 1 - Continued
Family - Continued
LimCap

1, if home does not have a dryer, washer, and dishwasher
0, otherwise

Demographic
NorthCen

1, if child's school is in a North Central states
0, otherwise

South

1, if child's school is in a Southern states
0, otherwise

West

1, if child's school is in a Western states
0, otherwise

N ote: C ertain v a ria b le s n e ed e d to b e re sca led fo r estim ation.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics
Public School Families
Variable
Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq
Parental Effort
Check
Never*
678
0.163
Rarely*
1118
0.269
Some*
1294
0.311
Often*
1069
0.257
Discuss
Never*
751
0.181
Some*
2530
0.608
Often*
878
0.211
Event
Go*
2527
0.608
School
Tea/Stu
0.068
0.016
LowSal
20000
2900
%Degree
5.00
2.00
NonUrb*
3504
0.843
%NonLun
82.00
17.40
%NonMin
79.50
25.60
Child
Achieve
105.00
18.00
Prior_A
95.00
15.00
BadChild*
226
0.054
Girl*
2160
0.519
Parents
M_Ed
13.20
2.70
FJEd
13.50
4.0
NonWhite*
801
0.193
Catholic*
1237
0.297
F_Invol*
841
0.202
M_Wage___________ 8^10_______ 3.20
Continued
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Table 2 - Continued
Variable
Mean/Freq
Parent - Continued
FW age
11.20
Family
Sibs
2.40
Income
44000
2632
Aidd
LimCapd
1501
Demographic
NorthCend
1362
South'1
1240
754
Wesf*

Sdv/R.Freq
4.70
2.20
34000
0.633
0.361
0.327
0.298
0.181

^ D enotes d is c re te v a ria b le s o f w hich th e freq u en cy
a n d re la tiv e fre q u e n c y a re provided
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Table 3 - Achievement Equation
Exogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Public School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)

Variable
Constant

Check
0.0062 ***
(3-34)

Parental Effort
Check
Rarely
Some
Often

Estimated Coefficients
Discuss
Event
0.0058 ***
0.0066 ***
(3.16)

(3.59)

A ll

0.0058 ***
(3.08)

0.0004

0.0001

(1.06)

(0.22)

0.0006

0.0001

(1.60)

(0 .21)

0.0007

0.0001

(1.61)

(0 .01)

Discuss
Some

0.0014 ***

0.0012

Often

0.0015 ***

0.0018 ***

(3.29)

(4.14)

Event
Go

***

(3-32)

(3.95)

0.0011

***

0.0009 ***

(4.04)

(3.27)

SfihQQl.

Tea/Stu
LowSal
%Degree
NonUrb
%NonLun
%NonMin

0.0041

0.0041

0.0022

0.0027

(0.43)

(0.43)

(0.23)

(0.29)

-0.0032

-0.0027

-0.0022

-0.002

(0.63)

(0.53)

(0.44)

(0.39)

0.0115*

0.0112*

0.0128 *

(1-74)

(1.70)

(1.93)

-0.0012 ***

-0.0012 ***

(3.08)

(3.15)

(3.36)

(3.35)

0.001

0.001

0.0011

0.0011

(1.14)

(1.14)

(1-22)

(1.25)

-0.0006

-0.0005

-0.0006

-0.0006

(0.86)

(0.78)

(0.94)

(0.84)

-0.0013 ***

0.0125
0 .8 8 )

-0.0013

Continued
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Table 3 - Continued

Variables
Child
Prior_A

Check
0.9978 ***
(103.68)

BadChild
Girl
Parent
M_Ed

NonWhite
Catholic
F_Invol
Familv
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
Demozranhic
NorthCen
South

0.9961 ***
(103.77)

0.9932 ***
(102.91)

All
0.9928 ***
(102.76)

-0.0014 **

-0.0013 **

-0.0013 **

-0.0013 **

(2.28)

(2.25)

O-20)

a . 12)

-0.0003

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0004

(1.18)

(1.52)

(1-33)

(1 3 4 )

0.0192 ***
(3.28)

F_Ed

Estimated Coefficients
Event
Discuss

0.013 ***

0.0174 ***
0 .9 7 )

0.0126 ***

0.0183 ***
(3.14)

0.0128 ***

0.0167 ***
(2.86)

0.0124 ***

(3.26)

(3.16)

(3.21)

(3.10)

-0.0002

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0001

(0.49)

(0.36)

(0.33)

(0.30)

0

0

0

0

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.10)

(0.10)

-0.0003

-0.0004

-0.0003

-0.0003

(0.95)

(1.06)

(0.83)

(0.93)

-0.0241 ***

-0.0231 ***

-0.0247 ***

-0.024 ***

(4.00)

(3.91)

(3.92)

(3.76)

-0.0055

-0.0057

-0.0063

-0.0064

(1.18)

0 .2 2 )

(1.35)

(1 3 8 )

0.0006**

0.0006 **

0.0006 **

0.0006 **

(2.24)

O-20)

(2-24)

0 .2 2 )

-0.0003

-0.0003

-0.0003

-0.0002

( l . 10)

(0.97)

(0.86)

(0.75)

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0005

-0.0005

(1 0 4 )

(0.95)

(1.26)

(1.15)

-0.0002

-0.0002

-0.0002

-0.0002

(0.38)

(0.36)

(0.47)

(0.44)

Continued
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Table 3 - Continued
Demographic -Continued
West
0.001 •*
(1-97)

0.0011 **
(2 .02)

0.001 •*

0.001 **

(197)

(1-96)

• * * S tatistically significant to th e 1 -p e rc e n t level.
* * S tatistically significant to th e 5 -p e rc e n t level.
* S tatistically significant to th e 1 0 -p e rc e n t lev e l.
Im p o rta n t: T h e reported coefficien ts w e r e e stim a te d w ith re sca led d ep en d en t v a ria b le s.
T a b le 1 fo r the rescalin g fa c to rs .

L o o k to
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Table 4 - Effort Equations
Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model
Public School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)

Variables
Constant
School
Tea/Stu
LowSal
%Degree
NonUrb
%NonLun
%NonMin
LR Test*
Child
PriorA

Estimated Coefficients
Check
Discuss
Event
-0.9988 ***
0.2222
1.0718 ***
(4.59)

(0.92)

-0.7267

-1.61

(0.62)

(1.26)

0.0796

-0.734

(0.13)

(1.09)

0.2204

-0.0107

(0.26)

(0.01)

-0.0564

0.0412

(1.14)

(0.78)

-0.1905*

-0.0858

-3.4174 ***
(3.35)

0.2312 ***
(3.91)

-0.3099 **

-0.1011

0.1057

(0.68)

(1.12)

(1-04)

7.31

5.33

72.62 ***

1.5521

9.9707 ***

-3.1102***

(1.20)

-0.2169 ***

-0.1219
(1.58)

0.2097 ***

-0.0423

(5.77)

1.2294

3.9893 ***
(4.28)

1.0147

1.1773 *

(1.62)

NonWhite

(2-95)

-0.0584

(1.49)

F_Ed

-2.2947 ***

(2.30)

(1.25)

Parent
M_Ed

(2.87)

(0.72)

(2-99)

Girl

4.3105***

(1.68)

(2.64)

BadChild

(3.53)

0.1053 **

(6.77)

-0.2345 ***
(2.64)

0.0679 *
(1.65)

2.0922 **
(2.09)

0.6485

(1.79)

(0.87)

-0.0541

-0.0698

(1.03)

(1.20)

(2-17)

Continued
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Table 4 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Check
Discuss

Variables
Parent - Continued
Catholic
0.0241

0.0045

(0.63)

(0.11)

-0.0137

0.062

(0.32)

(1 3 4 )

(2-16)

1.0899*

1.3438 **

1.2776*

F_Invol
MWage
FW age
Family
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
Demographic
NorthCen
South
West

(2-24)

-0.1124**

(1.98)

(1.67)

0.691

0.6963

0.6635

(1.41)

(1 3 2 )

-2.6258 ***

-2.0101 ***

-2.7695 ***

(3.70)

(2.68)

(2.98)

0.8118

0.4628

(1-37)

(0.70)

(3.29)

0.0403

0.0565

0.0016

(1-10)

(1.47)

(0.04)

-0.06

-0.0746 *

(in)

2.5141 ***

-0.2019 ***

(1.52)

(1.80)

0.0258

-0.0754

(0.49)

(1.36)

0.05

0.0138

(0.88)

(0.23)

(1.72)

0.0411

0.1164

(0.59)

(1.44)

0.2198 ***

0.8238 ***
(37.63)

Mu(2)

0.1037**

(1.72)

(3.28)

Miscellaneous
Mu(l)

Event

(4.27)

0.2344***
(3.70)

0.1178*

1.7734 ***
(61.74)

1.6616***
(60.42)

*** S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 1-percent level.
** S tatistically sig n ific a n t to the 5 -p e rc e n t level.
* S tatistically sig n ific a n t to the 10-percent level.
* T h e n u ll hy p o th esis is th a t the schooling c o effic ie n ts a re jo in tly zero.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d coefficients w e re estim ated w ith re sca led
d e p en d e n t v a ria b le s. L ook to T a b le 1 fo r th e re sc a lin g factors.
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Table 5 - Influence of Various Variables in Effort Equations
Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model
Public School Families
Influence of a Change in a Continuous Variable bv One Standard
Deviation on Probabilities
Variable
Tea/Stu
LowSal
%Degree
%NonLun
%NonMin
M_Ed
F_Ed
MWage
FW age
Sibs
Income

p(Check Often)*
-0.0038
0.0008
0.0015
-0.0105 *
-0.0048
0.0106
0.0131
0.0113*
0.0104
-0.0183 ***
0.0089

p(Discuss Often)b
-0.0074
-0.0061
-0.0001
-0.0042
-0.0072
0.0315 ***
0.0135 *
0.0124 **
0.0093
-0.0124 ***
0.0045

p(Go to Event)'
0.0266 ***
-0.0261 ***
-0.0288 ***
-0.0207 **
0.0103
0.0212 **
0.0098
0.0155 *
0.0118
-0.0237 ***
0.0322 ***

Change in the Probabilities Due to Dummv Variables
Variable
NonUrb
BadChild
Girl
NonWhite
Catholic
F_InvoI
Aid
LimCap

p(Check Often)
-0.0183
-0.0648 ***
-0.0136
0.0344 **
0.4113
-0.0044
0.0129
-0.0191

p(Discuss Often)
0.0115
-0.0329
0.0591 ***
-0.0151
0.4930
0.0178
0.0159
-0.0209 *

p(Go to Event)
0.0900 ***
-0.0917 ***
0.0260 *
-0.0268
0.3349 **
-0.0434 **
0.0006
-0.0777 ***

* * * S tatistically significant to th e 1 -p e rc e n t level.
** S tatistically significant to th e 5 -p e rc e n t lev el.
* S tatistically significant to th e 1 0 -p e rc e n t lev e l.
* A t sa m p le m eans p (C h e ck O ften) is 0 .2 5 .
b A t sa m p le m eans p(D iscuss O ften ) is
c A t sa m p le m eans p(G o to E vents) is

0 .6 2 .
0 .2 1 .
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Table 6 - Achievements Equations
Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model
Public School Families
(B o o tstra p p e d S t. E rro rs , 1000 iterations)
(th e a b so lu te v a lu e o f t-ratios a r e in p a re n th e se s)

Variable
Constant

Check
-0.0075
(1.14)

ExDected Effort
x(Check)

Estimated Coefficients
Event
Discuss
-0.0007
0.0038 •
(0.18)

(1.81)

(0.49)

(2-25)

0.0119 **

-0.0255

(2-33)

(0-49)

0.0195 ***

x(Event)

(2-82)

SdlOQl
Tea/Stu
LowSal
%Degree
NonUrb

0.01

(1.10)

-0.0036

0.0015

(0.70)

(0.28)

0.0092

0.009

(1.30)

(1.29)

(1.90)

%NonLun

0.0023 **
(2-03)

%NonMin

-0.0001
(0.09)

Child
Prior_A

1.0205 ***
(71.72)
(1.44) *

BadChild
Girl

0.0115

(1.06)

-0.0008*

-0.0232 *
(1.76)

0.0129 *
(1.69)

0.0348 ***
(3.40)

-0.0014 ***

-0.0029 ***

(4.04)

(4.10)

0.0012
(1.17)

0.0015 *
(1.90)

0.9847 ***
(92.14)
(1.48) '

0.003 ***
(2-58)

-0.0013 *
(1.77)

0.9259 ***
(34.31)
(2-75) *

0.0003

-0.0006

0.0003

(0.27)

(0.79)

(0.33)

-0.0017 ***

-0.0008 **

(2.69)

(2-53)

0.0001
(0.01)

(0.28)

0.0162

0.0082 •*

x(Discuss)

All
-0.0079

0.0202 *
(1.78)

-0.0349
(1.09)

0.0022
(0.09)

0.032 *
(1.91)

-0.0015
(0.51)

0.0048
(1.27)

-0.0018
(1.22)

0.9922 ***
(6.84)
(0.05) ‘

0.002
(0.56)

0.0027
(0.38)

Continued
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Table 6 - Continued

Variable
Parent
M_Ed
F_Ed
NonWhite
Catholic
FJnvol
Family
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
Demographic
NorthCen
South
West

Check

Estimated Coefficients
Discuss
Event

All

0.0051

-0.0115

-0.0005

0.0352

(0.55)

(0.76)

(0.05)

(0.48)

0.0015

0.0023

0.0053

0.0047

(0.23)

(0-36)

(1.07)

(0.68)

0.0002

0.0005

-0.0018

(1-75)

(0.51)

(1.15)

(0.39)

-0.0002

0

(0.58)

(0.15)

-0.0009*

-0.0002

-0.0011

(1.79)

(1-33)

0.0005

0.0016

(0.59)

(1.95)

(1.06)

(0.69)

-0.0043

-0.012

-0.0047

0.009

(0.37)

(1.31)

(0.47)

(0.31)

-0.012 **

-0.0007*

-0.0007*

-0.0097 **

-0.0215 ***

(2.24)

(2-01)

(2.9 3)

0.0003

0.0002

(0.94)

(0.71)

0.0002

0.0002

(0.40)

(0.52)

-0.0006

0.0001

(1.46)

(0.24)

-0.0005

-0.0002

(1.17)

(0.49)

-0.0006
(0.63)

0.0009*
(1.93)

0.0006 **
(2.19)

0.0012 *
(1.87)

-0.002 ***
(2-82)

-0.001*

-0.0281
(1.84)

0.0008
(1 6 0 )

0.0011
(1.63)

-0.0035
(1.12)

-0.0016

(1.89)

(1 1 9 )

0.0004

-0.0025

(0.62)

(0.43)

** S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 1 -p e rc e n t level.
** S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 5 -p e rc c n t lev el.
* S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 10 -p ercen t level.
1 D e n o tes th e a b so lu te v a lu e o f th e t-ratio u n d e r th e nu ll h y p o th esis that th e
p o p u latio n c o e ffic ie n t is e q u a l to 1.
Im portant: T h e re p o rte d c o efficie n ts w e re estim a te d w ith re sca led dependent
v a ria b le s.

L o o k to T a b le 1 fo r th e re sc a lin g fa cto rs.
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Table 7 - Descriptions of New Variables
Choice Set (State Level) Variables
B_Num

BJDen

number o f public schools in a state that have grades 10, 11, 12
(times 0.01)
number o f private schools in a state that have grades 10, 11, 12
(times 0.01)
number of public schools divided by the state's land area

R_Den

number o f private schools divided by the state's land area

R to B

ratio of private schools to public schools (R_Num/B_Num)

Local

percentage o f state and local school district revenue in the state
from local sources (times 0.01)

Alike

absolute value of the difference between 50 percent and percentage
of the state's population in urban areas (times 0.01)

Choice

1, if state allows children to switch districts without changing
residency
0, otherwise

Religious

percentage o f private enrollment in religious schools (times 0.01)

R_Num

N o te : C e rta in v a ria b le s needed to b e re sc a le d fo r estim ation.
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Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Public (n = 4159)
Private (n = 809)
All (n == 4968)
Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq

Variable
Parental Effort
Check
Never11
678
Rarely11
1118
1294
Somed
Oftend
1069
Discuss
Never11
751
Somed
2530
Oftend
878
Event
2527
God
$?hpgl
Tea/Stu
0.068
LowSal
20000
%Degree
5.00
3504
NonUrbd
%NonLun
82.00
%NonMin
79.50
Choice Set ("State Level-)
R to B
0.273
197
R_Num
BNum
742
R_Den
0.005
0.014
B_Den
84.80
Religious
565
Choiced
50.30
Local
Alike
26.90
Child
105
Achieve
PriorA
95
BadChildd
226

0.163
0.269
0.311
0.257

135
219
243
212

0.167
0.271
0.300
0.262

813
1337
1537
1281

0.164
0.269
0.309
0.258

0.181
0.608
0.211

80
481
248

0.099
0.595
0.307

831
3011
1126

0.167
0.606
0.227

0.608

635

0.785

3162

0.636

0.016
2900
2.00
0.843
17.40
25.60

0.083
17600
5.00
313
97.30
84.20

0.028
3700
3.00
0.387
11.70
18.20

0.070
19600
5.00
3817
84.50
80.20

0.020
3200
2.00
0.768
17.50
24.60

0.135
164
503
0.009
0.016
12.50
0.136
13.80
12.90

0.324
232
755
0.005
0.016
82.60
251
49.00
31.60

0.124
189
538
0.005
0.011
14.00
0.310
14.40
13.00

0.281
203
744
0.005
0.015
84.50
816
50.10
27.60

0.134
169
509
0.008
0.016
12.80
0.164
13.90
13.00

18
116
15
105
0.054
29
Continued

15
14
0.036

107
97
255

18
15
0.051
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Table 8 - Continued

Variable
Child Continued
Girl'1
Parent
M_Ed
F_Ed
NonWhited
Catholic*1
F_Invold
M_Wage
F_Wage
Family
Sibs
Income
Aidd
LimCapd
DemoeraDhic
NorthCend
South*1
West-

Public (n = 4159)
Private (n = 809)
All (n == 4968)
Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq
2160

0.519

401

0.496

2561

0.515

13.20
13.50
803
1237
841
8.10
11.20

2.70
4.00
0.193
0.297
0.202
3.20
4.70

15.10
16.50
109
330
186
9.60
13.50

2.90
4.20
0.135
0.408
0.230
3.30
4.90

13.50
14.00
910
1567
1027
8.30
11.60

2.80
4.20
0.183
0.315
0.207
3.30
4.80

2.40
44000
2632
1501

2.20
34000
0.633
0.361

1.90
93000
647
126

1.50
68000
0.800
0.156

2.40
52000
3279
1627

2.10
45000
0.660
0.327

1362
1240
754

0.327
0.298
0.181

261
282
121

0.323
0.349
0.150

1623
1522
875

0.327
0.306
0.176

D e n o tes d is c re te v a ria b le s o f w hich th e freq u e n c y a n d re la tiv e frequency a rc p ro v id ed .
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Table 9 - Private School Participation Equation
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)

Variable
Constant

Estimated Coefficients
-5.2747 •**
(12.79)

Choice Set (State Level)
R to B

2.1759***
(7.38)

Religious

-0.3858
(1 2 3 )

Choice

0.6023 ***
(7.25)

Local

-0.3029
(1.18)

0.7147 ***

Alike

(2 5 9 )

Child
Prior_A

13.385 ***
(7.15)

BadChild

-0.0596
(0.47)

Girl

-0.0535
(1-06)

Parent
M_Ed

5.000 ***
(4.10)

F_Ed

3.4985 ***
(3.74)

NonWhite

-0.2234 ***
(3.02)

Catholic

0.5009 ***
(9.24)

F_InvoI

0.0666
(1-08)

M_Wage

1.2523
(1.33)

Continued
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Table 9 - Continued

Earsnt -C ojnimigd
F W age

-0.8566
(1.22)

Family

Sibs

-2.3703 *
(1.63)

Income

7.5579 ***
(13.43)

0.0996*

Aid

(1.69)

LimCap

-0.0318
(0.50)

Demographic

NorthCen

0.94 ***
(10.04)

South

0.8545 ***
(8.72)

West

0.192*
0 -6 7 )

* * * S tatistically significant to th e 1 -p e rc e n t lev e l.
* * S tatistically significant to th e 5 -p e rc c n t lev e l.
* S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 1 0 -p e rc e n t level.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d c o efficie n ts w e re e stim ated w ith rescaled
d e p e n d e n t v ariables. L o o k to T a b le s 1 a n d 7 fo r th e
re sc a lin g factors.
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Table 10 - Effort Equations
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Public School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)

Variable
Constant

Estimated Coefficients
Check
Discuss
Events
0.344*
-1.0667***
0.5861 ***
(1.75)

(2-85)

Choice Set (State Level')
BNum
0.0007
B_Den
Choice
Local
Alike

0.0865 *

(0.01)

(0.61)

0.1703

-1.3526

-1.2541

(0.07)

(0.98)

(0.49)

0.0306

-0.0479

-0.0061

(0-46)

(0.70)

(0.08)

0.1181

0.1656

(0.68)

(0.93)

-0.7179 ***

0.0028

(3.02)

-2.5698 **

-0.464
(0.35)

(2.01)

BadChild

-0.2179 ***

-0.1055
(1.37)

(3.00)

Girl

0.2075 ***

-0.043

(5.80)

0 -2 7 )

Parent
M_Ed

1.4575*

3.1121 ***

1.1922*

Catholic
F_Invol

0.1235 ***

(2-47)

-0.3189
(1 0 6 )

11.197 ***
(7 6 8 )

-0.2419 ***
(2.84)

0.0516
(1 2 8 )

2.6228 ***
(2.68)

0.6772

1.0354

(1.03)

(1-43)

(1 8 7 )

NonWhite

-0.5002 ***

(3.32)

(1-71)

F_Ed

0.0352

(1.83)

(0.01)

Child
Prior_A

(4.52)

-0.0137

(2.65)

(0.28)

0.0569

-0.0654

0 -3 3 )

(1.58)

-0.0086

0.0491

(0.20)

(1.08)

-0.1512***
(2.86)

0.1556***
(3.12)

-0.1065**
(2-09)

Continued
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Table 10 - Continued
Parent - Continued
MWage
1.1407*
(1.80)

FWage
Familv
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap

0.5914

South
West

0.8801 *

0.2199
(0.38)

-2.6339 ***

-1.6989 **

-2.7317 ***

(3.74)

(2-23)

(3.04)

1.4796*

-1.5336 **

(1.90)

a . i4 )

(3.96)

0.0453

0.0421

-0.0137

(1.24)

( l.ii)

(0-32)

-0.0719 *

-0.1918***

(1.78)

(4.11)

-0.0388

0.0407

-0.2292 ***

3.4649 *•*

0.2343 ***

(0.61)

(3.53)

0.1244*

-0.1439 **

(1.67)

(2.03)

(0.36)

0.0303

-0.0803

(0.41)

(0.85)

0.2638 ***

0.8181 ***
(36.02)

MU(2)

(1.96)

(1.71)

(3.24)

Miscellaneous
MU(1)

1.4556**

(1 8 1 )

(1.21)

(0.99)

DemoeraDhic
NorthCen

1.2142 *

(3.04)

0.0323

1.7097***
(44.20)

1.6496 ***
(53.35)

Lambda

0.2263
(1.46)

-0.5288 ***

-0.5613 ***

(5.13)

(2-47)

*** S ta tistica lly sig n ifican t to the 1 -p e rc e n t level.
** S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 5 -p e rc e n t level.
* S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 10 -p ercen t level.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d coefficients w e re e stim a te d w ith re sca led
d e p e n d e n t variab les. L o o k to T ab les 1 a n d 7 fo r th e rescalin g
fa cto rs.
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Table 11 - Schooling Equations
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Public School Families
((he absolute value of t-ratku are in parentheses)

Variable
Constant

Estimated Coefficients
%NonLun
%Degree
%NonMin
Tea/Stu
LowSal
NonUrb
0.8457 •**
0.0635 *** 0.2027 *** 0.0049 *** 2.5512 *** 0.4658 ***
(21.77)

Choice Set (State Level)
BNum
-0.0043
a .o 8 )

B_Den

BadChild
Girl
Parent
M_Ed

(0.06)

0.3813 ***
(6.36)

0.0119*** 2.9886 ***
(5.08)

(4.65)

-0.0005 *** -0.1956**
(3.69)

0.0007 **
(1.99)

0.0006

(2.05)

-0.052
(0.22)

-2.0871 ***

0.0979 *** -0.1443*** -0.0041

-1.9239

(14.85)

-0.0245 ***

(20 J 0 )

-0.0495 ***
(5.34)

(3.56)

0.1456

-0.8423 ***

(0.79)

(3.33)

0.0169 *

-0.0471 ***

(1.66)

(3.49)

0.1443 ***

-0.0412

(5.60)

0.2897 ***

(1.22)

0.078 *

(8.40)

0.9799 ***

(1.70)

0.7616 ***

(5.23)

(3.85)

(1.53)

0.00)

(4.88)

(2.89)

-0.0003

0.0005

0.0001

-0.0268

-0.0005

-0.001

(0.26)

(0.25)

(0.77)

(0.26)

(0.05)

(0.06)

-0.0004

0.0015

0.0001

-0.0066

-0.0033

-0.0048

(0.78)

(1.58)

(1.46)

(0.14)

(0.64)

(0.71)

0.0006

-0.6831

(0.35)

(0.53)

(2.64)

(1 4 1 )

-1.1403

0.0386

0.1129

(1.28)

(0.40)

(0.90)

-0.0326 ***

-0.1939 ***

0.0245 ** -0.0407*
(1.68)

0.0283 •** -0.0265

NonWhite -0.0015 **
(2-26)

(1-48)

0.0062 ***

-0.0024 *
(1.88)

0.0003 *** -0.4617 ***

0.3428 ***

0.241

(4.68)

(2.84)

(7.17)

(4.60)

0 0 .8 7 )

0.0023 *** -0.0011

0.0001

-0.0802

0.0083

-0.0013

(0.88)

(1.00)

(1.24)

(1.25)

(0.15)

-0.0001

0

-0.0001

-0.0918

0.0058

-0.0012

(0.23)

(0.01)

(1.16)

0 .54)

(0.88)

(0.14)

(3.77)

FInvol

(5.68)

0

(9 JO)

a is)

(3.17)

Catholic

(3.44)

(11.79)

(1.34)

a .o 2 )

F_Ed

(1.03)

-0.0123 *** 0.0351 ***
(3.97)

Child
PriorA

(3.21)

0.0109 *** 0.0165 ***
(4.53)

Alike

(6.19)

0.0085 *** 0.0019
(9.13)

Local

0.0073 ***

0.042 *** 0.0962 ***
a -7 4 )

Choice

(34.85)

Continued
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Table 11 - Continued

Variable
Tea/Stu
Parent - Continued
M_Wage
0.0097
(1.08)

F_Wage
Familv
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap

LowSal

Estimated Coefficients
%NonLun
%Degree
NonUrb

%NonMin

-0.0331 *
(1 8 3 )

-0.0301 *** 0.0258 *

•0.0006

0.6687

-0.0207

-0.1765

(0.44)

(0.76)

(0.22)

(1-40)

0.0035 *** 0.3613

(4.35)

(1 8 5 )

(3-56)

(0-53)

-0.0082

-0.0074

-0.0016

-1.0697

(0.73)

(0.33)

(0.97)

(0.94)

0.0761 *** -0.0505 **

0.0023

(6-96)

(2.28)

-0.0011 *•

0.0018 *

(2.20)

(1.74)

(1.51)

0.0012 •* -0.0017

0

(2-08)

(1-55)

(1.41)

0.0001

(0.15)

-3.154***
(2.97)

-0.1009*

South

(5.32)

(8.97)

(5.43)

(3.81)

Miscellaneous
Lambda
-0.0159 *** 0.0359 ***
(7-36)

(8.25)

(8.32)

0.9707 ***

(0.74)

0.5488 ***

(7.96)

0.0227 ***

(3.37)

-0.0003

-0.1928 ***

-0.0491 ***

-0.0413 ***

(3.29)

(5.44)

(9.35)

(5.11)

0.0018 *** 0.3367 *
(5.56)

-0.1155

(2.60)

(0.04)

-0.0228 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0012 *** -0.4955 ***
(23.58)

-0.3099 ***

(113)

(4.11)

-0.0113*** -0.0181 *** -0.0008 *** -0.8745 ***
(11.18)

West

(10.43)

-0.1106

(3.71)

(1.90)

Demographic
NorthCen -0.0081 *** -0.0188 *** -0.0007 •** -0.5052 ***
(8.95)

0.2758 ***

(1.64)

(8.25)

0.0539 ***

(5 31)

0.0669 ***

(5.49)

0.0375 ***

(S.16)

-0.1079 ***
(7-42)

(3.41)

0.0596 ***

-0.1631 ***

(5.72)

(11.90)

-0.1031 ***

-0.0697 **

(4.16)

(2.09)

*** S ta tistica lly significant to th e 1-p e rc e n t level.
** S ta tistic a lly sig n ifican t to th e 5 -p e rc e n t lev e l.
* S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to th e 10-p ercen t level.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d coefficients w e re e stim a te d w ith rescaled d e p en d e n t v a ria b le s .
f o r th e re sca lin g factors.

L o o k to T ab le s 1 and 7
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Table 12 - Test of Joint Significance
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model

Equations
ParsntaLEffod
Check*
Discuss*
Events*
School ins
T to S
LowSal
%Degrees
NonUrb*
%NonLun
%NonMin

Public
Wages
Public Fees

Wages

Private
Private Fees

Public Fees

5.26*
7.11 •*
0.13

0.73
13.39 **
12.72 **

1.52
4.97*
1.92

1.46
8.49 **
13.01 **

2.32
10.61 *
14.13 ***

11.66 ***
4.44 **
7.06 ***
0.63
7.33 ***
1.83

44.84 ***
69.31 ***
11.79 ***
52.01 ***
36.58 ***
15.26 ***

0.42
1.24
0.36
1.48
1.32
0.52

9.71 ***
5.17 ***
3.86 ***
6.55*
3.31 **
9.37 ***

15.49 ***
5.99 ***
3.57 ***
72.25 ***
4.37 ***
21.15 ***

*** S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 1 -p e rc e n t level.
** Statistically sig n ific a n t to th e 5 -p e rc e n t level.
* Statistically sig n ific a n t to th e 1 0 -p ercen t level.
k D enotes likelihood ra tio te sts; a ll o th e rs a re F -test.
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Table 13 - Achievements Equations
Endogenous Effort and Schooling
Public School Families
(B ootstrapped S t. E r r o r s , 1000 iterations)
(th e absolute v a lu e o f t-ra tio s a r e in parentheses)

Variables
Constant

Check
0.0301
(0.44)

Estimated Coefficients
Discuss
Event
0.0324
0.0498
(0.95)

(0.79)

Parental Effort (Exoected Values)
x(Check)
0.0051

(0 5 4 )

-0.0106

(0.44)

(0.73)

0.0087

x(Discuss)

All
-0.0298

0.0176 *
(1-77)

(1.32)

x(Event)

0.0019

0.0242

(0.13)

(1 5 3 )

School fExoected Values)
-0.1324
x(Tea/Stu)

-0.1041

-0.1614

0.089

(1.05)

(1.12)

(1.10)

(0.44)

-0.0848

-0.0569

-0.1434

0.1047

(0.46)

(0.54)

(0.97)

(0.45)

-0.1123

0.3316

-0.2196

1.2907

(0.10)

(0.28)

(0.20)

(0.89)

-0.0058

-0.0121

-0.0044

-0.0128

(0.85)

(1-51)

(0.63)

(1 5 8 )

0.0121

0.0072

(0.37)

(0 5 7 )

0 .6 4 )

(0.27)

-0.0052

-0.0075

-0.0132

0.0125

(0.20)

(0-56)

(0.57)

(0 5 8 )

x(LowSaL)
x(%Degree)
x(NonUrb)
x(%NonLun)
x(%NonMin)
Child
PriorA
BadChild
Girl

1.0022

0.9978 ***

0.0244 *

0.9711 *«*

0.0089

0.8652 ***

(17.77)

(39.92)

(14.85)

(7-95)

-0.0004

-0.001

-0.0012

-0.0006

(0.17)

(1 5 1 )

(0.83)

(0.24)

0

-0.0013

-0.0002

(0.07)

(1 5 8 )

(0.36)

-0.0034 *
(1.76)

Continued
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Table 13 - Continued

Variables

Estimated Coefficients
Check
Discuss

Pjcsots
M_Ed

0.0061
(0.45)

F_Ed
NonWhite
Catholic
FInvol

Event

All

-0.0002

0.0086

-0.0284

(0.02)

(0.47)

(1 0 9 )

0.0029

0.0043

0.0073

0.0021

(0.24)

(0.76)

(0.98)

(0.16)

-0.0014

-0.0024

-0.0013

0.0032

(0.44)

(0.83)

(0.26)

(0.59)

-0.0001

0.0003

0

-0.0006

(0.18)

(0.67)

(0.01)

(0.55)

-0.0005

-0.0001

(0.65)

(0.13)

-0.022

-0.007

-0.0005
(1.02)

Family
Sibs

-0.0137

Income
Aid
LimCap
Demographic
NorthCen
South
West
Miscellaneous
Lambda

-0.0008 **
(2-08)

-0.0206 **

(0.53)

(2-22)

(1.04)

(0.23)

-0.0146

-0.002

-0.0167

-0.0321

(1.16)

(0.14)

(0.57)

(1.12)

0.0001

0

0.0001

0.0001

(0.25)

(0.03)

(0.42)

(0.35)

0.0001

-0.0004

0.0003

0.0023

(0.06)

(0.32)

(0.13)

(1.00)

-0.0037

-0.0019

(0.89)

(0.55)

(1-71)

(0.24)

-0.0054

-0.0044

-0.0073

0.005

(0.73)

(0.91)

(0.92)

(0.46)

-0.006

-0.0043

-0.0078

0.0087

(0.73)

(0.71)

(0.79)

(0.64)

0.0015

0.0003

0.0042

0.0026

(0.21)

(0.07)

(1.13)

(0.36)

-0.005*

0.0013

* * * S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 1-pcrcent le v e l.
** S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 5 -p e rc c n t le v e l.
* S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 10-percent le v e l.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d coefficients w e re e stim a te d w ith re sca led d ependent v a ria b le s.
L o o k to T a b le s 1 a n d 7 fo r th e re s c a lin g fa cto rs.
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Table 14 - Effort Equations
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Private School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)
■r ■ - r sagBSBF 'ti:a - r

Variable
Constant

t-

i - -in j a a e g g"BT -Maacggggag

Estimated Coefficients
Check
Discuss
0.2283
1.3132

Event
0.5947

(0.15)

(0.77)

(0.26)

Choice Set (State Level)
RNum
0.5362

0.9602

-0.6841

(0.65)

(1.01)

(0 .68)

R_Den
Religious
BNum

33.244

-150.29 *•*
(2.73)

(0.26)

-0.0388

-0.0364

-0.5646

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0-77)

-0.133

-0.6431 *

(0.40)

B_Den
Choice
Local
Alike
QM
Prior_A
BadChild
Girl

18.235

(0.60)

-1.7079

(1.84)

61.116 ***

0.292
(0.79)

-28.253

(0.09)

(3.02)

0.0884

-0.0807

(0.56)

(0.42)

0.4855

0.1105

(1.18)

(0.23)

(2.34)

-0.2765

0.8613

-0.2523

(0.46)

(1.32)

(0.31)

-6.9084

-0.0291

4.2043

(1.32)

(0 .01)

(0.59)

0.0439

-0.2748

0.1769

(0.16)

(0.93)

(0.53)

-0.1016

0.1664*

(1. 10)

0.6495 **
(2.52)

1.508 **

0.0339

(1.27)

(1.90)

(0.30)

0.1114

3.1451

-0.4698

(0.05)

(1.24)

(0.15)

-0.1802

0.3717

1.4177

(0 . 12)

(0 .20)

(0.57)

Earg.nl
M _E d

F Ed

Continued
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Table 14 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Check
Discuss

Variable
Parent (continued}
NonWhite
-0.0556

-0.1653

(0.47)

(1.19)

(1.70)

0.1035

-0.1933

-0.1759

(0-71)

(1.22)

(0.77)

0.116

0.0002

0.0307

(1.23)

(0.00)

(0.22)

Catholic
F_InvoI
MWage
FWage
Family
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
Demographic
NorthCen
South
West

0.8932

-3.3925 **

2.7948

(2-07)

(1.34)

0.9759

0.1819

-0.3773

(0.94)

(0.16)

(0.25)

-0.2753

2.1911

(1.97)

(0-09)

(0.64)

1.6132

-1.5331

-0.6077

(0.97)

(0.79)

(0.22)

-4.8727 **

0.271 **

0.1169

-0.2399

(1.14)

(2-24)

(1.60)

-0.0105

-0.1956

-0.1715

(0.08)

(1.57)

( i.n )

-0.3639

-0.1971

(1.91)

(0.94)

(0.37)

0.3952

-0.1007

-0.2312

(1.60)

(0.29)

(0.51)

0.1735

-0.2683

(0.59)

(0.80)

0.5767 *

0.5314**

0.7961 ***
(9.69)

MU(2)

-0.3062 *

(0-59)

(2.12)

Miscellaneous
MU(1)

Event

1.843***
(13.36)

1.5813***
(11.24)

Continued
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Table 14 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variable
Check
Discuss
Event
Miscellaneous - Continued
Lambda
-0.3262
0.2399
-0.1684
(1.01)

(0.60)

(0.31)

* * * S ta tistica lly significant to th e 1 -p erccn t level.
* * S tatistically significant to th e 5 -p e rc e n t level.
* S tatistically sig n ifican t to th e 1 0 -p e rc e n t level.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d c o efficie n ts w e re e stim a te d w ith re sc a le d d e p en d e n t
v a ria b le s. L o o k to T ab les 1 a n d 7 fo r th e re sc a lin g fa cto rs.
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Table 15 - Schooling Equations
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Private School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)

Variable
Constant

Tea/Stu
0.0291
(0.86)

Estimated Coefficients
%Degree
NonUrb
LowSal
%NonLun
%NonMin
-3.7703 —
0.3331 *** 0.0022
1.1061 ***
0.0701
(5 J 6 )

(6.14)

(6.28)

0.0077 *** 1.3531

-0.0902

(3.46)

(1.00)

(1.05)

-0.1433

-27.161

5.8101

(1.05)

(0.55)

(1-12)

0

0.6029

(1.83)

(0.01)

(1.53)

(2.44)

-0.0094

-0.0008

-0.8367

0.0226

(1.03)

(1.56)

(0.73)

28.687

-2.3971

(1.38)

(1.26)

0.3714 **

-0.0333 *

(2.46)

(1.69)

CHqice.SeJ IStat§_UYd)
R_Num
-0.0695 *** 0.0486 *
(4.15)

R_Den

-0.6471
(0.64)

Religious

B_Den
Choice

0.0108 *

(1.08)

0.1518

0.0455

(0.41)

(0.09)

0.001

Girl
Parent
M_Ed

-0.0014

(1.38)

0.0365 *** 0.0098
(0.46)

0.2291 ** -0.1287

(1.28)

-0.0036 **
(2-42)

-1.5131 ***
(3.25)

2.3507 ***

0.1326**

0.1294***

C0.29)

0.5211 ***
(4.60)

-27.668 ***
(4.09)

-0.0052
(0.07)

-0.2538 ***
(6 J 0 )

12.153***
(4.90)

0.201 ***
a. 27)
0.3128 ***

(2.87)

-0.1253 **

(4.87)

-0.0992

(4.03)

(2-12)

(1-20)

3.0281

-0.4608

1.124

(0.66)

(1.78)

(0.92)

(0.86)

(1.49)

0.0127 *** 0.0025

-0.0003

0.0657

-0.0278

0.0071

(0.60)

(0.29)

(1.24)

(0.23)

-0.0071

0.0035

-0.0193

(0.09)

(0.40)

(1.57)

(2-97)

(0.30)

0.0019

-0.0029

(1.14)

(0.86)

0.0314
(0.68)

F_Ed

-0.0007

0.0608 *** 0.0239

(2.24)

BadChild

(1.98)

(1.38)

(3.24)

Child
PriorA

-0.0143 **

0.0992 **

(1 99)

(7.09)

Alike

(1.65)

(1.79)

(0.26)

Local

-2.4169 *

0.0377 *** 0.0387 *
(3.67)

B_Num

(1 91)

(0.51)

-0.1704*
(1.82)

-0.0961 *** -0.0641
0 .8 3 )

(0.93)

0.0238 *

-0.0004*
(1.82)

0.0015
(0.25)

0.0097 **
a i9)

4.0502 **

-0.3762

0.391

(2-29)

(1.54)

(1.12)

1.1874

-0.1874

0.4047

(0.97)

(1.04)

(1-58)

Continued
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Table 15 - Continued

Tea/Stu
Variable
Parent- Continued
NonWhite 0.0048 *
(1.77)

Catholic

M_Wage
F_Wage
Familv
Sibs

0.0026

(2-31)

(4.01)

-0.2387 **

-0.001

-0.1664 ***

(0.73)

(2.02)

(0.07)

0.0002

-0.131

-0.0169

(0 3 8 )

(1.10)

(0.96)

(3.13)

(*•28)

0.078 ***

-0.0001

0.1455

-0.0034

0.0098

(1.67)

(0 3 2 )

(1.61)

(0 3 3 )

(Q.66)

-0.0126

-0.0526

0.0027

1.2775

-0.2471

-0.154

(0.42)

(0.85)

(0.69)

(0.91)

(1.56)

(0.68)

0.0188

0.0243

-0.0018

0.6724

0.0126

0.1173

(0.86)

(0.54)

(0.63)

(0.66)

(0.11)

(0.71)

-0.1947 *** 0.0695

-0.0027

0.0722

0.2796

-0.6476

(0 3 9 )

(0.03)

(0.99)

(1.63)

0.0523
(1.30)

(0.67)

-0.2541 ***
(3-32)

3.783 ***

-0.4412 **

0.792 ***

(0.39)

(4.41)

(2-09)

(2.66)

0.0003

-0.0826

0.0075

-0.0205

(1.20)

(0.86)

(0.66)

(130)

0.0028

-0.0002

-0.0187

(0.63)

(0.52)

(0.19)

(2.67)

Demographic
NorthCen -0.0345 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0015

0.3056

0.0245

(1.60)

(1.12)

(0.66)

(149)

LimCap

0.0058 **
(2-47)

(4.81)

South

-0.0073
(1.25)

West

0.0001
(0.03)

Miscellaneous
Lambda
-0.0111
(1.38)

0.0074 *

0.0021

(1.78)

Aid

0.0032

-0.0067*

-0.0003

%NonMin

(1.34)

(3.61)

Income

0.0123 **

-0.0133 •** -0.026 ***
(3.97)

F_Invol

LowSal

Estimated Coefficients
%NonLun
%Degree
NonUrb

(4.40)

-0.0614 *** -0.0017 **
(5.41)

-0.019 **
(2-21)

-0.0638 ***
(4.40)

(2-06)

0.7153 ***
(3.88)

-0.0039 *** 0.4387 *
(6.06)

0.0004
(0.42)

(1.80)

0.8876 ***
(11.60)

-0.0326 ***

0.039

-0.0322 *
(1.90)

0.1401 ***
(2.75)

0.2699 ***

(1.20)

0.1274***

(5.98)

0.0824 **
(239)

(5.05)

-0.0787 *

0.1666 ***

(1.88)

(2.* 7)

* * * S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 1 -percent level.
** S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 5 -p e rc e n t le v e l.
* S ta tistica lly sig n ific a n t to the 1 0 -p e rc e n t le v e l.
Im p o rta n t: T h e re p o rte d coefficients w e re e stim a te d w ith re sca led d ep en d en t v a ria b le s.
f o r th e re sca lin g factors.

L o o k to T ab les 1 and 7
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Table 16 - Achievements Equations
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Private School Families
(B o o tstrap p e d St. E rro rs , 1000 iteratio n s)
(th e a b so lu te v a lu e o f t-ratio s a r e in p a re n th e se s)

Variables
Constant

Check
0.0072
(0.36)

EaisntaLEffsrt
x(Check)
x(Discuss)

Estimated Coefficients
Event
Discuss
0.0144
-0.0055

All
-0.0047

(0.89)

(0.22)

(0.26)

0.0014

-0.0015

(0.53)

(039)

---------

-0.002

-------

(t.20)

-------

x(Event)
School
x(Tea/Stu)
x(LowSaL)
x(%Degree)
x(NonUrb)
x(%NonLun)
x(%NonMin)
Child
PriorA
BadChild
Girl

-0.0026
(1.08)

0.0002

0.0002

(0.31)

(0.32)

-0.0345

-0.0555

0.0061

-0.0339

(0 3 9 )

(0.80)

(0.12)

(039)

0.071 •

0.0895 •*

0.0725 *

0.0966 **

(1.86)

(2.18)

(1.84)

(2.16)

-0.0778

-0.1636

0.2391

0.0317

(0.10)

(0.27)

(0.48)

(0.04)

-0.001

-0.001

-0.001

-0.001

(0.71)

(0.63)

(0.65)

(0.65)

0.0011

0.0075

-0.003

0.0067

(0.06)

(0.37)

(0.16)

(033)

0.0022

0.006

0.0006

0.0061

(0-34)

(0.86)

(0.10)

(0.90)

0.8428 ***

0.8534 ***

0.8082 ***

0.8323 ***

(10.55)

(14.49)

(18.14)

(10.46)

-0.0011

-0.0009

-0.0015

-0.0011

(0.38)

(0.31)

(0.52)

(037)

0.0002

0.0003

0.0002

0.0003

(0.27)

(0.40)

(0.20)

(037)

Continued
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Table 16 - Continued

Variables
Parent
M_Ed

Check

Estimated Coefficients
Discuss
Event

0.0203

0.0312

0.0144

0.0307

(1.52)

(0.97)

(1.54)

0.0024

0.004

0.002

0.0043

(0.23)

(0.37)

(0.20)

(0.41)

-0.0007

-0.0006

-0.001

-0.0008

(0.49)

(0.45)

(0.75)

(0.53)

-0.0004

-0.0001

0

0.0002

(0.26)

(0.09)

(0.03)

(0.14)

-0.0005

-0.0002

-0.0004

-0.0001

(0.56)

(0.22)

(0.53)

(0.10)

-0.0013

-0.0133

0.0043

-0.0133

(0.05)

(0.45)

(0.17)

(0.44)

0.0081

0.0185

0.0028

0.0183

(0.54)

(1.10)

(0.24)

(1.09)

0.0005

0.001

0.0004

0.001

(0.59)

(0.95)

(0.44)

(1.03)

0.0003

0.0004

-0.0001

0.0002

(0.20)

(0.32)

(0.05)

(0.14)

0.0012

0.0016

0.003

0.003

(0.26)

(0.49)

(1-10)

(0.61)

0.002

0.0025

0.0034

0.0036

(0.52)

(0.79)

(1.15)

(0.85)

-0.001

-0.0005

0.0011

0.0012

(0.20)

(0-15)

(0.35)

(0.20)

0.0004

0.0021

-0.0001

0.0023

(0.19)

(0-77)

(0.06)

(0.84)

(in)

F_Ed
NonWhite
Catholic
F_Invol
Family
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
Demographic
NorthCen
South
West
Miscellaneous
Lambda

All

*** S tatistically sig n ific a n t to th e 1 -p e rc e n t level.
** Statistically sig n ific a n t to th e 5 -p e rc e n t level.
* Statistically sig n ific a n t to th e 1 0 -p e rc e n t level.
Im portant: T h e re p o rte d c o e ffic ie n ts w e re estim ated w ith re sca led d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le s.
7 fo r th e re sc a lin g fa cto rs.

L o o k to T a b le s 1 a n d

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 17 - Summary of Effort Tables
(14)
(10)
(4)
ex-Public ee-Public ee-Private
C D E C D E C D E

Variable
Schooling
Tea/Stu
+
LowSal
Degrees +
NonUrb %NonLun ©
%NonMin Child
PriorA ©
BadChild ©
Girl
Parents
MJEd
+
F_Ed
+
NonWhite 0
Catholic +
F_Invol
M_Wage 0
F_Wage +
Familv
Sibs
©
+
Income
+
Aid
LimCap Choice Set
R_Num
RDen
Religious
BNum
BDen
Choice
Local
Alike
Misc.
Lambda

+
-

0
©
©
©
©
+

+ 0 © - 0 - - © © - © + 0 0 - 0 + - 0

+
+
+

0
0
+
+
0
4*

0
+
0
©
0
+

©
©
©
+
0
+

0
+
0
0

0
+
©
0
©
0
+

+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
©
+

©
+
+
©

©
0
+
©

©
0
+
-

©
©
+
©

©
©
©

©
+
+
-

- +
- 0 - -

+
+
+ © + + - - + - - +
+ + © +
+ © - + © ©

-

+
©
©
©
+
+

+
+
©
+
+
-

+
+
0
0
-

+ -

N o te : C ircled signs a re sta tistica lly sig n ific a n t.
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Table 18 - Summary of Schooling Tables With
Participation Table

Variable
Constant
Child
Prior_A
BadChild
Girl
Parents
M_Ed
F_Ed
NonWhite
Catholic
F_InvoI
M_Wage
FWage
Family
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
ChQi?? Set
R to B
RNum
R_Den
Religious
B_Num
BDen
Choice
Local
Alike
Misc.
Lambda

(15)
(11)
(9)
ee-Public
ee
ee-Private
T L D U L M P T L D U L M
0 © 0 0 © 0 © + 0 + © 0 +
© © - - 0 0 © © - 0 + - +
- + + - - - - 0 + - + - +
- + + - - - - + - ©
+ 0
0
©
0
+
©

©
©
©
0

+
©
0
+
0

©
+
+

0
+
©
+
+
©

+
+
©
-

0
0
©
0
+
+
-

+
©
0
©
+
+

©
0
©
©
+

+

+
+
©
0
+
+

0
©
0

©
0
-

+
+
-

©
©
©

©
0
0
©

0
©

©
0
0
-

©
+
+
0

+ - + +
© + 0 ©
0
+ - - ©

0
©

+
0
+
+
-

0
+
©
+
+
■f

0
© © 0
©
0 0
©
0 - + + 0
©
+
© 0
© 0 +
© 0 0 + ©
-

©
©
©
0
©

0
0
+
0
0

0
©
0
+

©
0
©
©

©
+
0
0
©

-

-

-

+

-

-

© 0 0 0 © ©

- ©

+

+

-

-

+

+
+
0
©
0

0
+
©
0
©

0
©
©
0
©
©
-

© © 0

N ote: C ircled signs a re sta tistica lly sig n ifican t.
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Table 19 - Summary of Achievement Tables

Variables
Constant
Effort
Check
Discuss
Events
Schooling
Tea/Stu
LowSal
%Degrees
NonUrb
%NonLun
%NonMin
Child
PriorA
BadChild
Girl
Parents
M_Ed
F_Ed
NonWhite
Catholic
FInvol
Familv
Sibs
Income
Aid
LimCap
Miscellaneous
Lambda

(3)
(13)
(6)
(16)
xx-Public
ex-Public
ee-Public
ee-Private
C D E A C D E A C D E A C D E A
© © © 0 - - © - + +• + - + - + +

+ ©
- +
+ +
+
©
©
©
©
+
+
© ©
© ©

+ + + + + + ©
+ ©
© © © © + + ©
© © © © © © ©
+ + + + © + ©
- - - © ©
-

+ © -

+ +

+ + 0 0 0 0
+ - - + +

- + -

+ + + © + + + - +
- - - - + + + + +

© © © © © © © © © © © © 0 0 0 0
© © © © + - + +
- - - - + 0 © + - - - © + + + +
© © ©
© © ©
- + + -

© + - - +
+ + +
©
- © + +
- - - © - © + +

© © © © ©
© © © © +
- - +
-

©
+
+

©
0
0

+
©
+
+

+ - + - + + + 4
+ + + + + + + +
*

- + - ©

-

-

-

+ +

+
©
- - - + +
+ + + + + +
- + + + + -

+
+
+

+ + + + + + -

+

+
+

-

-

-

-

N ote: C irc le d sig n s a r e sta tistica lly significant.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Exogenous Schooling Model
Second-Order Conditions

\G i\ =

^ aJ

e

uaJ e

* U J ee

+

+ U J ee + v 'V c c
w 2u cc
:

v 'V c c

< 0

(1)

”% c

U LL

+ W 2U CC
(2)

= lUAjB +U Ja +»2UcdlUu +yv2Ucc] - [ w 2Ucc)[w2Ucc]

= W j j l + V J eA W ll + * 2u cc] + ” 2u ccull > o
NOTE:
G =

(3)

1*3

179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180
Total Differential of E and L

cc

dE
dL

w2Utcc

U u 'M c c
dN

” UCC ^ V cc UaJ S s - v J

e s - ”P ! Vcc

U ^ lT - E - D w U ^

-SwU(CC

dr
dS

wUcc w 2Ucc

Uc +[T-E-L]wUcc

- w p s U.cc

-SwU,cc

dw
dp*

(4)
Comparative Statics on Parental Effort
Non-labor Income

* u cc

w 2Ucc

wUcc

VLL + w 2Ucc

En = G
(5)
= G[[w Ucc][Ull + w 2Ucc] - [wUcc][w2Ucc])
= G[w UccUL[) > 0
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181
Schooling

~UaaFJs ~ UjJ es ~ 'wP sUcc

* 2uc

ES = G
-w psUtcc
-

Vll * * 2Vcc

♦ V j B * " P sUa$ V LL+ v1Vcc] ^ V c c M ^ U ^ ]

<«

- - c ttW ,t ♦v j j i v ll + w % c] H y v succv Lj
- - p % - C [ l W s][l/t l * ^ U cci - G W J eeKV ll * *>2VCJ >=< 0
Price of Public Schooling

-SwUcc

w 2Ucc

-Sw2Ucc

ULL * w2Ucc

Eps = G

= -G[[S w Ucc][Ull * w 2Ucc] - [w2Ucc][SwUcc]]
= -G[Sw UccUlJ
=

<

0
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(7)

182
Wags

Uc + [T - E - L]wU.cc

w 2U,cc

Uc + [T - E - L]wUcc

ULL + w 2Ucc

= G{[UC * Hw Ucc][Ull + w 2Ucc]
'cc*

(8)

= G[UC «■ Hw Ucc\U ll
= GUCUU + HEn >=< 0
Total Time Available

w 2Ucc

w 2Ucc

ET = G

* 2VCC

VLL

+

= G[[w2^ cc][^ I£ + w 2Ucc] - [W2UC
C][W2UC
C])
'cc*1
- v cc*
= G[w 2UccUl J
= wEn > 0
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(9)

183
Endogenous Schooling Model
Second-Order Conditions

(10)

|C?i| - UjuJ e + ^ jS ee + w2Ucc < ®

* V J u * w*u cc

v 'V c c

w 2U.cc

Uu <• w 2Vcc
(11)

■ W j ! ♦ V J u <■ w 2Ucc][Uu * w 2Ucc] - [w2t/cc][w 2Vccl
m W aJ I * U J e J lU u * W2UCC] * w2UccULL > 0

w 2C/cc

UJuf/s*U jifEs*wP SUtCC

w U,cc

Ul l +w 2Ucc

wpsU.cc

t v / f + UJ es +WPS^cc

WP SVCC

Ua/

e 'U

J s e ^ U ,cc

W j l + % £ +” 2UCC] [ U j * * %
^A /S S e +

UaJ s +UJ x +p 'U

cc

+ plucc] [Ull + w 2Ucc]

fsE + WPs^cc]

+

^A /SS e + UjS se + WPsUCc] [W2(^ccl

W /J J s

+

U/SeS

+

WPs^CC^ Wa/SeSs

+ ^/t^E S +

[U/jS e + U/SeE + w2^ c J W W

WPs^CC^

['VPs^Cci

+ ^/Sss + P su ccttw2uccttw2ucc\ K 0

(w»/xw«0
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(12)

NQXEi
G =—
N
Total Differential of E.L and S

VaJ

b +V J ee +w 2Ucc

” 2Ucc

UjJ / s +U J b + ^ U

cc

\dE
w 2 u cc

u l l + w 2u cc

* P SUCc

dL
dS

U a J S s + U J e s +* P S U c c

wUcc

w'Ucc

wpsucc

UAj Z + U J s s + p * U'cc
c

Vc ♦ [T-E~L]wUcc

-SwUcc
dN

wUcc

» 2UCC

Uc * [ T - E - L W a .

-SwUcc

dr
dw

PSUCC

”P SUCC

IT -E -L ] p % c

Uc - S p \ c

dps
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DATA APPENDIX

This appendix contains descriptions of the variables used in the econometric
models. Whenever possible the actual survey question that a variable is based upon is
provided. In addition, descriptions from the NELS code book are provided when
possible.
Parental Effort
Check

Discuss

Event

- How often do your parents check on whether you have done your
homework? [OFTEN, SOMETIMES, RARELY, NEVER] Source:
the 1990 student survey, F1S100A.
- In the first half of this school year, how often have you discussed things
you've studied in class with either or both of your parents or
guardians? [NEVER, SOMETIMES, OFTEN] Source: the 1990
student survey, F1S105C.
- In the first half of the school year, how often did either of your parents
or guardians attend a school event in which you participated?
[NEVER, MORE THAN ONCE] Source: the 1990 student survey,
F1S106C.
School

Private

- classifies the type of school into public, Catholic, other religious and
nonsectarian private schools, as reported by the school. . Source: the
1990 school survey, G10CTRL1.
Tea/Stu - How many full-time regular teachers work in your school? As of
October 1, 1989 (or the most recent date for which data are available),
what was the total student enrollment in your school? Source: the
1990 school survey, F1C35 & F1C2.
LowSal
- What are the low est... annual salaries currently paid to full-time teachers
on your school's payroll? Source: the 1990 school survey, F1C42A.
%Degree - How many members of your full-time regular teaching staff have
[Masters] ? How many members of your full-time regular teaching
staff have [Ed.D. or Ph.D] ? Source: the 1990 school survey,
191
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F1C44C & F1C44D.
NonUrb - is derived from a variable that trichotomizes the urbanicity of the area in
which the sample member's second follow-up school is located. This
metropolitan status is defined by QED for public school districts, for
Catholic dioceses, or in some cases for the county in which the school
is located. These classifications are based on the U.S. Census.
[URBAN, SUBURBAN, RURAL] Source: the 1990 school survey,
G10URBAN.
%NonLun - What percentage of the total student body in your school receives [free or
reduced-price school lunch program]? (Please provide your best
estimate.) Source: the 1990 school survey, F1C30A.
%NonMin - What percentage of your current tenth grade students are [white, not of
hispanic origin]? (If none, enter '000'. Percentages should sum to
100%.) Source: the 1990 school survey, F1C27F.
Child
Achieve
Prior A

- IRT Theta: t-score According to the NELS Second Follow-Up: Student
- Component Data File User's Manual, "... this score is standardized to a
mean of SO and standard deviation of 10. ... First, it is a
transformation of the IRT-estimated ability scale (theta) rather than of
a count of estimated correct answers on test items. Second, the
standardization is done across years, rather than within year. Each
test taker in the panel sample had three thetas: the measurements of
ability at the base year, first follow-up, and second follow-up. The
scores are standardized so that the mean score within each subject area
is SO, and the standard deviation is equal to 10 when scores are
aggregated over all students and all three observations for each
student. The parameters for standardizing were computed for the
panel sample, using panel weights, and then applied to all test scores.
Thus, the mean of these scores for the base year test takers alone
would be less than SO, for the first follow-up around SO, and for the
second follow-up, more than 50. ... Since all three waves are used in
standardizing, the resulting scores are normally distributed across
years, and the distributions within year, particularly for the earliest
and the latest observations, would be somewhat skewed. Thus, this
score is most useful for analysis of longitudinal gains rather than
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cross-sectional comparisons. Gains in this metric can be computed by
subtracting earlier scores from later ones.” Source: the 1992 student
survey.
BadChild - Has your eighth grader ever been considered to have a behavior problem
at school? [YES, NO] Source: the 1988 parent survey, BYP50.
Girl
- was taken first from the "Your Background" section of the student
questionnaire. If this source was missing or not available, then the
value of the variable SEX assigned on the school roster was used. If
SEX was still missing, it was imputed from the respondent's name. On
any records for which this could not be done unambiguously, this
variable had a value of Male or Female randomly assigned. Source:
the 1990 student survey, SEX.
Parent
2 Parents - Which of the following people live in the same household with you?
[FATHER, STEPFATHER, OTHER ADULT MALE, MOTHER,
STEPMOTHER, OTHER ADULT FEMALE] Source: the 1990
student survey, F1S92A, F1S92B, F1S92C, F1S92D, F1S92E &
F1S92F.
Ed
- What is the HIGHEST LEVEL of education you have completed? What
is the HIGHEST level of education your spouse/partner has
completed? [EIGHTH GRADE OR LESS, NOT H.S
GRADUATION, GED, H.S GRADUATION, VOC,TRADE,BUS <
1 YR, VOC,TRADE,BUS 1-2YRS, VOC,TRADE 2YRS OR > ,
LESS THAN 2 YRS COLL, OR MORE YRS COLL, FINISHED
2YR PROGRAM, FINISHED 4-5YR PROG, MASTER'S DEGREE,
PH.D./M.D./OTHR PRO] Source: the 1988 parent survey, BYP30 &
BYP31. M_Ed and F_Ed were derived from these categories.
Non White - race of the student, the categories of RACE are ASIAN/PACIFIC
ISLANDER, HISPANIC, BLACK NOT HISPANIC, WHITE NOT
HISPANIC, AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE. Source: the
1988 student survey, RACE.
Catholic - What is your religious background? [BAPTIST, METHODIST,
LUTHERAN, PRESBYTERIAN, EPISCOPALIAN, OTHER
PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, EASTERN ORTHODOX, OTHER
CHRISTIAN, JEWISH, MOSLEM, BUDDHIST, HINDU, TAO,
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F_Invol

Wage

OTHER, NONE] Source: the 1988 parent survey, BYP29.
- What is your relationship and that of your spouse/partner to the student
named on the front cover? [PARTNER'S RELATIONSHIP TO 8TH
GRADER MOTHER, FATHER, STEPMOTHER, STEPFATHER,
GRANDMOTHER, GRANDFATHER, OTHER FEM. RELATIVE,
OTHER MALE RELATIVE, OTHER FEM. GUARDIAN, OTHER
MALE GUARDIAN, NO OTH PARENT/GUARDN] It is asked that
the most involved parent respond to the survey. Source: the 1988
parent survey, BYP1A1 & BYP1A2.
- Which of the categories below comes closest to describing this [your]
job? Which of the categories below comes closest to describing this
[your spouse's] job? [CLERICAL, CRAFTSPERSON,
FARMER/FARM MANAGER, HOMEMAKER, LABORER,
MANAGER, MILITARY, OPERATIVE,
ACCNTNT/ARTIST/NURSE, DENTIST/LAWYER, PROPRIETOR,
PROTECTIVE SERVICE, SALES, SCHOOL TEACHER, SERVICE,
TECHNICAL, NEVER WORKED, DON'T KNOW] The wages
were created by using these occupation question and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics median weekly earnings by occupation, by gender for
1990. Home-makers received the wage for his or her gender's overall
market wage as a measure of their foregone market wage. Sources:
the 1988 parent survey, BYP34B & BYP37B and Bureau of Labor
Statistics 1990.
Family

Sibs

Income

Aids

- How many older brothers do you have (including adopted, step-, or
half-)? How many older sisters do you have (including adopted, step-,
or half-)? How many younger brothers do you have (including
adopted, step-, or half-)? How many younger sisters do you have
(including adopted, step-, or half)? [NONE, ONE, TWO, THREE,
FOUR, FIVE, SIX OR MORE] Source: the 1990 student survey,
F1S90A, F1S90B, F1S90C and F1S90D.
- What was your total family income from all sources in 1987? (If you are
not sure about the amount, please estimate.) Source: the 1988 student
survey, BYP80.
- Does your family have in your home a specific place for study? Does
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LimCap

your family have in your home an encyclopedia? Does your family
have in your home computer? Source: the 1988 student survey,
BYS35A, BYS35D & BYS35H.
- Does your family have in your home an electric dishwasher? Does your
family have in your home clothes dryer? Does your family have in
your home washing machine? Source: the 1988 student survey,
BYS35I, BYS35K & BYS35J.
Demographic

NorthCen - indicates in which of the four U.S. Census regions the school is
South
located. It was created by recoding the state of the tenth grade
West
school the four Census Bureau regions: Northeast (New England and
Middle Atlantic states); North Central (East North Central and West
North Central states); South (South Atlantic, East South Central and
West South Central states); West (Mountain and Pacific states).
Source: the 1990 school survey, GIOREGON.
Choice Set (State LeveD Variables
State
BNum

RNum

BDen
RDen
R to B
Local

- indicates the student's last attended school state. Source: the 1990
student survey, G10STATE.
the number of private secondary schools plus schools with secondary
grades in a state in the Fall 1990. Source: Digest of Education
Statistics 1991, Table 40.
the number of private secondary schools plus schools with secondary
grades in a state in the Fall 1980. Source: Digest o f Education
Statistics 1985-86, Table 40. Note: 1980 data is the most trustworthy
data available; it is derived from a survey of all private schools in
1980-81. More recent figures are base on samples that are not
sufficiently large in all states.
B_Num divided by the land area (sq. mi.) of the state. Source:
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1991, table 347.
R_Num divided by the land area (sq. mi.) of the state. Source:
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1991, table 347.
R_Num divided by B_Num.
state and local revenue for public primary and elementary state general
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revenue from state sources. Source: Digest of Education Statistics,
1991, table 152.
Alike
- absolute value of the difference between 50 percent and percentage of the
state's population in urban areas in 1990. Source: Statistical Abstracts
of the United States, 1992, table 33.
Choice
- whether a state supports local public school choice programs. Source:
"Public School Choice: National Trends and Initiatives," New Jersey
State Department of Education, 1988.
Religious - total enrollment in private primary and secondary schools divided by the
total enrollment in Church-related, for the Fall of 1980. Source:
Digest of Education Statistics 1982, table 40.
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